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INTRODUCTION 
When the Berlin Wall fell and the governments of the former So-
viet world reconstituted themselves under new constitutions, every 
country in the region created a new constitutional court.1  Charged 
with ensuring that their nations’ new constitutions would in fact be 
followed, these new courts often became both the center of the popu-
lation’s high hopes and a frequent annoyance for the elected gov-
ernments that had to comply with their decisions.  The hope was that 
the courts would be the “guardians of the constitution”;2 the reality 
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1 HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE 1 (2000).  The only potential exception to this generalization is 
Estonia, which created a constitutional panel within its Supreme Court instead.  Id. at 
249 n.2, 253 n.7. 
2 The phrase is associated with debate between Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen in 
1931, which took place as the Weimar Republic teetered toward collapse.  Schmitt’s 
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was that many of these courts tried hard and were eventually squashed 
by ambitious political leaders who wanted to govern without judicial 
constraint. 
This Article examines the infancy of two Constitutional Courts 
and their firebrand first Presidents—focusing on László Sólyom of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court and Valerii Zorkin of the Russian 
Constitutional Court.  In both cases, these Presidents came to be seen 
as the public faces of their respective Courts, and they often over-
stepped the bounds of judicial modesty to openly criticize their gov-
ernments for failing to take constitutional principles seriously.  Both 
frequently gave interviews to the media and spoke as if they personally 
were the mouthpieces of their Constitutions.  Both set themselves up 
as political leaders in a fragile world of political reconstitution, and 
both created public personae for themselves, and for their Courts, as 
principled populists who stood up for the underdog in the big politi-
cal fights of their time.  In both cases, elected political leaders at-
tempted to silence the voices of these outspoken Court Presidents.  In 
both cases, however, the Court Presidents launched spectacular re-
coveries of their public positions in just a few short years, building on 
their popular reputations for being aggressive constitutional guardi-
ans.  Both Presidents rose from the ashes of their respective Courts to 
emerge again as phoenix-like images of constitutionality itself.3
The tale I tell about Russia and Hungary is not just a tale of two 
Courts.  It is, in many ways, a more general story about the fragility of 
view was that the constitution needed a guardian and that the president—not the 
court—was the figure to guard it, because the court would be dependent on legality 
and therefore unable to take the initiative where it might be necessary.  CARL SCHMITT, 
DER HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG [THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION] (1931).  For a 
discussion of Schmitt’s views on this point, see Gabriel L. Negretto & José Antonio 
Aguilar Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin America:  Reflections on Carl 
Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1797, 1816-21 
(2000).  Schmitt’s interlocutor in that debate was Hans Kelsen, who argued that courts 
were the proper guardian.  HANS KELSEN, WER SOLL DER HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG 
SEIN? [WHO SHOULD BE THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION?] (1931).  For a discus-
sion of Kelsen’s response to Schmitt, see ARTHUR J. JACOBSON & BERNHARD SCHLINK, 
WEIMAR:  A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 70-71 (2000).  Kelsen had been behind the crea-
tion of the Constitutional Court in Austria after the First World War, and he remained 
an advocate of the institution throughout his life.  See Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of 
Legislation:  A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 
183, 188 (1942) [hereinafter Kelsen, Judicial Review] (suggesting that the dissolution of 
the Austrian Constitutional Court made the government more susceptible to fascism). 
3 There are also, as we will see, very substantial differences between the two coun-
tries, the two Courts, and the two Presidents.  For now, I am simply emphasizing the 
uncanny similarities. 
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new institutions and the importance of personality in shaping posi-
tions that have not yet established themselves as important offices that 
can retain their power regardless of the office holder.  Until new insti-
tutions have a history that gives them a certain stability, it is often the 
first few occupants of an office who define the meaning, power, and 
shape that the office takes.  While “great man” history is frowned 
upon these days, and often for good reason,4 there are moments in 
the development of institutions when their occupants are in many 
ways more important than the impersonal influences of structure.  
The early days of the Russian and Hungarian Constitutional Courts 
bear out this view that the accidents of occupancy can be crucial, par-
ticularly in the early days of institution building. 
The tale I will tell is also a story of the establishment of a distinc-
tive form of judicial power.  Courts famously have the power neither 
of the purse nor of the army, and so they generally rely on other 
sources for authority, sources that are both intellectual and moral.5  
Judicial power has an intellectual basis because courts are institutions 
of reason that publish not only their decisions but also their ration-
ales.  The cogency and persuasiveness of the reasons matter in deter-
mining the power that courts have.  Judicial power has a moral basis 
because constitutions and laws are typically normative documents as 
4 As Geoff Eley notes, the rise of social history in the 1960s and 1970s pushed the 
old political histories featuring major political leaders off to one side.  Only with the 
rise of feminist history was the genre of biography reclaimed.  But by then, of course, it 
was not the “great man,” but perhaps a great woman or someone altogether more or-
dinary that captured historians’ attention.  And then the point of such histories was to 
use the individual biography to capture the complexity of the period, not the glory of a 
singled-out life.  GEOFF ELEY, A CROOKED LINE:  FROM CULTURAL HISTORY TO THE HIS-
TORY OF SOCIETY 168-69 (2005). 
5 The American literature has, of course, emphasized judges’ democratic deficit 
without sufficiently considering that there may be other sources of legitimating power 
available to judges.  For the classic view on the democratic deficit, see ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLI-
TICS 16-23 (1962) (asserting that judicial review is counter-majoritarian because it 
places in the judiciary power that, in a democratic government, should reside with 
elected representatives).  I have tried to argue more recently that there are other 
sources of judicial power.  See Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary.  Or, Why 
Courts Can Be More Democratic Than Parliaments, in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER 
COMMUNISM 25, 28-31 (Adam Czarnota, Martin Krygier & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 
2005) (arguing that judges often have superior information compared with legislators 
about what is going wrong in their societies and that many constitutions embody a sub-
stantive sense of what democracy requires, which courts are in a good position to 
elaborate); Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1921, 1924 (2004) [hereinafter Scheppele, Realpolitik Defense] (positing that courts may 
enable democratically elected governments to stand up to external pressures that 
would otherwise undermine the governments’ democratic mandate). 
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well as strictly legal ones, and courts must be seen as engaging in 
something bigger and more important than mere legalism.  Having a 
principled and coherent vision is one way that a court can cajole from 
the other branches the critical resources it needs to function and the 
legitimacy it needs to hold off sheer force.  In the early days of a court, 
when these principles are not yet established, a court can establish its 
unique place in the political order by virtue of being the locus of 
principled, moral, intellectual decisions.  Here, too, the person of the 
constitutional court president can be crucial if the president can con-
vey the intellectual and moral gravitas that allows the attribution of 
those principles to the institution.  In both cases we will be examining, 
the Court Presidents took to the media early and often, holding press 
conferences, giving interviews, and explaining at every opportunity 
how a constitutional system works.  In many ways, it was the extra-
judicial lectures given by these experienced former professors that so-
lidified the position of the new Constitutions and of the new Courts.  
Both Presidents made the case for the creation of a uniquely judicial 
form of power that transcended personality, while simultaneously per-
sonifying the rule of law themselves. 
Finally, the tale I have to tell is also a story of the separation of 
powers as a contact sport.  Hannah Arendt famously made the argu-
ment that successful constitutions do not just constrain power, they 
create power through the opposition of interest to interest.6  States 
(and courts) can fail.  What prevents their failure in the early fragile 
days of a new constitution is the willingness of new institutions to de-
ploy their power and to parry off the power of others in return.  Presi-
dents of new courts have to be willing to assert power to be granted 
power, and in the early days of a new institution, that power has to be 
asserted before anyone can really be sure that others will recognize it 
as such.  The political strategies of constitutional court presidents, 
then, matter a great deal in the eventual recognition of the power of a 
court.  Constitutional court presidents, in short, have to have sharp 
elbows to ensure that they can have a seat at the table of power. 
Our story of Russia and Hungary in the early days of their Consti-
tutional Courts will illustrate all three of these factors:  the centrality 
of personality, the importance of establishing uniquely judicial power, 
and the strategic deployment of constitutional aggression.  Before we 
examine our two cases, however, we should first consider the ways in 
which the legal systems of Hungary and Russia (and for that matter, 
6 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 151-52 (Penguin Books 1990) (1963). 
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most countries in the civil law world) differ from the legal system of 
the United States, because these differences affect the powers of the 
Chief Justice or Court President. 
I.  CHIEF JUSTICES, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT PRESIDENTS,  
AND DIFFERENCES IN INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
Most of this Symposium addresses the American court system (and 
the American federal system, at that).  But if we are to understand the 
situation of the high court president as a more general phenomenon, 
we need a comparative perspective to see that the United States is un-
usual for several reasons—reasons that bear on both the structure of 
courts and the capacities of court presidents.  In particular, the Chief 
Justice of the United States is the head of a Court that both sits at the 
apex of a federal judicial system and that also entertains petitions to 
review decisions from state courts.  This provides for an unusual cen-
tralization of judicial functions in one court, something many other 
countries have avoided.  In addition, as other articles in this Sympo-
sium have argued, the unique structure of the American judiciary 
makes the role of the Chief Justice a particularly crucial one in the 
maintenance of the entire federal court system.7  Since I will focus on 
the role of the high court chief executive in legal systems constructed 
very differently from that of the United States, I first need to explain 
the general contours of a constitutional court and how it differs struc-
turally from the U.S. Supreme Court. 
A.  The Jurisdictional Segregation of Constitutional Courts 
The power of judicial review is diffuse in the United States, which 
means that any federal court can hear and decide federal constitu-
tional questions.  In systems that have constitutional courts, by con-
trast, it is typically the case that only the constitutional court has the 
power to rule on constitutional matters.8  As a result, in these systems, 
7 See generally Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit:  Limiting 
the Powers and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 
(2006); Theodore W. Ruger, The Chief Justice’s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial 
Power, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1551 (2006). 
8 Constitutional courts have their intellectual origin in the work of Hans Kelsen, 
the Austrian legal theorist and creator of the first specialized constitutional court, that 
of Austria in its post-World-War-I constitution.  It was important for Kelsen that the 
constitutional court, bearing as it did enormous political weight in his constitutional 
order, be the only court that could exercise judicial review.  Kelsen, Judicial Review, su-
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all constitutional questions have to be referred to the constitutional 
court, both from other sorts of courts and from other places in the po-
litical system.  Not only is the constitutional court the only court to hear 
constitutional questions, but it also has the jurisdiction to hear only 
constitutional questions, which means that questions of routine interpre-
tation of other legal sources are simply never on a constitutional 
court’s docket.  The “ordinary courts” do not deal with constitutional 
questions, and the constitutional court does not deal with ordinary le-
gal questions.  As a result, a constitutional court is generally the only 
court that has the power to nullify laws inconsistent with the constitu-
tion and to require the government to take steps to correct the prob-
lem. 
The constitutional court typically has a jurisdictional segregation 
from other courts, which means that constitutional court decisions 
have a different status and audience than decisions of the U.S. Su-
preme Court.  If the constitutional court rules in a case that would be 
a “case or controversy” in the United States (that is, where there are 
concrete individuals locked in a dispute), the constitutional court has 
the final word in the matter only if the case involves only a constitu-
tional claim.  Because the constitutional question can be just one of 
many in a concrete dispute, matters decided by the constitutional 
court will often be referred back for final resolution to the ordinary 
court that sent the case to the constitutional court in the first place.9  
In short, the constitutional court can address a specific factual matter 
only insofar as that matter presents only a constitutional claim.  All 
pra note 2, at 192.  For a discussion of Kelsen’s contribution, see MARTIN SHAPIRO & 
ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 147-48 (2002). 
9 This is especially true of cases that are referred to the constitutional court by an 
ordinary court judge who has a constitutional question that cannot be resolved by her 
court.  The judge in such a case is supposed to send the constitutional question to the 
constitutional court for resolution, staying the proceedings in her court until she gets 
an answer.  When the constitutional court provides the answer to the constitutional 
question, the case in the ordinary court can be resumed.  See Herbert Hausmaninger, 
Judicial Referral of Constitutional Questions in Austria, Germany, and Russia, 12 TUL. EUR. & 
CIV. L.F. 25, 29-36 (1997) (explaining the constitutional question referral process in 
Austria, Germany, and Russia).  This may look like the old system of interlocutory ap-
peals in the United States, but it has a different rationale.  Rather than ensuring an 
intermediate question is finally settled through the usual mechanisms of appeal, the 
constitutional referral process sends a constitutional question to the only court that 
can hear it.  The ordinary judge cannot make a ruling on the matter and must wait for 
the one body that can make such a judgment to make it. 
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other claims (including ones that depend on fact finding) have to be 
settled elsewhere.10
But constitutional courts often have the power to rule in matters 
that are not strictly cases or controversies in the American sense.  Ab-
stract review allows constitutional courts to review laws for their consti-
tutionality in the absence of a concrete dispute.11  While most consti-
tutional systems, including Russia’s, only allow certain political actors 
(the President of the country, the head of either chamber of Parlia-
ment, or a substantially sized fraction of members of Parliament, for 
example) to ask for abstract review,12 some countries, like Hungary, 
allow even lone individuals to request review.13  If a law is found con-
stitutionally deficient on abstract review, the court will nullify the of-
fending law immediately or will order the parliament or the executive 
to correct it within a fixed time.  More than with the U.S. Supreme 
Court, then, the decisions of a constitutional court will be directed at 
the government and not simply at the litigants before it.  This poses a 
special problem of compliance because the vast majority of adverse 
decisions will require government action first and foremost.  Clever 
constitutional court leadership, combined with politicians willing to 
respect the court’s constitutional judgments, can ensure that decisions 
will be followed.  Bad court leadership can aggravate already annoyed 
politicians who might find the constitution a burden in any event. 
Constitutional courts, then, have a particular and narrow but po-
litically crucial function in the broader context of judicial power:  they 
review laws, decisions, and actions of government for their constitu-
10 See HELMUT STEINBERGER, MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION 29 
(1993) (“[The constitutional court’s] scope of review should be restricted to scrutiniz-
ing the challenged act as to the violation of constitutional rights and not to its lawful-
ness in general.”). 
11 Abstract review occurs when a constitutional court is asked to review legislation 
for constitutionality “in the abstract”—that is, as a facial challenge to a law without any 
concrete parties who have been affected by this law in the picture.  In fact, abstract re-
view may and often does occur before a law has even gone into effect.  Louis Favoreu, 
Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:  THE INFLUENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38, 40-42 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. 
Rosenthal eds., 1990). 
12 See KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [Constitution] art. 125(2) 
(Russ.) [hereinafter RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION], available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/ 
law/icl/rs00000_.html (listing the parties that may request that the Constitutional 
Court hear a case). 
13 See A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [Constitution] art. 32A(3) (Hung.) 
[hereinafter HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION], available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/ 
icl/hu00000_.html (“Everyone has the right to initiate proceedings of the Constitu-
tional Court in the cases specified by law.”). 
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tionality—period.14  As a result, they are constantly engaged with the 
review of government action and constantly directing their decisions 
at the constitutional improvement of the state.  The president of a 
constitutional court, then, will be someone in the midst of political 
controversy all the time, since the constitutional court can hardly be 
apolitical with this jurisdictional mandate. 
B.  The Institutional Segregation of Constitutional Courts 
Jurisdictional segregation of constitutional questions implies insti-
tutional segregation as well.  Typically, a constitutional court is not in 
a hierarchy with other courts,15 as, for example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court is with respect to other federal courts.  It would therefore be 
highly surprising if the constitutional court president had any admin-
istrative responsibilities that touched other courts, and she typically 
does not.  The ordinary courts will generally be governed in hierarchy 
by a supreme court, which is the final court of appeal.16  In the Soviet 
period, supreme courts in the Soviet orbit not only had the power to 
overturn decisions below, but also to issue general normative direc-
14 Actually, this is not quite true.  Some constitutional courts certify election re-
sults, decertify political parties, and conduct other such political functions.  Constitu-
tional courts also often adjudicate jurisdictional disputes between branches of gov-
ernment.  See, e.g., RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION art. 125(3) (conferring authority on the 
Russian Constitutional Court to adjudicate intra-governmental disputes).  But the cru-
cial point here is that constitutional courts cannot hear garden-variety matters of statu-
tory interpretation or regulatory adjudication, types of cases that are the bread and 
butter of U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
15 For example, the judicial reform that created the Russian Constitutional Court 
separated it from other courts.  See Peter Krug, Departure from the Centralized Model:  The 
Russian Supreme Court and Constitutional Control of Legislation, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 725, 737-
38 (1997) (calling the Constitutional Court established in 1993 “a new, specialized 
court separate from the ordinary judicial system”). 
16 Depending on the court system, other bits of jurisdiction may be hived off into 
other specialized courts that are not in hierarchy with the ordinary court system.  For 
example, arbitrazh (commercial) courts in Russia and administrative courts in France 
and Germany have their own jurisdiction, hierarchy, and administrative structures.  
For more on the arbitrazh courts and their jurisdiction, see Kathryn Hendley, Remaking 
an Institution:  The Transition in Russia from State Arbitrazh to Arbitrazh Courts, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 93, 95 (1998) (noting that arbitrazh courts have the power to adjudicate dis-
putes among corporations and between corporations and the government).  For more 
on the structure of the French legal system, see John Henry Merryman, The French De-
viation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 111 (1996) (recounting how the French Conseil d’Etat 
and lower administrative courts emerged from the denial to ordinary judges of judicial 
power over administration).  The structure of the German legal system is explained in 
David Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany:  Implementation of a 
Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1795, 1809-12 (1988). 
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tives:  “guiding explanations” that were to govern the interpretation of 
lower courts.17  Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, supreme 
courts have generally retained their powers to exercise appellate juris-
diction over lower courts and sometimes even to go on issuing guiding 
explanations.18  The constitutional courts, by contrast, were added to 
this system without having any administrative relationship to the other 
courts.  As a result, constitutional court presidents simply do not play 
an institutional role in the national judiciary as the Chief Justice of the 
United States does as the top administrator of the federal court sys-
tem. 
That said, constitutional court presidents do typically control the 
administrative machinery of their own courts.  The office of the gen-
eral secretary of the court typically screens petitions, manages the 
general administrative staff of the court, and deals with everything 
from the physical facilities of the court to the routine correspondence 
going out of the building in the direction of parties, government 
agencies, and other courts.  And the general secretary typically works 
at the direction of the president of the court.  While individual justices 
of constitutional courts have “clerks” (who are not new law school 
graduates but typically mid-career professionals who are often law pro-
fessors in their own right), the constitutional court itself will typically 
have a staff of general experts who will be deployed under the office 
of the general secretary.19  For example, in countries that are bound 
to comply with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
17 Peter Krug, Civil Defamation Law and the Press in Russia:  Private and Public Inter-
ests, the 1995 Civil Code, and the Constitution (pt. 2), 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 297, 
299 n.10 (1996). 
18 See Hausmaninger, supra note 9, at 35, for a recent example of just such a 
“guiding explanation.” 
19 For information about the staff of the Russian Constitutional Court, see Consti-
tutional Court of the Russian Federation, http://ks.rfnet.ru/english/booklet.htm (last 
visited June 6, 2006).  While the structure of the staff of the Russian Constitutional 
Court is mandated by statute, id., the staff of the Hungarian Constitutional Court is 
only vaguely referenced in Hungarian law, see Act No. XXXII of 1989 on the Constitu-
tional Court art. 18 [hereinafter Hungarian Constitutional Court Act], available at 
http://codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll/Codices/a15711/b15712/c15713/d15733.htm 
(last visited June 6, 2006) (stating that an office of the Constitutional Court shall carry 
out the administrative work of the court).  The statute regulating the Court leaves the 
details of the administrative apparatus to the internal workings of the Court.  I had an 
office in the Hungarian Court building during the time I served there as a researcher 
(1994-1998), and I can say from my experience that the General Secretary of the Court 
always had a close working relationship with the President of the Court.  For example, 
the two met regularly to work out the assignments for the judges as rapporteurs (opin-
ion writers) on specific cases. 
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Rights (ECHR), there is often an office that is part of the general ad-
ministrative staff that produces memos about the relevant ECHR ju-
risprudence on upcoming matters on which the constitutional court 
will rule.  In addition, there are general offices under the purview of 
the general secretary to handle international inquiries, to produce 
press releases on court activity, to publish (or not) the decisions of the 
court, and to engage in active correspondence with the substantial 
general public that addresses the court for relief.  Managing the in-
ternal operation of the constitutional court can be a substantial job, 
and that job generally falls to the general secretary, who is directly re-
sponsible to the president of the court. 
Institutional segregation of the constitutional court, then, means 
that the constitutional court president does not have administrative 
responsibility with respect to other courts.  But the president does 
have administrative control over the constitutional court itself, control 
that, given the enormous political role of the institution, is a substan-
tial power in its own right. 
C.  Judicial Selection and Judicial Leadership on Constitutional Courts 
Judges on constitutional courts are generally appointed in a man-
ner that is not only different from the appointment of judges in the 
United States, but that is also different from the appointment process 
of any other court in their own jurisdiction.  Constitutional judges are 
typically selected by some combination of presidential or prime minis-
terial appointment and parliamentary approval, but they are only cho-
sen to serve for a fixed term of years.  In Hungary, the term has re-
mained nine years, once renewable, since the beginning of the Court 
in 1989;20 in Russia, the term has changed repeatedly, but now fea-
tures life tenure, with a mandatory retirement age of seventy.21  Be-
20 See Hungarian Constitutional Court Act, supra note 19, art. 8(3) (“The Members 
of the Constitutional Court shall be elected for nine years.  Any Member of the Consti-
tutional Court may be re-elected once.”). 
21 Alexei Trochev details the changing tenures of the judges: 
In 1991, the RCC [Russian Constitutional Court] Justices were elected for an 
unlimited term, subject to a compulsory retirement age of 65.  In 1994-95, 
RCC Justices were appointed for a single non-renewable term of 12 years, 
while their mandatory retirement age was raised to 70.  In February 2001, the 
time that constitutional judges could spend on the bench was increased from 
12 to 15 years, and the mandatory retirement age of 70 was abolished.  How-
ever, 10 months later, this mandatory retirement age of 70 was brought back.  
Finally, in April 2005, Russia abolished the 15-year term while keeping the 
mandatory retirement age of 70. 
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cause the terms of constitutional judges are more predictable than 
they are in the United States, the process of their appointment occurs 
on a more regular schedule.  In Hungary, that regular schedule allows 
log-rolling, political compromise, and tacit understandings about the 
balance of political preferences on the Court to ensure that most po-
litical factions get their representatives on the Court.22  In Russia, 
where constitutional judges are appointed by the President with the 
approval of the Federation Council (the upper house of Russia’s par-
liament), there has been less political compromise in practice.23  The 
process of judicial appointment is simultaneously more political and 
less political than in the United States.  It is more political because in 
Hungary, all political factions expect that they will have representa-
tion on the Court, while in Russia, the Russian President, in practice, 
almost single-handedly selects the Court; it is less political because in 
Hungary there is generally an understanding about the representative 
quality of the Court, while in Russia, the selection of judges is widely 
considered a technical matter that is not a subject of political discus-
sion. 
Within countries that have constitutional courts, ordinary court 
judges typically have civil service careers in which they enter the lower-
level judiciary first and are promoted up through the ranks on the ba-
sis of seniority and merit.  Constitutional judges typically enter the ju-
diciary for the first time later in their careers, and more often from 
academia than from anywhere else.  They have different qualifica-
Alexei Trochev, Tinkering with Tenure:  The Russian Constitutional Court in Com-
parative Perspective 1 (Mar. 11, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
22 During the four years I lived in Hungary, I observed that vacancies for constitu-
tional judges were rarely filled one-by-one.  Instead, the Parliament typically waited for 
multiple vacancies to open up and then filled them as a package.  This was encouraged 
by the constitutionally mandated process for selecting constitutional judges, which 
started in a specially constituted committee of the Parliament in which each political 
party with a fraction in the Parliament got one vote, followed by a two-thirds vote of all 
of the members of the Parliament.  See HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION art. 32A(4) (outlin-
ing the procedures for determining new members of the Court).  Because minority 
parties could dominate the selection committee, but could only get a candidate 
through the Parliament with the aid of the majority party, compromises were struck to 
enable a set of candidates of diverse views to get through the process all at once.  This 
process ensured that no one political party could dominate the Court. 
23 None of the people nominated for judgeships on the Russian Constitutional 
Court have ever been refused, or even much debated by the Federation Council.  The 
existence of openings on the Constitutional Court has also not been quite as predict-
able as in most courts with fixed terms of office, because the terms of office of the jus-
tices have been changed so frequently that each individual justice practically had her 
own personal term of office until they were regularized and equalized in 2005.  Tro-
chev, supra note 21, at 23 tbl.1. 
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tions, backgrounds, and levels of education than most judges in their 
own systems or, for that matter, most judges in the United States.24  
Because the vast majority of constitutional judges enter the judiciary 
from either academia or the higher reaches of politics, they are often 
well known before they issue any decisions at all, but they are usually 
not known for their political beliefs.25
Not only are constitutional judges appointed in a different sort of 
process than other judges in their own countries, but also the leader-
ship of the court is differently determined.  In many constitutional 
courts, the judges themselves select their own president and vice 
president, who serve for substantially shorter terms than their overall 
terms of office.  In Hungary and Russia, the term of the Chairman or 
President of the Court is three years, renewable until the judicial term 
24 For example, constitutional judges in Hungary must meet stringent qualifica-
tions: 
The Members of the Constitutional Court shall be elected by Parliament from 
among outstanding theoretical legal experts, university professors, or Doctors 
of Political Sciences and Laws, or lawyers with at least twenty years of practice 
in the field.  Practice in the field shall be in a field which requires a degree in 
Political Sciences and Laws. 
Hungarian Constitutional Court Act, supra note 19, art. 5, § 2.  The same is true in 
Russia: 
A citizen of the Russian Federation who has by the day of the appointment at-
tained at least forty years of age, with an irreproachable reputation, who has 
higher juridical education and an experience in the legal profession of at least 
fifteen years, who possesses recognised high qualifications in the sphere of 
law, may be appointed as the Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation. 
Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation art. 
8 (1994) [hereinafter Russian Constitutional Court Act], available at http:// 
codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll/Codices/a15711/b15712/c15713/d15748.htm (last 
visited June 6, 2006). 
25 For example, Géza Kilényi, elected to the Hungarian Constitutional Court in 
the first round of judges, had been deputy minister of justice before his elevation to 
the bench.  The second President of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, János Né-
meth, had been the president of the Hungarian Election Commission for seven years 
before his term on the Court.  While both had been in political offices, the political 
offices they had held were not partisan offices or offices where one would have ex-
pected the personal views of the occupants to be visible.  For biographies of former 
justices of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, see The Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Hungary, Former Members, http://www.mkab.hu/content/en/ 
encont2b.htm (last visited June 6, 2006).  Recently, these high-level political positions 
have been more overtly political.  The current President of the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court, Mihaly Bihari, was a member of Parliament for the Socialist Party from 
1994 to 1998.  The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary, Present Members, 
http://www.mkab.hu/content/en/encont2.htm (last visited June 6, 2006).  In Russia, 
virtually all of the constitutional judges were professors before their time on the Con-
stitutional Court. 
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of office is up.26  As a result, internal leadership of the Court is ac-
countable not to the external political forces that put the judges onto 
the Court in the first place, but instead to the internal relations 
among the judges.  This means that all Court Presidents have to con-
sider how they are seen by their fellow justices if they want to be re-
elected in the job.  The President can be removed from that office 
(though not from the Court itself) by the equivalent of a no-
confidence vote of the other justices.  By contrast, in the United 
States, the President appoints the Chief Justice, who can be not only 
the newest member of the court but also the least popular.  In consti-
tutional courts, court presidents must have the ongoing support of 
their colleagues to stay on the job. 
D.  The Overtly Political Role of Constitutional Courts 
Constitutional courts are avowedly political institutions.  Because 
these courts have jurisdictional and institutional segregation from the 
rest of the legal system and because their judges, court leadership, 
and administrative personnel are chosen differently, they do not look 
like regular courts and are therefore not held to the standards of po-
litical disengagement of ordinary courts.  Instead, constitutional 
courts often appear more like third chambers of parliament27 or nega-
tive legislatures28 because the questions they receive necessarily re-
quire answers that have political consequences.  Indeed, they cannot 
avoid political engagement, because, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the jurisdiction of constitutional courts is limited to constitutional 
matters which tend to have high political impact.  Moreover, constitu-
tional courts do not typically have formally recognized discretionary 
powers to choose which cases they will decide.29  If a constitutional 
26 Hungarian Constitutional Court Act, supra note 19, art. 4; Russian Constitu-
tional Court Act, supra note 24, art. 23. 
27 See ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE:  THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 225-53 (1992) (exploring the political 
roles of constitutional courts). 
28 See Kelsen, Judicial Review, supra note 2, at 187 (“The decision of the Constitu-
tional Court by which the statute was annulled . . . was a negative act of legislation.”). 
29 In practice, because of the huge press of cases, however, courts have to find a 
way to triage their decisions.  The Russian Constitutional Court separates cases into 
first impression cases (postanovlenia) versus mere elaborations (opredelenia).  Postanov-
lenia require formal briefing, oral arguments, and plenary sessions of a senate of the 
court.  Opredelenia are decided on the basis of the initial submissions and are generally 
written by one judge as rapporteur, with the decision then voted on in a full plenary ses-
sion of the Court, without full oral argument.  Scheppele, Realpolitik Defense, supra note 
5, at 1954 n.145.  In Hungary, the Court uses more or less formal procedures accord-
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question falls within the jurisdiction of the court, the court must an-
swer it.30  As a result, there is no “political question doctrine” or other 
evasive doctrinal mechanism for avoiding tough political issues.  Given 
the prevalence of abstract review, there are not even mootness, ripe-
ness, and other fact-based procedural tactics for avoiding a decision 
on the grounds that the case is not ready to be decided.  Without 
these devices for leaving matters over until another day, these courts 
are therefore built for political controversy, and political controversy 
they get.31
ing to the sort of norm that is reviewed.  Hungarian cases only engage the whole Court 
if a statute is being reviewed; administrative regulations are dealt with by three-judge 
panels.  Georg Brunner, Structure and Proceedings of the Hungarian Constitutional Judici-
ary, in LÁSZLÓ SÓLYOM & GEORG BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DE-
MOCRACY:  THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 65, 74-75 (2000) [hereinafter 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY]. 
30 In Hungary, the court must hear all legitimately filed petitions within its juris-
diction and must also refer all petitions not within its jurisdiction to the state body that 
bears responsibility for inquiring into the matter raised.  Hungarian Constitutional 
Court Act, supra note 19, art. 23, § 2. 
 In Russia, the reasons for legitimately dismissing a petition are listed in the Consti-
tutional Court’s framework statute: 
 The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation shall take decision to 
dismiss the petition in the events where: 
 1. resolution of the question raised in the petition does not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation; 
 2. in accordance with the requirements of the present Federal Constitu-
tional Law the petition is inadmissible; 
 3. the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has issued a ruling on 
the object of the petition, that ruling retaining its force. 
 If the act the constitutionality of which is being contested has been abro-
gated or terminated by the beginning or during the consideration of the case, 
the proceedings initiated by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federa-
tion may be cancelled, except for the events when constitutional rights and 
freedoms of citizens have been violated by the operation of the act. 
Russian Constitutional Court Act, supra note 24, art. 43. 
31 This is not to say that constitutional courts do not have any evasive tactics for 
avoiding head-on political conflicts.  Constitutional courts often decide controversial 
matters on procedural rather than substantive grounds.  So, for example, when the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court decided its first abortion case, the Court struck down 
the communist-era abortion law on the grounds that it had been enacted as an admin-
istrative regulation rather than as a constitutionally required statute, thereby avoiding 
the more politically controversial question of when life began under the Hungarian 
Constitution.  See On the Regulation of Abortion, Decision 64/1991 (Hung. Const. Ct. 
Dec. 17, 1991), translated in CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY, supra 
note 29, at 178, 191 (leaving it to parliament “to draw the line between the unconstitu-
tional extremes of total prohibition and unrestricted availability of abortions”).  Simi-
larly, when the Russian Constitutional Court had to rule on the legality of the Chechen 
War, the Court limited itself to inquiring whether the procedures for declaring war 
had been properly followed by involving the Parliament appropriately, avoiding the 
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As a result, it is far more common in constitutional court systems 
to find that court presidents are considered major political figures 
and are expected to play a role in public debate over constitutional 
issues.  Anxiety about “judicial activism,” which is a commonplace of 
American constitutional discussion, simply does not appear the same 
way in systems that have courts specially designed for a political work-
load.  If a constitutional court were not active, it would appear to be 
shirking its responsibility.  And if the president of the court were not a 
widely known political figure, the court would lose crucial visibility.  
Constitutional courts are first and foremost political institutions and 
are recognized as such.  Their presidents are clearly seen as political 
actors. 
*      *      * 
All of these institutional differences suggest that we are likely to 
find that constitutional court presidents play a different role in estab-
lishing the “institutional judiciary” of their respective countries than 
does the Chief Justice of the United States.  First, constitutional court 
presidents only preside over the development of constitutional law 
and not over any other branch of law,32 so their influence over the rest 
of the judiciary is not as substantial as is that of the Chief Justice of the 
United States.  Second, constitutional court presidents do not have 
administrative responsibility for courts outside their own, giving them 
a lower profile in the “institutional judiciary” than the U.S. Chief Jus-
tice. 
But the internal selection of constitutional court presidents by 
their fellow justices and their public role in speaking on behalf of a 
court that is designed to be activist gives the constitutional court 
question of whether the war violated the rights of people living in Chechnya.  In re 
Edict No. 2137, On Measures for the Restoration of Constitutional Legality and Law 
and Order on the Territory of the Chechen Republic, ROSSIISKAIA GAZ., Aug. 11, 1995, 
translated in 31 STATUTES & DECISIONS:  THE LAWS OF THE USSR & ITS SUCCESSOR 
STATES 48, 51 (Sept.-Oct. 1995) [hereinafter STATUTES & DECISIONS]. 
32 Examined more closely, this statement may be a bit misleading because an in-
creasing number of constitutional systems have “horizontal application” of constitu-
tional norms, which means that they have spillover effects into other areas of legal doc-
trine, including even into private law.  For a discussion of horizontal application of 
constitutional norms, see Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judi-
cial Role:  Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 435, 442-43 (2002) (“The state 
action/horizontal effect doctrine is the doctrinal vehicle whereby background rules of 
property, contract, and tort are made subject to constitutional norms dealing with the 
level and distribution of important goods.”). 
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president a larger responsibility than the U.S. Chief Justice in another 
sense.  Many governments, particularly those recovering from an au-
thoritarian and human-rights-violating period, want to locate respon-
sibility for its maintenance in a “guardian of the constitution.”  And 
that guardian is, in many constitutional systems, the constitutional 
court.  Given the role of the court president in speaking on behalf of 
the justices of the constitutional court, the court president is generally 
the public personification of the guardian of the constitution.  This is 
a very different role, and in many ways a bigger and more important 
role, than that possessed by the Chief Justice of the United States.  
The public voice of the court projects itself as the voice of the consti-
tution itself.  And that is what gives the office of the constitutional 
court president—at least the constitutional court president who does 
the job well—its immense moral power. 
Court presidents in constitutional courts, then, may not have the 
administrative power that the U.S. Chief Justice has, but these presi-
dents have greater moral power to speak on behalf of the constitution 
itself. 
With that background, we can now tell our tale of two Courts, 
where Constitutional Court Presidents were faced with different chal-
lenges and different resources with which to address them.  At first, 
both Presidents seemed to be beaten by stronger political forces.  But 
then, drawing on their resources as the guardians of the Constitution, 
they were able to claw their way back to power by taking the constitu-
tional and moral high ground. 
II.  A TALE OF TWO COURTS 
A.  From President to President:   
László Sólyom as Hungarian Constitutional Guardian 
By the time it was clear that the Soviet Union would loosen its grip 
on its dependent states in the eastern part of Europe at the end of the 
1980s, Hungary had already moved substantially toward legal and po-
litical change.  By the mid-1980s, there were rumblings in civil society, 
rumblings that would intensify into the earthquake that changed the 
government from a one-party Communist state to a multiparty democ-
racy in 1989.  The cracks in the monolithic façade of official Commu-
nism emanated from many directions:  post-Marxist, now-liberal intel-
lectuals had founded the samizdat journal Beszelô (Speaker); post-
Marxist, now-socialist intellectuals had built an insider critique of the 
government; and populists harnessed Hungarian nationalism for fur-
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ther Hungarian independence.33  The rumblings were audible in the 
area of environmental activism, where the civil society organization 
Duna Kör (Danube Circle), among others, focused on the potential 
ecological harm to the Danube River caused by a major dam project.34  
And the rumblings were also audible as a group of Budapest intellec-
tuals formed the Nyilvánosság Klub (Publicity Club, Openness Club, or 
Committee for Press Freedom) devoted to increasing press freedom 
and reducing censorship.35  The Magyar Democratic Forum (MDF) 
was founded in 1987, first as a loose intellectual organization with 
populist roots, and then as a nascent political party ready to contest 
elections.36  While there were many highly visible dissidents—
dissidents who are quite prominently written into the histories of each 
of these organizations—involved in these activities, one rather unas-
suming individual played a crucial but less visible role in all three 
(Duna Kör,37 Nyilvánosság Klub, and the MDF):  László Sólyom.38
33 These three opposition movements are detailed in RUDOLF TÔKÉS, HUNGARY’S 
NEGOTIATED REVOLUTION 167-209 (1996). 
34 For the history of the environmental movement in Hungary, see REGIONAL EN-
VIRONMENTAL CENTER, PROBLEMS, PROGRESS AND POSSIBILITIES:  A NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, at ch. 6 (Country Re-
ports:  Hungary) (Apr. 1997), available at http://www.rec.org/REC/Publications/ 
NGONeeds/Hungary.html; on the Duna Kör specifically, see CHRISTY DUIJVELAAR, RE-
GIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER, SIDE REPORT (HUNGARY:  DUNA KÖR) to BEYOND 
BORDERS:  EAST-EAST COOPERATION AMONG ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE (May 1996), available at http://www.rec.org/REC/Publications/ 
BeyondBorders/Hung3.html. 
35 Péter Bajomi-Lázár, Press Freedom in Hungary:  1988-1998, at 20 (Open Society 
Inst. (OSI)-Int’l Policy Fellowships (IPF), Draft Working Paper, Nov. 1999), available at 
http://www.policy.hu/discus/messages/102/peterbl-pressfree.pdf. 
36 András Bozóki & Gergely Karácsony, The Making of a Political Elite:  Participants in 
the Hungarian Roundtable Talks of 1989, in THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS OF 1989:  THE 
GENESIS OF HUNGARIAN DEMOCRACY 71, 83-86 (András Bozóki ed., 2002) [hereinafter 
ROUNDTABLE TALKS]. 
37 Sólyom’s role in the Duna Kör gave rise to a new, liberal legal theory with which 
Sólyom would come to be associated: 
Almost from its inception, the Danube Circle had sought out the lawyer in his 
corner office at Budapest’s Lorand Eotvos University.  Here the pale, bespec-
tacled professor would sit among the glass-doored cases filled with leather-
bound volumes and give advice.  Solyom became crucial to the movement.  
For he had written a legal tract published in the official press that would help 
the opposition.  In it, he maintained that any action not specifically illegal was 
possible. 
Victoria Pope, A Dam on the Danube:  The Greening of Hungarian Politics, APF REP. (1989), 
available at http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF1203/Pope/Pope.html. 
38 Sólyom’s official biography on the Hungarian presidential website refers to his 
pre-1989 membership in all three organizations.  Office of the President of the Repub-
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László Sólyom had been trained as a lawyer and a librarian in 
Pécs, a provincial city in Southern Hungary.  He received his first doc-
torate in civil law from the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, then 
located in the German Democratic Republic.  After returning to Hun-
gary, he worked at the Library of Parliament and in the Institute of 
Political and Legal Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.  
He obtained his second doctorate (habilitation) from the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences and took a faculty position in the department of 
civil law at the University of Budapest (ELTE), where he taught in the 
1980s and 1990s as a university professor.39  A specialist in torts and 
environmental law40 (a field which he helped to found in Hungary), 
Sólyom was an unlikely candidate to be thrust into the position of the 
guardian of the constitution.  As was true of many of the top intellec-
tuals in Hungary at that time, he had stayed away from fields that 
would have had a political taint before 1989.  Private law was, during 
the late communist years, far more respectable precisely because it was 
more amenable to nonpolitical work that could meet international 
standards than was the field of constitutional law. 
Sólyom was one of the members of the democratic opposition in-
volved in the Hungarian National Roundtable of 1989, the forum that 
produced a negotiated transition toward a system of multiparty elec-
tions, democratic transformation, and a new commitment to the rule 
of law.41  Here, too, he was not the most visible representative of his 
party, but he was crucial in establishing the basic ground rules 
through which the roundtable talks between the Communist Party 
and the democratic opposition would take place.42
Perhaps the most substantial result of the roundtable negotiations 
was an almost wholly new Constitution.  Technically developed as a set 
of amendments to the existing Constitution (otherwise known as Law 
XX of 1949), the new Constitution was voted on piecemeal by the ex-
isting Hungarian communist Parliament over two weeks in mid-
lic of Hungary, President László Sólyom, available at http://www.keh.hu/keh_en/ 
laszlosolyom.html (last visited June 6, 2006). 
39 Id. 
40 See id. (noting Sólyom’s work in torts and damages and his involvement with en-
vironmental movements). 
41 András Bozóki, Biography of the Key Participants, in ROUNDTABLE TALKS, supra 
note 36, at 385, 404. 
42 See Bozóki & Kerácsony, supra note 36, at 86 (“Sólyom played his most impor-
tant role . . . during the preparatory talks . . . .”). 
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October 1989.43  The new Hungarian Republic was officially declared 
about two weeks before the fall of the Berlin Wall.44
The new Constitution created (through a last-minute amend-
ment) the Hungarian Constitutional Court.45  About a month after 
the adoption of the new institution, Parliament elected its first five jus-
tices—including László Sólyom—who each received “an overwhelm-
ing majority of votes.”46
The Constitutional Court itself opened for business on January 1, 
1990, fully five months before the first multiparty democratic elec-
tions.  With Sólyom as the acting President, the Court immediately 
started to issue path-breaking decisions.  First, the Court issued a deci-
sion striking down the law that allowed trade unions to represent their 
members without their members’ consent, citing the principles of 
human dignity and the right to the free development of personality.47  
Then, faced with petitions from thousands of people who were an-
gered that a tax on mortgages had just been passed, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court struck down the tax as unconstitutional on the 
grounds that it unilaterally changed the terms of mortgage contracts.48  
Upholding freedom of contract and relying on notions of human dig-
nity were just the first signs that this new Court was going to take the 
new Constitution seriously and create what Sólyom would later call the 
43 The new Constitution involved nearly a hundred amendments to the old Con-
stitution.  Klas Bergman, Jubilant Hungary Sets New Course, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Oct. 25, 1989, at 3.  These amendments changed about ninety percent of the previous 
text.  Judy Dempsey, Hungary Steps out of Stalin’s Shadow, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 19, 
1989, at 2. 
44 See Patricia Koza, Hungarians Cheer New Republic’s Proclamation, UPI, Oct. 24, 
1989 (describing the declaration of the democratic republic). 
45 Kálmán Kulcsár, the minister of justice at the time, presented the bill on the 
Constitutional Court to Parliament on Friday, October 20, 1989; the new Constitution 
was to be finalized on Monday, October 23, 1989.  “I am of the view,” he said during 
his presentation, “that it can serve to satisfy us all that in Hungary today there is no po-
litical power, nor is there any notable political force, which would not pursue, or wish 
to pursue, its political activity within a constitutional framework, reckoning with and 
accepting the institutional system of constitutional control.”  Justice Minister Kulcsár Pre-
sents Bill on Constitutional Court, BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 21, 1989. 
46 Hungarian National Assembly Session EE/0625/C1/1, BBC SUMMARY WORLD 
BROADCASTS, Nov. 28, 1989. 
47 On Trade Union Representation, Decision 8/1990 (Hung. Const. Ct. Apr. 23, 
1990), translated in CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY, supra note 29, at 
105. 
48 See Barnabas Gerô, The Role of the Hungarian Constitutional Court nn.44-45 (Inst. 
on East Central Europe, Working Paper, Mar. 1997), available at http:// 
www.ciaonet.org/conf/ece01/ece01geb.html (discussing the facts and holding of De-
cision 13/1990 of the Hungarian Constitutional Court). 
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“revolution under the rule of law.”49  If the previous communist gov-
ernment had failed to take law seriously, the Constitutional Court 
would indicate its revolutionary break from the past by making the 
rule of law one of its key normative pillars. 
The first multiparty elections put a center-right government into 
power in the summer of 1990, and that new Parliament elected a sec-
ond round of five constitutional Justices in July 1990.  Soon thereafter, 
Sólyom’s fellow Justices elected him as the President of the Court in 
the Court’s first formal election of a leader.50
Sólyom continued to lead the Constitutional Court into the politi-
cal headwinds with major constitutional pronouncements.  Asked by 
the new democratically elected Prime Minister whether the govern-
ment’s proposed reprivatization program was constitutional, the an-
swer of the Constitutional Court was a resounding “no.”51  The Court 
held that the government’s plan discriminated by giving property 
back only to the holders of land that had been taken into agricultural 
cooperatives, leaving out of the scheme others whose land had been 
taken under other laws and for other reasons.52  From this decision, it 
was clear that the Constitutional Court was going to take as aggressive 
a stance toward the new, democratically elected government as it had 
taken toward the outgoing communist government under which the 
Court had issued its first bold decisions.  Constitutional supervision 
was to be continual, aggressive, and without regard to the democratic 
pedigree of the government making the laws. 
Sólyom made his distinctive public mark on the Court and on 
Hungarian political life with his stirring concurring opinion in the 
death penalty case in late October 1990.53  The Court confronted the 
death penalty, which had been a key tool of the communist govern-
49 László Sólyom, Introduction to the Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Hungary, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY, supra note 29, at 1, 
38. 
50 Brunner, supra note 29, at 70-71. 
51 On Compensation for Expropriated Property, Decision 21/1990 (Hung. Const. 
Ct. Oct. 4, 1990), translated in CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY, supra 
note 29, at 108, 109-10.  The center-right government at the time was led by the Mag-
yar Democratic Forum, the political party that Sólyom had helped to found.  Even so, 
this did not keep Sólyom from building majorities in the Court to rule against this gov-
ernment frequently whenever, in Court majority’s view, the government got out of con-
stitutional line. 
52 Id. at 113-14. 
53 On Capital Punishment, Decision 23/1990 (Hung. Const. Ct. Oct. 31, 1990) 
(Sólyom, P., concurring), translated in CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOC-
RACY, supra note 29, at 118, 125. 
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ment, and declared it to be flatly unconstitutional.54  As it turns out, 
however, the outgoing communist government, arguing the case be-
fore the Court, refused to defend the law and suggested that Euro-
pean legal development pushed Hungary in the direction of aboli-
tion.55  Experts appointed by the Court also found the death penalty 
to be unconstitutional under the country’s new constitution.56  Even 
the President of the Hungarian Supreme Court urged the death pen-
alty’s demise.57  As a result of the near-unanimous views put before the 
Court, the decision was not surprising, but Sólyom’s lengthy, concur-
ring and philosophically ambitious opinion was. 
Sólyom argued that the right of human dignity was not just any 
simple right, but was instead a “mother right” (anyajóg) that contained 
within it potential and implicit rights that were not yet defined.58  It 
was the task of the Constitutional Court, he noted, to develop its own 
legally justifiable views of these rights, independent of public opinion, 
legislative intent, or political will.59  To do this, the Constitution must 
be seen as a whole, embodying a coherent system of principles.  
Sólyom called his approach to the new Constitution the development 
of an “invisible Constitution.”60  As his death penalty concurrence re-
vealed, Sólyom’s particular worry was that the new democratically 
elected Parliament would keep amending the Constitution to the 
point where it lost its core principles: 
The Constitutional Court must continue in its effort to explain the theo-
retical bases of the Constitution and of the rights included in it and to 
form a coherent system with its decisions, which as an “invisible Constitu-
tion” provides for a reliable standard of constitutionality beyond the 
Constitution, which nowadays is often amended out of current political 
interests . . . . The Constitutional Court enjoys freedom in this process as 
long as it remains within the framework of the concept of constitutional-
ity.61
The reaction to Sólyom’s declaration of the invisible Constitution 
was immediate and intense.  Endre Babus, an influential journalist 
writing for the weekly newsmagazine HvG (a weekly newsmagazine on 
54 Id. at 118-19 (majority opinion). 
55 Id. at 120. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 120-21. 
58 Id. at 125 (Sólyom, P., concurring). 
59 Id. at 125-26. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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the model of the Economist), pronounced that the theory of the “in-
visible Constitution” not only allowed the Court to interpret the Con-
stitution, but also to write it.62  Members of Parliament were dismayed 
that the President of the Court would argue that the Constitution was 
not just what was written, but what was unwritten as well.  László Sala-
mon, chair of the constitutional committee of Parliament from 1990 
to 1994, told me in an interview in 1995 that he was disturbed by the 
concept of an “invisible Constitution”: 
If we consider that [measuring a law against the “invisible Constitution”] 
is the general practice, then it is obvious that the Parliament will not 
know whether a law will comply or not. . . . The more invisible the consti-
tution is, the more difficult it is to see it.  It’s the same if you take the 
highway, and there are all these cars on it that are not lit up when they 
are driving at night—then the number of accidents will rise.63
Salamon’s constitutional committee could be forgiven for not being 
able to guess the decisions of the Court in advance, he said.64
Even with this criticism, however, there were few people in public 
life who advocated ignoring or evading the decisions of the Court.65  
62 He repeated this criticism in English later:  “At that time and place the Consti-
tutional Court, or more precisely the President, stated its intention to replace its role 
of guarding and interpreting the Constitution by the role of drafting it.”  Endre Babus, 
The Superego of the Transformation, 40 HUNG. Q. (Spring 1999), available at http:// 
www.hungarianquarterly.com/no153/003.html. 
63 Interview with Lászlo Salamon, Deputy Speaker, Hungarian National Assembly, 
in Budapest, Hung. (Nov. 15, 1995). 
64 Id. 
65 In an interview I conducted with Imre Kónya, founder of the Independent Law-
yers’ Forum and a member of Parliament with the Magyar Democratic Forum in the 
1990s, he recalled conversations he had with József Antall, prime minister from 1990 to 
1993, when Antall was on his death bed.  Though the Constitutional Court frequently 
ruled against the Antall government in those early days, Antall nonetheless had the 
view that the Court was to be obeyed and respected, even when one disagreed with its 
holding.  Antall had also reprimanded one of the few public critics of the Constitu-
tional Court, Smallholders’ Party leader István Torgyán, for his comments.  After the 
parliamentary elections of 1994, when the government changed hands away from 
Antall’s and Kónya’s party, there was still no public criticism of the Court.  Asked 
whether a government could even think about failing to follow a decision of the Court, 
Kónya said: 
They just can’t do it, to not obey the court.  It’s so developed already in Hun-
gary that no one would dare upset this.  Now that the [current government’s] 
popularity is down, they cannot confront the Court like this.  It’s a situation 
that even someone not sensitive to constitutional issues like [the then-prime 
minister] would realize that he cannot go head to head with the Constitu-
tional Court or he will be put out of his seat. 
Interview with Imre Kónya, Deputy Leader, Parliamentary Fraction of the MDF, in Bu-
dapest, Hung. (Nov. 24, 1995). 
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Sólyom gave frequent interviews and speeches advocating the view 
that the Constitutional Court’s decisions simply elaborated principles 
already contained in the constitutional text, and were thus not activist.  
Activist or not, few spoke out against the Court as an institution, 
though individual decisions were still criticized. 
Perhaps most crucially, however, Sólyom became for all practical 
purposes the voice of the Court.  Whenever Court decisions were is-
sued, it was often Sólyom who spoke to the press explaining what the 
decisions meant.  For example, when the Court struck down the law 
that would have extended the statute of limitations for crimes commit-
ted during the communist era—a law that would have allowed former 
communist leaders to be put on trial—Sólyom was in the lead in ex-
plaining why the values of the rule-of-law state were more important 
than the principle that no crime should go unpunished.  As one news 
report indicated: 
 “There is no reason for joy,” said the president of the court, Dr. 
László Sólyom, in announcing the court decision Mar. 3. 
 “The whole matter was about a conflict of values.  No matter how 
many serious crimes were committed, the ethical glory of punishing a vil-
lain is not worth risking the legal guarantees of our constitutional state,” 
Sólyom said.
66
Criticism of this “justice law” decision echoed around the anti-
communist political parties.  The MDF thought that the Court’s deci-
sion was “immoral” and the Independent Smallholders’ Party was 
“shocked.”67  To calm the criticism, Sólyom took to the airwaves again 
and defended the Court’s decision.  In an interview on Hungarian ra-
dio, Sólyom said: 
In the case of such an important judgment the Constitutional Court 
must step out in front of the public and once again explain clearly what 
is the substance of this decision and its significance . . . . The Constitu-
tional Court had been created to ensure unconditionally the implemen-
tation of the Constitution.  If the legislature, either by mistake or delib-
erately, think they can breach the Constitution, it is the role of the 
Constitutional Court to correct this mistake . . . . 
 But I want to emphasize that this decision of the Constitutional Court 
does not place a formal legalistic attitude against the sense of justice, but 
66 Ken Kasriel, Court Rules “Justice” Law Unconstitutional,  INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 
5, 1992. 
67 Reaction to Constitutional Court Ruling; MDF Calls Court Verdict “Morally Unaccept-
able”; Independent Smallholders Shocked (Hung. Radio broadcast, Mar. 4, 1992), translated 
in BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 7, 1992. 
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one form of morality against another morality.  Here I am thinking that 
it is true that moral justice demands that the criminal is punished, but 
moral justice also demands that the criminal receives his punishment in 
accordance with the law.  So punishment can never be arbitrary, only 
what is set out in the law.
68
In short, Sólyom insisted that the Court’s decisions placed the law first 
and foremost, against any other moral sensibility. 
When particular decisions of the Constitutional Court were con-
troversial in Hungarian public life, questions arose about what could 
be done to change them.  Shoring up the Constitutional Court’s posi-
tion by giving a public interview again, Sólyom indicated that “there is 
no legal possibility for the reinterpretation of previous decisions.”69  
Perhaps surprisingly, there were no serious attempts to either limit the 
Court’s jurisdiction or to amend the Constitution to nullify any Court 
decision after the first multiparty elections in 1990.  Griping about 
particular decisions quickly fizzled into diffuse support for the Court 
in general. 
The Constitutional Court was very active during Sólyom’s first 
term as Court President.  In just the first three years of the Court’s 
operation, it considered some six thousand petitions, published be-
tween two hundred and three hundred decisions each year, and 
struck down many favorite laws of the first elected government.70  
Nonetheless, “even the Justice Minister [whose job was to defend the 
laws eventually struck down] agreed that the Court has been vital in 
guarding the law.”71
Sólyom was reelected by his fellow justices to a second three-year 
term as Court President in March 1993.72  Considering the Court’s ac-
complishments going into its fourth year, Sólyom placed the Court 
above ordinary politics as the force that stabilized constitutional 
meaning.  He extolled the virtues of the Constitutional Court: 
[T]hree years ago the Constitution, composed as it was of basic sen-
tences, could be explained in many ways, and was in practice exposed to 
selfish interpretations by various political forces.  Owing to the court, 
68 President of the Constitutional Court Defends Zétényi/Takács Ruling (Hung. Radio 
broadcast Mar. 8, 1992), translated in BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 10, 
1992. 
69 Chairman of Constitutional Court Rules Out Revision of Previous Verdicts (Hung. Ra-
dio broadcast Nov. 1, 1992), translated in BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 6, 
1992. 
70 Three Years of the Constitutional Court, MTI HUNG. NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 29, 1992. 
71 Id. 
72 Constitutional Court Reelects Its President, MTI HUNG. NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 22, 1993. 
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this situation has completely changed.  With its rulings, the court has put 
clothes on the skeleton, and created links between constitutional rights 
and institutions.  As a result of its three years work, it is now much easier 
to predict what will comply with the Constitution and what will violate 
it.
73
And, as the Hungarian News Agency noted, “Apart from some ex-
tremist reactions, all parties and political and social organizations 
have welcomed the resolutions the court has passed.”74  Sólyom was 
very much the public face of the Court during his time as President.  
He explained decisions of the Court, lectured the Hungarian popula-
tion on the proper meaning of the Constitution, and personified the 
role of constitutional guardian. 
But the Court met its match in a pitched battle in 1995, when the 
Socialist/Liberal government came under pressure from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) to cut the state budget radically or run 
the risk of having its access to international loans cut off.  The gov-
ernment of Socialist Prime Minister Gyula Horn, led by its photo-
genic, mustachioed Finance Minister Lajos Bokros, passed a severe 
austerity budget in spring 1995 that took aim at a variety of social 
safety-net programs.75
The “Bokros package” was immediately challenged before the 
Constitutional Court, and the Court rushed to decide the constitu-
tionality of the welfare cuts before they could go into effect.  In a se-
ries of decisions starting on June 30, 1995, the Court declared that the 
principle of legal security guaranteed by the Constitution was violated 
by the economic plan.76  Because the changes were instituted so 
quickly, giving those involved no time to adjust themselves to this 
73 Constitutional Court Enters Fourth Year, MTI HUNG. NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 30, 1993.  
The source of this quotation is the state news agency, which may cause some to distrust 
its political leanings in making this statement.  But I lived in Hungary from 1994 to 
1998, conducted many interviews with politicians, and read the daily press, and I can 
confirm that the state news evaluation was accurate in the mid-1990s.  While there were 
some specific groups angered when their pet laws were struck down, all agreed that 
Constitutional Court decisions had to be followed, that it was important to Hungarian 
constitutional development to allow the Constitutional Court to elaborate what the 
Constitution required in this way, and that politicians who might advocate going 
around the decisions of the Constitutional Court were dangerous. 
74 Id. 
75 I have explored this conflict and the resulting opinions of the Hungarian Con-
stitutional Court at some length in Scheppele, Realpolitik Defense, supra note 5, at 1941-
49. 
76 On Social Security Benefits, Decision 43/1995 (Hung. Const. Ct. June 30, 
1995), translated in CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY, supra note 29, at 
322, 325. 
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radical change of fortune, the Constitutional Court held that the 
deepest welfare cuts had to be postponed.77  Moreover, the Court ar-
gued, the Constitution required that a minimum income be guaran-
teed, even while the government would be permitted to gradually re-
duce some welfare payments.78
Five days after the first decision, a public opinion poll found that 
eighty-nine percent of the public had heard of the decision and that 
overwhelming majorities—eighty-four percent of those who had voted 
for the parties in the government and ninety percent of those who 
had not—believed that the Court made the right decision in the aus-
terity program cases.79  But the government parties were angry and 
threatened to raise taxes in response to the Constitutional Court’s de-
cision.80  When the government made a public statement criticizing 
the Court, the opposition parties joined unanimously in defending 
it.81  The Court continued to chop away at the Bokros package, even-
tually nullifying some 26 out of the 159 provisions of the law in 18 
separate decisions, including many of its centerpiece elements.82  
Eventually, Lajos Bokros threatened to resign from the government, 
saying that he could not work with the Constitutional Court always 
second-guessing him.83  A few months later, Sólyom was reelected 
Court President by his fellow justices for the third time.84
In the showdown between the government and the Court over the 
radical austerity package, the Court clearly won.  But some started to 
grumble to the press that the Constitutional Court’s power should be 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Poll results were reported in the Magyar Hirlap (Hung.), July 5, 1995. 
80 Miklós S. Gáspár, Bokros Plan:  Defeat Means More Cuts, Taxes, BUDAPEST BUS. J., 
July 7, 1995. 
81 As they stated: 
 The opposition parties participating in today’s five-party consultations are 
unanimous in their rejection of the government statement criticizing the Con-
stitutional Court in which the cabinet accused the Court of paralyzing the 
economic reforms. 
 The opposition parties consider the government statement published yes-
terday 14th September unacceptable. 
Opposition Slates Government for Statement on Court Ruling (Hung. Radio broadcast Sept. 
15, 1995), translated in BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 18, 1995. 
82 Strong Constitutional Court Stands the Test, MTI HUNG. NEWS AGENCY, June 20, 
1996. 
83 Miklós S. Gáspár, Bokros Resigns over Court Rulings, Horn Refuses, BUDAPEST BUS. 
J., Nov. 27, 1995. 
84 Sólyom Reelected as Constitutional Court President, MTI HUNG. NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 
19, 1996. 
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slashed.85  The grumbling got so loud both from the governing parties 
and from the Independent Smallholders’ Party (which had always 
been the most critical of the Court) that Albert Takacs, a constitu-
tional lawyer close to the Court, said in an interview with the Magyar 
Nemzet, a center-right newspaper, that it would be “scandalous” if the 
Constitutional Court were abolished or reigned in.86  Sólyom knew 
that the Bokros package decisions had been costly for the Court as 
politicians more openly criticized the Court after its controversial de-
cision.87
Sólyom once again took to the media to defend the Court from 
criticism.  In late 1995, Sólyom gave several interviews to the press ex-
plaining that the Court had to guard the Constitution from political 
assault.  To the HvG, Sólyom said that Court had to be as aggressive as 
it was because 
it became obvious that rights and freedoms (szabadságjogok) may become 
tools in the hands of politicians, tools which they use accordingly for 
their own interests.  Therefore, it becomes a vital necessity that there be 
a body which, in accordance with the higher duties of the state, acts as a 
guardian over basic rights and institutions.
88
To the Magyar Hirlap, a center-left daily with a large circulation, 
Sólyom argued that the Court was merely the mouthpiece of the Con-
stitution itself and not an interested party in the daily operation of 
politics: 
In the present situation, the requirement of constitutionalism may hurt 
other kinds of interests.  The objective collision of interests and the con-
stitution, which is a real and natural situation, should not be turned into 
an emotional issue. . . . I’m increasingly bothered by the difference in 
mentality between the government and the [Constitutional Court].  I’m 
worried that they receive our decisions exclusively through the thought 
85 Strong Constitutional Court Stands the Test, supra note 82. 
86 Hungarian Press Review, MTI HUNG. NEWS AGENCY, July 31, 1996. 
87 As was reported at the time: 
Solyom feels the situation has been especially strained by the current govern-
ment’s attempts to reform the major social systems, which would have seri-
ously curtailed existing rights within a short time.  The [Constitutional Court] 
ruled citizens must be given adequate time to prepare for the changes and re-
pealed several legal provisions endorsed by Parliament.  The government 
criticised the [Constitutional Court] for “narrowing” its scope of activity in a 
statement which in Solyom’s opinion, was unprecedented in the world.  He 
believes the court’s decision was in line with the Constitution. 
Freedom of Expression—Constitutional Court, MTI HUNG. NEWS AGENCY, July 30, 1997. 
88 Some of Us Share Frigyes Nagy’s Dreams:  Interview with László Sólyom, President of the 
Constitutional Court, HVG, Dec. 23, 1995 (Réka Pigniczky trans.). 
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process of daily politics, on the basis of assumptions and in [a] bellicose 
manner. . . . But you must believe me, the [Constitutional Court] really 
doesn’t know which pocket nor which hand belongs to whom . . . .
89
As criticism of the Court mounted after the Bokros package deci-
sions extended from 1995 through the fall of 1996, the usual deal-
making that had previously resulted in unproblematic elections of 
judges to the Constitutional Court broke down.  In an unprecedented 
move, one of the judges who had been put forward by the parliamen-
tary nominations committee went down in defeat.90  The Constitu-
tional Court was supposed to have eleven judges at full capacity at that 
point; it was unable to make an authoritative decision with fewer than 
eight.  From this first hiccup in Court appointments, people—and 
more crucially, politicians—could start to see how the Constitutional 
Court could be weakened.  The Court could be pushed down below 
the eight judges required to make decisions; the Court could be 
packed with judges who would not give trouble to the governing par-
ties.  Given that most of the constitutional justices, including Sólyom, 
had been elected in 1989 or 1990, the expiration of the original jus-
tices’ nine-year terms was fast approaching.  Once the parliamentary 
process for electing judges broke down the first time, there was a con-
stant question of whether the Court would have enough judges to go 
on making decisions.  Moreover, there was a clear question on the po-
litical table of whether the terms of the activist judges would be re-
newed. 
Sólyom’s term was scheduled to end in November 1998, along 
with the mandates of the other two justices still on the Court who had 
been elected in the first round of judicial appointments.91  The law 
regulating the Constitutional Court specified that the normal term of 
a justice was nine years, once renewable, provided that she had not 
89 Balázs Stépán, There Is No Return from the Rule of Law (State):  Interview with László 
Sólyom About the Procedures of the Constitutional Court, MAGYAR HIRLAP (Hung.), Dec. 23, 
1995 (Réka Pigniczky trans.). 
90 Log-rolling had been the most common method of allocating judicial appoint-
ments, so that virtually all parts of the Hungarian political spectrum were represented 
on the Court.  In November 1996, however, the conservatives voted for a socialist judge 
expecting that their conservative judge would be voted through on the next round.  
The socialists, however, did not hold up their end of the deal and the conservative 
judge was defeated.  This was widely considered scandalous, and it signaled the start of 
some real troubles at the Constitutional Court.  Miklós S. Gáspár, Socialists Break Promise 
To Approve Court Judge, BUDAPEST BUS. J., Nov. 18, 1996. 
91 Constitutional Court Elects New President, MTI HUNG. NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 24, 1998. 
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reached the age of seventy.92  Given that a second term was possible, it 
seemed clear that the justices who had not yet turned seventy ex-
pected that they would be reelected to the Court.  Sólyom took the 
lead in arguing to the government and Parliament that the justices 
should be renewed, because otherwise virtually all of the experienced 
justices would have to step down within a short period, leaving the 
Court to absolute newcomers.93  But in 1998, there was another gen-
eral election, and once again the government changed hands.  
Sólyom negotiated first with the outgoing socialist government and 
then with the incoming center-right government of Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán.  Sólyom argued he should be reelected or, failing that, 
his term should be extended.  When his reelection looked increas-
ingly unlikely, Sólyom argued for an amendment to the Constitutional 
Court Act that would allow justices to sit for twelve years, without re-
newal.94  Neither the outgoing government nor the incoming gov-
ernment ever made a decision on Sólyom’s proposals; they simply 
failed to act.  Without ever having a formal vote on his continued ten-
ure because the parliamentary committee that had to nominate him 
failed to reach a decision, Sólyom had to step down.95  He was one of 
five justices to leave the Court within the year.  Two had retired when 
they hit the age of seventy, but three were simply never voted on when 
their terms came up for renewal.96
During Sólyom’s nine-year tenure, the Court had issued 1871 de-
cisions and had a hand in virtually every major aspect of Hungary’s 
transition to an independent democratic state.97  But with a whimper 
rather than a bang, the activist Constitutional Court was transformed 
92 The law provides that “[t]he Members of the Constitutional Court shall be 
elected for nine years”; that “[a]ny Member of the Constitutional Court may be re-
elected once”; and that “[t]he Member of the Constitutional Court who has turned 70 
shall retire.”  Hungarian Constitutional Court Act, supra note 19, arts. 8(3), 15(3). 
93 I was still living in Budapest and had an office at the Court while these issues 
were debated.  Court staff often winced as Sólyom made an increasing number of 
pitches to renew the terms of all of the justices whose terms were due to expire.  Many 
felt that Sólyom demeaned the Court by making such openly political pleas to stay in 
office. 
94 Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Hungarian Constitutional Court, 8 E. EUR. CONST. 
REV. 81, 82 (1999), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol8num4/special/ 
newhungarian.html [hereinafter Scheppele, New Constitutional Court]. 
95 Hungarian Constitutional Court Reaches Minimum Size, Elects New Chairman (Hun-
gary TV1 broadcast Nov. 29, 1998), translated in BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Nov. 
30, 1998. 
96 Scheppele, New Constitutional Court, supra note 94, at 82. 
97 Hungarian Constitutional Court Reaches Minimum Size, Elects New Chairman, supra 
note 95. 
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by the public indecision of Parliament and the government.  The ac-
tivist judges were never rejected or even openly criticized.  They were 
just not renewed. 
János Németh, a judge elected to the Court in 1997, was elected as 
Court President by his fellow justices just as Sólyom’s own mandate 
ended.98  Németh had been a professor of law at the University of Bu-
dapest, where he had been the civil procedure teacher (and later 
friend) of Viktor Orbán, the new Prime Minister.  Eventually, Parlia-
ment elected new justices to the Court to fill the spots left open by the 
departure of the original group of judges and the Court carried on.  
But its productivity fell sharply—in 1999, the Court issued only a little 
over fifty decisions, compared with the yearly average of more than 
two hundred decisions during the Sólyom Court.99  And the early de-
cisions showed a strong tendency to defer to the new government.100
From having been a constant presence in Hungarian public life, 
the Constitutional Court nearly disappeared as a public institution.  
Sólyom virtually disappeared as well.  He took up a guest professor-
ship at the University of Cologne, but eventually returned to Budapest 
to teach at the new, private, Catholic law school, Péter Pázmány Uni-
versity.101  His public appearances were few and far between. 
Nonetheless, Sólyom retained a certain positive image in the pub-
lic mind.  When the term of the Hungarian President was up in sum-
mer 2005, the parliamentary parties started scouting around to find 
someone to succeed President Ferenc Madl, who had announced that 
he would not run for another term.  Unconventionally, a civil society 
group calling itself Védegylet (Protect the Future) formally nominated 
Sólyom for President,102 and this nomination was seized on as a good 
idea by the center-right political parties FIDESz (Hungarian Civic Alli-
98 Constitutional Court Elects New President, supra note 91. 
99 Scheppele, New Constitutional Court, supra note 94, at 86. 
100 Id. at 82-85. 
101 Office of the President of the Republic of Hungary, supra note 38. 
102 Védegylet is a group dedicated to environmental causes, see Védegylet, Info in 
English, http://www.vedegylet.hu/index.php?newlang=English (last visited June 6, 
2006), and Sólyom was one of its founding members.  Since Sólyom had gotten his 
start in public life through working on environmental causes, it was not surprising that 
his return to private life would see him once again agitating on environmental issues.  
Védegylet took the rather surprising step of nominating him to be president of Hungary 
while the political parties dithered over their choices.  Sólyom has always proudly said 
that he belongs to no political party (though he was in the founding circle of the 
MDF) and so it was entirely in keeping with his public image that he should be put 
forward by a nongovernmental organization rather than by a political party. 
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ance) and the MDF.103  In addition to this organized support, a popu-
larity poll conducted by FIDESz found that the most popular con-
tender for national President was Madl, the current President.  But 
just behind him was László Sólyom.104
With this rather unusual beginning, the campaign for Sólyom’s 
presidency was on.  Rather than shrink back and let politics take its 
course, Sólyom was again actively before the media, campaigning to 
become President of the country, independently of any political af-
filiation.  Here, too, he emphasized that the role of the President 
should be to model constitutional correctness: 
I have made an important decision, I have been considering it for a long 
time, that the president, first and foremost, should show a moral exam-
ple and demonstrate the right standard to the whole nation. . . . [I]t 
should be felt deep in one’s heart, and then one will succeed.  I could 
simply call it setting an example.
105
Sólyom, as presidential candidate, also explored the constitutional 
role of the President of the republic: 
 The constitution specifies a number of authorities ensuring consider-
able power for the president, especially in crisis situations.  The presi-
dent’s authority might extend as far as dissolving the parliament, but he 
or she can also have a say in regular proceedings.  For example, given 
the president’s right to initiate legislation, he or she might submit a 
bill . . . if he or she has had enough of the morass in parliament.  The 
president might also take part in political debates if necessary, and he or 
she is also entitled to speak in the parliament.  The president might also 
veto bills . . . . 
 I just wanted to point out through all of this that the president has 
extensive scope for weighing things.  If he or she wants to influence the 
course of events, he or she might choose to do so, though better not.  It 
should be an exception when the situation gets truly carried away.  In 
such cases, the president must remind politicians to get back to their 
senses. . . . 
 By the way, it is not a bad thing when the political parties are some-
what afraid of the president . . . .
106
103 Hungarian Opposition Party Names Presidential Candidate, BBC MONITORING INT’L 
REP., May 27, 2005. 
104 Id. 
105 Hungarian Opposition’s Presidential Candidate Wants To Set Moral Example (Kos-
suth Radio (Budapest) broadcast June 2, 2005), translated in BBC WORLDWIDE MONI-
TORING, June 2, 2005. 
106 Opposition Presidential Candidate Explains His “Activist” Approach, NÉPSZABADSÁG 
(Budapest) (web site), June 1, 2005, translated in BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, June 
3, 2005. 
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Sólyom’s candidacy was defeated on the first round of parliamen-
tary voting when some of his initial backers deserted him.107  When 
Sólyom was finally elected in a second round of voting on June 7, 
2005, the international media praised him as someone who laid “the 
foundations of democratic rules of law and the protection of civil lib-
erties” and as “a calm, modest man, held in high moral esteem” as well 
as “an expert in international law and a humanist, who had fought to 
abolish [the] death penalty in Hungary.”108  All of the political parties, 
even those whose representatives in Parliament had voted for a candi-
date other than Sólyom, indicated their support for him and willing-
ness to work with him.109  The parliamentary fraction chair for the 
MDF, Ibolya Dávid, went further: 
[A]ll of Hungarian society and not just MDF are winners today, . . . since 
the person who today became president has given 16 or 17 years of proof 
that he is the guardian of the constitution that today’s Hungary sorely 
needs.
110
And, to demonstrate that he still thought of himself as the guardian of 
the Constitution, Sólyom’s first speech to Parliament after his election 
demonstrated just this commitment: 
[T]he constitution regulates not only institutions and authorities, but 
primarily, and first and foremost, it declares moral values which deter-
mine the legal system of the Hungarian Republic and people’s rights.  
One of my most important duties will be to safeguard these rights, with 
particular regard to the right to human dignity, the right to a humane 
life, and the freedom of expression.
111
Since Sólyom took office as President of the Republic of Hungary 
on August 5, 2005, he has repeatedly emphasized his connection with 
the Constitution and the importance of his office for guaranteeing the 
constitutional structure of Hungary.  While the Constitutional Court 
was the guardian of the Constitution during his tenure as President of 
107 Hungarian Parties Comment on Failed First Round of Presidential Voting (Duna TV 
Satellite Service (Budapest) broadcast June 6, 2005), translated in BBC WORLDWIDE 
MONITORING, June 6, 2005. 
108 New President a Democrat and Constitution-Maker, MTI HUNG. NEWS AGENCY, June 
7, 2005 (summarizing reports of the German News Agency (DPA) and French Press 
Agency (AFP)). 
109 Sólyom Acceptable President, Say All Parties, MTI HUNG. NEWS AGENCY, June 7, 
2005. 
110 Id. 
111 Hungary’s New President Pledges to Promote National Unity (Hungary Television M2 
Satellite Service broadcast June 7, 2005), translated in BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, 
June 7, 2005. 
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the Court, now the President of the country locates constitutional 
guardianship in his new position.  In his inaugural address, Sólyom 
noted that the Hungarian Constitution starts with the guarantee that 
power belongs to the people and that “we, who are mandated to serve 
this, must fulfill this duty of ours in such a way that we must always 
keep in view the freedom, the freedom rights, of the people.”112
Already, Sólyom has indicated that he does not intend to be a pas-
sive President, but one who aggressively defends the Constitution.  In 
December 2005, he sent back to Parliament for reconsideration a bill 
that would have allowed the political parties to use state-owned prop-
erty for their party headquarters.113  And in March 2006, he rejected a 
law that would have postponed the realization of rights for disabled 
persons.114  Sólyom indicated his intent in the run-up to parliamentary 
elections in April 2006 to closely monitor the campaign to ensure that 
political parties did not put short-term popularity ahead of Hungary’s 
longer-term interests.115
What do Hungarians think of having such an aggressive President 
at the helm?  In recent opinion polls, Sólyom has been by far the most 
popular politician, with fifty-nine percent of the socialists (who had 
not supported his election), sixty-four percent of the liberals (who 
had only reluctantly supported him) and seventy-one percent of FI-
DESz members (his core supporters) approving of his performance.116  
By contrast, heads of the political parties contesting the election were 
supported by one-quarter or less of those from other parties.117  Only 
Sólyom has managed to unite the country behind his political stance.  
Perhaps his success consists precisely in his standing up for the Consti-
tution and appearing not to be political at all. 
112 Hungarian President’s Inauguration Speech Stresses Love of Homeland (Duna TV Sat-
ellite Service (Budapest) broadcast Aug. 5, 2005), translated in BBC WORLDWIDE MONI-
TORING, Aug. 5, 2005. 
113 President Rejects Bill on Parties’ Access to State-Owned Property, MTI HUNG. NEWS 
AGENCY, Dec. 30, 2005. 
114 President Sends Back Disabled Amendment for MPs Reconsideration, MTI HUNG. 
NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 2, 2006. 
115 Sólyom said in his New Year’s 2006 address:  “[T]he economy and generally 
everyday life does not exist in four-year terms.  It follows from all this that politics 
should be conducted with a much longer perspective and by taking the interests of the 
country and now also Europe into consideration.”  Hungarian President’s New Year Ad-
dress Stresses Need for Reforms, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jan. 3, 2006. 
116 Hungarian Opposition Politicians’ Popularity Falling—Poll, BBC WORLDWIDE 
MONITORING, Feb. 28, 2006. 
117 Id. 
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Through Hungary’s first decade and a half after the fall of com-
munism, László Sólyom has been the person who has most embodied 
the Hungarian Constitution in his own life, stance, and office.  He was 
able to use his position as President of the Constitutional Court of 
Hungary to create the official public role of guardian of the Constitu-
tion by speaking for the Court and therefore speaking for the Consti-
tution itself.  He always couched his views not in personal terms but in 
constitutional terms, claiming to speak not for himself but for the 
greater constitutional commitments of the nation.  While he initially 
portrayed his constitutional commitments as distinctly judicial ones, in 
which the Constitutional Court’s role was firmly established as ex-
plaining (not inventing) what the Constitution said, he was able to 
carry this persona over into his role as President of the Republic of 
Hungary, where he was once again guardian of the Constitution.  
Sólyom has never been shy about defending the Constitution in pub-
lic.  He has given, and continues to give, frequent interviews to the 
media, has been out front in the public eye explaining the Constitu-
tion, hectoring Parliament and the government about their constitu-
tional commitments, and has strategically deployed constitutional ag-
gression to sustain his views in the public sphere. 
It is hard to imagine a U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice doing the 
things that Sólyom was able to do as Court President.  For one thing, 
Sólyom more clearly spoke for the Court as an institution than can the 
U.S. Chief Justice, who has more publicly fractious colleagues.  For 
another, the process of constitutional interpretation in Hungary can 
still be portrayed as the neutral enunciation of constitutional meaning 
that is already there, rather than as the development of controversial 
and contested interpretations of a text with structural ambiguities, as 
the U.S. Constitution now clearly is publicly seen as having.  In Hun-
gary, the construction of judicial meaning of the Constitution is more 
clearly an expert science with right answers than a politically charged 
act of interpretation.  Sólyom was able to take advantage of this (or, 
perhaps more accurately, this was the way he successfully portrayed 
the process of constitutional decision making).  And these things 
clearly bolstered his public popularity as Court President, to the point 
where he was able to translate these positive feelings into becoming 
the head of state of the republic.  In the Hungarian public sphere, 
Sólyom is still the guardian of the Constitution and not a mere politi-
cian.  He is still seen as standing above adversarial politics, protecting 
the Constitution’s principles from partisan attack. 
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B.  Russian Phoenix:  The Rise and Fall and Rise of Valerii Zorkin 
The “transition” from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation 
was anything but orderly.  In the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union had en-
tered a period of glasnost (openness), in which conflicting political vi-
sions floated freely in the newly animated public sphere,118 the na-
tional political grip on the economy was loosened, law was reformed 
at a staggering rate, and the general secretary of the Communist Party, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, did not himself appear to believe in the strict 
communist ideology over which he allegedly presided.119
In August 1991, Gorbachev was on holiday when a group of anti-
reform members of his cabinet, plus Gorbachev’s vice president, de-
clared that Gorbachev was ill and temporarily incapable of serving as 
the Soviet President.  The State Committee for the State of Emer-
gency, as the group called itself, pushed the hapless and ineffective 
vice president into Gorbachev’s place.  The August coup threw the 
country—and, in particular, its political elites—into disarray, but the 
coup plotters eventually found themselves unable to mobilize enough 
of the state to go along with them.  Although the attempted coup 
failed, its near success revealed that Gorbachev’s center could not 
hold either.  Gorbachev emerged from the coup both physically and 
politically disheveled, but he continued to attempt to keep the Soviet 
Union together as a single state.  Despite his efforts, however, the So-
viet Union fell in the fall of 1991.  Perhaps more truthfully, it was 
pushed.  Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a deal with his coun-
terparts from Belarus and Ukraine creating an alternative and much 
looser union, which spelled the end of the larger one.120
118 Perhaps the most symbolic change from the standpoint of the development of 
constitutional law was the new public role played by Andrei Sahkarov.  Sakharov was a 
world-class physicist, but also a dissident.  He had been a prominent advocate of a new 
constitution for the Soviet Union and had even written a draft of one.  He had been 
banished to internal exile in Gorky and one of the indicators that the Soviet Union was 
changing came when a famous phone call from Mikhail Gorbachev allowed him to re-
turn to Moscow.  Though he often went too far for Gorbachev, Sakharov’s draft consti-
tution for the Soviet Union captured the popular imagination and gave Gorbachev’s 
own more modest constitutional proposals a sort of legitimacy.  ROBERT AHDIEH, RUS-
SIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 24-25 (1997). 
119 At the main Community Party Congress in 1988, Gorbachev announced that 
these reforms would proceed under the banner of the pravovoe gosudarstvo, literally 
“state of law,” though sometimes translated as “rule of law” and sometimes translated as 
“rule by law.”  Id. at 24.  In any event, given the purely instrumental conception of law 
that reigned during the Soviet period, Gorbachev’s attention to legality as a constraint 
was novel. 
120 Id. at 42-43. 
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The Russian Federation,121 the largest part of the former Soviet 
Union, was therefore rather abruptly born as an independent state, 
without a gestation period during which it might have developed a 
clear legal structure of its own.  During the Soviet era, Russia had its 
own Constitution, a nominal state government, and a highly detailed 
internal federal structure, but these were all Potemkin institutions122—
more for show than for function.  When the Russian Federation sud-
denly gained its independence, all of those institutions had to imme-
diately bear the real weight of state power.  Russia had followed the 
Soviet Union in changing its own political structures during the na-
tional reforms in 1990 and 1991,123 but until the moment of inde-
pendence, the constitutionally retooled institutions had never had to 
manage anything substantial.  Suddenly they were thrust into the spot-
light and had to perform as constitutional organs of power in what was 
officially (as well as functionally) a new state. 
Carried over from the Soviet era, the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation had been amended often and substantially in 1990 and 
1991.  An office of the President, a newly constituted permanent Par-
liament with a speaker at its head, and a brand new Constitutional 
Court had been added, mirroring change at the national level.  The 
Russian Constitutional Court was established by constitutional 
amendment in December 1990, and the Law on the Constitutional 
Court was passed by the new Parliament in July 1991.124  The Court 
opened for business just as the country was unexpectedly sprung loose 
from the Soviet Union.  Given the turbulence of the time, it is not 
surprising that this Court immediately became embroiled in political 
controversy. 
121 For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to independent Russia as the Russian Federa-
tion, even though its official legal title between 1991 and 1993 was the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic.  Russia took the legal name of simply “the Russian Fed-
eration” with the adoption of its new Constitution in 1993.  But even before the legal 
name was changed with the 1993 Constitution, Yeltsin’s speechwriters had already 
started calling the country the Russian Federation, or simply “Russia.”  ROBERT SER-
VICE, A HISTORY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY RUSSIA 511 (1998). 
122 The ever-amusing but insightful Cecil Adams inquired into the history of Po-
temkin villages, those façade-only constructions that appeared to be towns.  As it turns 
out, they never existed the way that the legend indicates, but were probably fabricated 
as part of an anti-Potemkin public relations campaign launched by the Saxon envoy to 
the court of Catherine the Great.  Cecil Adams, The Straight Dope, Did “Potemkin Vil-
lages” Really Exist? (Nov. 14, 2003), http://www.straightdope.com/columns/ 
031114.html.  The idea of a “Potemkin institution,” however, has outlived any actually 
existing (or fictitious) Potemkin villages. 
123 AHDIEH, supra note 118, at 47. 
124 Id. at 78-79. 
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Yeltsin set about consolidating his newly won power in his newly 
independent country with a series of brash decrees.  To vanquish his 
communist political opponents, he issued several edicts, starting in 
August 1991 and continuing through December 1991, suspending the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation,125 freezing the assets of 
the Communist Parties of both the Soviet Union and Russia,126 and fi-
nally terminating the activity of both party wings.127  To further cen-
tralize power, Yeltsin issued an edict on December 19, 1991, consoli-
dating the police with the intelligence services.128  All of these orders 
were challenged before the newly opened Russian Constitutional 
Court. 
Valerii Zorkin, the new President of the new Constitutional Court, 
seemed an unlikely opponent to go up against Yeltsin at the height of 
his power.  Yeltsin had won a contested, popular election to become 
President of the Russian Federation; Zorkin had been a quiet law pro-
fessor without much public visibility before becoming President of the 
Court, a job one might reasonably have expected would amount to 
very little at the time Zorkin was elected to it.  Yeltsin had been seen 
bravely standing on a tank, apparently in command of the demonstra-
tions that the State Committee for the State of Emergency had failed 
to quell; Zorkin’s primary audience before this point had been law 
students who knew full well that law was not where the power was in 
the Soviet state. 
In fact, Zorkin had virtually no public profile at all in Soviet times.  
Coming from a small town in Russia’s Far East, Zorkin had been ad-
mitted to the prestigious Moscow State University, where he did his 
first degree in legal studies.129  His first doctorate (called a Kandidat) 
revealed his penchant for legal history, since he chose “Chicherin’s 
Views on State and Law” as his dissertation topic.130  Zorkin’s second 
125 President of the Russian Federation, Edict No. 79, On the Suspension of Activ-
ity of the Communist Party of the RSFSR  (Aug. 23, 1991). 
126 President of the Russian Federation, Edict No. 90, On the Property of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Aug. 25, 1991). 
127 President of the Russian Federation, Edict No. 169, On the Activity of the 
Communist Party of the CPSU and the CP RSFSR  (Nov. 6, 1991). 
128 President of the Russian Federation, Edict No. 289, On the Establishment of 
the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs of the RSFSR (Dec. 19, 1991). 
129 This and the details to follow in this paragraph are drawn from the Russian-
only biography of Zorkin on the Russian Constitutional Court’s website, http:// 
www.ksrf.ru/about/judge/ks/bio/zorkin.htm (last visited June 6, 2006). 
130 This is actually a very interesting choice.  Boris Chicherin was a nineteenth-
century Russian liberal legal theorist and one of the very few Russian liberals whom it 
would have been possible for anyone in the Soviet period to study.  As Andrzej Walicki 
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doctorate (called a doctor of sciences degree) further revealed his in-
terest in legal theory, as he wrote on the topic of “Positivist Theory in 
Russian Law.”  Rather than being given a faculty position at the more 
prestigious institutions of Moscow State University or the Institute of 
State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Zorkin instead 
toiled away as a professor in the department of constitutional law in 
the Academy of the Interior Ministry from 1979 to 1986, when he then 
went to work for the Higher Law School of the Interior Ministry, a 
correspondence school for police officials.  The Interior Ministry was 
the part of the Soviet state charged with maintaining public order, 
and would have been an odd posting for someone who showed any 
signs of commitment to constitutionalism.  It was also not the place 
from which one would expect a major legal thinker to spring. 
But, once he became President of the Constitutional Court, 
Zorkin suddenly emerged as a strong voice in defense of the impor-
tance of constitutional standards.  In its first ringing decision, an-
nounced on January 14, 1992, the Constitutional Court declared that 
the presidential edict unifying the state security ministry with the or-
dinary police was unconstitutional.131  As the Court announced, the 
constitutional right to create executive bodies lay not in the compe-
tencies of the President under the then-existing Russian Constitution, 
but with the Russian Parliament instead.132  Citing the provisions of 
notes in his portrayal of Chicherin, “Soviet scholars . . . treat Chicherin with great re-
spect, emphasizing his intellectual calibre and personal integrity, while at the same 
time regarding him as a staunch class enemy of progressive forces.”  ANDRZEJ WALICKI, 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF RUSSIAN LIBERALISM 105 (1987).  Zorkin’s choice of 
Chicherin could have very well presaged Zorkin’s own turn to liberalism when he be-
came President of the Constitutional Court several decades later. 
131 In re Edict No. 289, On the Establishment of the Ministry of Security and Inter-
nal Affairs of the RFSFR, VED. RSFSR, 1992, No. 6, Item 247, translated in 30 STATUTES 
& DECISIONS 9, 14-15 (May-June 1994).  One note on the citation of Russian Constitu-
tional Court cases:  I will be using English-language citations throughout, so that they 
will be easier to find for the English-language reader.  Fortunately, all decisions of the 
Russian Constitutional Court have been translated by Sarah J. Reynolds in the journal 
Statutes and Decisions.  Reynolds’s translations are superb and the non-Russian-speaking 
reader loses nothing by relying on her versions of the decisions.  To make the citations 
to Russian Constitutional Court decisions easier to understand in English, I have re-
placed their usual cumbersome case names (in which the above decision would be 
called “In the Case of the Verification of the Constitutionality of Edict No. 289 of the 
President of the RFSFR of 19 December 1991 ‘On the Establishment of the Ministry of 
Security and Internal Affairs of the RFSFR’”) with the simpler English “In re . . . .”  I 
have also abbreviated the case names of these Russian decisions by mentioning only 
the first law reviewed in the decision, not the whole string of laws that the decision 
takes up, as is customary in the full citation. 
132 Id. at 10. 
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the Russian Constitution that established the roles of Parliament and 
the President, the unanimous Court decision was signed by Zorkin.133
But Zorkin did not just leave it at that.  He took to the press to ex-
plain what the Court had done.  In an interview with the Moscow 
newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, Zorkin indicated that a new Consti-
tution was necessary to “save the President the trouble of issuing nu-
merous decrees and directives,” but in the meantime, he warned that 
the existing Constitution should be “observed strictly.”134
The Russian Constitution in those early days of Russian independ-
ence, amended though it was, created terrific trouble.  Written at a 
time when no Constitution in the Soviet legal space mattered as a real 
legal document, and amended to mirror changes in the Soviet Un-
ion’s politics throughout Gorbachev’s legal reforms, the Russian Con-
stitution created a formally weak executive and a formally strong Par-
liament.135  As Russia emerged from the Soviet Union with Yeltsin at 
the helm, however, the actually existing state structure featured a 
strong President and a weak Parliament.136  In short, the Constitution 
was being flouted every day, and the Constitutional Court was charged 
with enforcing the Constitution the country happened to have.  This, 
as we will see, turned into a recipe for crisis. 
After this first decision boldly striking down a presidential decree 
on the basis of the existing Constitution, Russian constitutional judges 
received death threats and security was tightened.  But Zorkin contin-
133 Id. at 15. 
134 Konstantin Katanyan, There’s a Severe Court:  The Most Constitutional Court, 
KURANTY (Moscow), at 1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Jan. 15, 1992. 
135 The 1977 (Brezhnev) Soviet Constitution had been virtually copied by the Rus-
sian Federation.  Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, the Russian Consti-
tution had, of course, been heavily amended.  For our purposes, the crucial part that 
remained the same was the recognition of the Supreme Soviet as the primary organ of 
state power.  The Soviet version of that article, which the Russian Constitution copied, 
read: 
(1)  All power in the USSR belongs to the people. 
(2) The people exercise state power through Soviets of People’s Deputies, 
which constitute the political foundation of the USSR. 
(3) All other state bodies are under the control of, and accountable to, the 
Soviets of People’s Deputies. 
KONSTITUTSIIA SSR (1977) [KONST. SSR] [Constitution] art. 2 (USSR), available at 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/r100000_.html. 
136 The President was able to gain power relative to the Parliament not only be-
cause he seized the power, but also because the Parliament gave it to him.  In fall 1991, 
the Parliament gave Yeltsin emergency powers to rule by decree.  Justin Burke, Russia 
Defers Constitutional Debate, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 20, 1992, at 3.  As we will see, 
he used these powers to the fullest. 
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ued to speak out about the importance of bringing the power of the 
President into line with the existing Constitution: 
Well, my manner seems mild after years of teaching. . . . But I know I am 
tough inside.  Toughness is essential.  How can you afford to be mild 
when you are told that there is one law for the rich and another for the 
poor, that might goes before right?  Such is my opponents’ opinion of 
the Constitution.  However imperfect or compromising it might be, it is 
this Constitution we must honour.  There can be no bending the law to 
suit authority. . . . Montesquieu said that despotism is cutting down the 
tree in order to taste the fruit.  A lot of hacking is going on in this coun-
try now.  But one should not delude oneself about the fact that the 
president who won the general election has his mandate, but not an in-
dulgence.
137
Unconstitutionality was clearly a problem throughout the new 
country in those early days.  Numerous regions of the Russian Federa-
tion declared their independence, wrote constitutions inconsistent 
with the federal one, and threatened to secede.  The Russian Consti-
tutional Court was drawn into the maelstrom of competing sovereign-
ties when it was called upon to decide whether a number of these se-
cessionist moves were constitutional.  In March 1992, the Constitutional 
Court held that Tatarstan could not remove itself from the authority 
of the government of the Russian Federation.138  When Tatarstan pro-
ceeded to prepare to carry out the independence referendum that the 
Constitutional Court had deemed unconstitutional, Zorkin called a 
news conference to warn Tatarstan not to ignore the Constitution: 
The forcefulness with which those leaders seek to plunge their peoples 
into confrontation with Russia, with the Federation, and want to destroy 
the effects of Russian laws could lead to grave consequences.  They are 
cutting off the very bough on which they are sitting.  They are pushing 
people into the abyss of lawlessness and civil war.
139
Tatarstan paid no attention to either Zorkin or the decision of the 
Constitutional Court and held its referendum anyway.140  Worse yet, 
other republics followed in this “parade of sovereignties,” ignoring the 
137 Vladimir Orlov, Valery Zorkin:  “Russia’s President Has His Mandate, Not an Indul-
gence,” MOSCOW NEWS, Jan. 30, 1992, Personalities, at 5. 
138 In re the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan et al., 
VED. RSFSR, 1992, No. 13, Item 671, translated in 30 STATUTES & DECISIONS 32, 43-44 
(May-June 1994). 
139 Stanislav Oganyan, How Close Is Russia to Breaking Up?, PRAVDA (Moscow), Feb. 
21, 1992, at 2, translated in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Mar. 25, 1992, at 3. 
140 Steven Erlanger, Tatars Vote on a Referendum All Agree Is Confusing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 1992, at A8. 
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Constitutional Court and, for that matter, the Constitution as well.141  
Zorkin again warned all parties to follow the law or state force would 
be forthcoming: 
If the state is falling apart but would like to preserve itself, to become a 
rule-of-law state and to protect human rights on its territory, then it has 
both moral and legal grounds to defend its right to existence as well.  
Any state is built on the foundation of not only law, but also force com-
bined with law.  And the actions of the state should be adequate to the 
existing situation.  Any other line of conduct turns it from a rule-of-law 
state into a country of rampant anarchy and discord, ruled by gangs of 
bandits competing for power.
142
But the Russian state under President Boris Yeltsin was not listen-
ing to the Constitutional Court either.  Zorkin warned on the liberal 
television program Itogi that the country was in danger of “disinte-
grat[ing] before everyone’s eyes” because of secessionist movements, 
economic failures, the encroachment of the mafia, the continuing 
impoverishment of the people, and the involvement of the army in 
political processes.143  He also gave an interview to Komsomolskaya 
Pravda, pointing to the failure of public officials to “fulfill their duty 
for the protection of the country’s Constitutional order” and threaten-
ing that the Constitutional Court would take up the question of 
whether public officials’ failure to act conformed with the Russian 
Constitution.144  Lest the implications of this for the government be 
unclear, Zorkin wrote in the journal Kuranty that high officials would 
be subject to impeachment proceedings in the Constitutional Court if 
they failed to perform their duties.145
That said, Zorkin never made himself out to be different from 
those he judged.  He publicly acknowledged that he had remained a 
member of the Communist Party until October 30, 1991, and that he 
had never been a dissident.  He explained:  “We weren’t all Sak-
harovs. . . . Anyway, I have no past work for which I should feel 
141 In the Unity of Law and Force, OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Apr. 
20, 1992. 
142 Id. 
143 TV Programme Itogi Reviews Weekly Events, ITAR-TASS, June 29, 1992. 
144 Y. Kozyreva & L. Nikitinsky, Dusk-Time Telephone Call to Valery Zorkin, KOMSO-
MOLSKAYA PRAVDA (Moscow), June 27, 1992, at 1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., June 
27, 1992. 
145 Valery Zorkin, The Metastasis of Lawlessness Threatens Russia with Death, KURANTY 
(Moscow), June 30, 1992, at 1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., June 30, 1992. 
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ashamed.  We all moved through this system, each doing it in his own 
way.”146
In summer and fall 1992, the Constitutional Court made the spec-
tacular move of convening a public trial on the constitutional chal-
lenges to Yeltsin’s decrees banning the Communist Party.147  Yeltsin’s 
fall 1991 decrees had put both the Soviet and Russian Communist Par-
ties out of business.  Pleasantly surprising the Kremlin, however, the 
Constitutional Court agreed to hear a companion case brought by Yel-
tsin, along with the Communist Party challenges to Yeltsin’s decrees.  
The companion case raised the question of whether the Communist 
Parties had engaged in anticonstitutional action.148  The record of 
what the Communist Party had done would therefore be made public 
simultaneously with the record on whether Yeltsin’s decrees followed 
the Constitution.  As Princeton Professor Stephen F. Cohen would say, 
though, in describing what was at stake in this trial:  “this is one wing 
of the Communist Party against another.”149
Throughout the summer and fall of 1992, the Constitutional 
Court held public hearings in the Communist Party case, exposing as-
pects of Russia’s past and present.  The testimony was gripping, 
though it was hard for Zorkin, as the presiding judge in the hearing, 
to keep everything within legal bounds.150  As the past poured out in 
146 Steven Erlanger, Russian Court Weighs Communist Party’s Legality, N.Y. TIMES, July 
8, 1992, at A8. 
147 The trial was spectacular because the Constitutional Court brought into open 
court some of the deepest secrets of the Soviet times.  But, perhaps surprisingly, 
though the trial was of great interest to the political elites for whom the future shape 
of Russian politics stood in the balance, the trial generated surprisingly little public 
attention.  “On most days the courtroom was all but empty, and none of the commen-
taries in the press ever treated it as the great trial of Communism that Mr. Yeltsin’s side 
wanted.”  Serge Schmemann, Yeltsin’s Ban on Communists Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 
1992, at A8. 
148 Guy Chazan, Russian Court To Put Communist Party on Trial,  UPI, May 26, 1992. 
149 Erlanger, supra note 146, at A8.  Cohen’s comment makes more sense if one 
realizes that virtually all of the major players in this dispute had been members of the 
Communist Party up until, at a minimum, the year before.  Yeltsin had won the Rus-
sian presidency in a contested election—in which all those eligible to contest the elec-
tion were Communists.  The first batch of Constitutional Court judges had been 
elected to the Court before the Soviet Union fell, and were nearly all party members at 
the time of their election.  (The one exception was Tamara Morshchakova, who had 
managed to never formally join the party though she had been active in the Young 
Communist League.  Lyubov Tsukanova, Tamara Morshchakova:  A Judge from the Faction 
of Non-Party People, NEW TIMES, Apr. 2006, available at http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/ 
detail.asp?art_id=272.)  Those opposed to Yeltsin’s decree were also party members, 
though perhaps the only ones still claiming that mantle at the time of the trial. 
150 As one commentator for the newspaper Izvestia noted: 
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historic fashion in the Constitutional Court’s hearing room, however, 
Zorkin entered a standoff with former Soviet President Mikhail Gor-
bachev over whether Gorbachev would testify.  Zorkin insisted that 
Gorbachev’s testimony was necessary in order to determine whether 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was a political party 
or just another name for the Soviet state structure itself.  Gorbachev’s 
testimony was also important for sorting out whether state funds were 
used for party purposes, in order to determine the ownership struc-
ture of party property.151  Gorbachev refused to come to the Court, 
even if he were “brought in the court-room in handcuffs.”152  To this, 
Zorkin replied: 
[Gorbachev] should not have said that.  It is a challenge not only to the 
Constitutional Court but to public opinion as well.  Essentially, it is a 
challenge to the whole of Russian society which established the Constitu-
tional Court as an independent body of power. . . . Generally speaking, I 
wonder how the man who had once proclaimed a policy of building a 
law-governed state, could say such a thing.
153
Gorbachev responded to the Court’s subpoena with an open letter 
in the Komsomolskaya Pravda, in which he claimed that the Court “has 
become a hostage of political confrontation.”154  Zorkin responded by 
asking the Russian government to prevent Gorbachev from traveling 
abroad, which it did.155  Calling himself a “refusenik,” Gorbachev shot 
back:  “The Constitutional Court is supposed to analyze legal docu-
In the courtroom itself, in newspapers and on television, it has been con-
stantly stressed that the trial must be exclusively a legal proceeding and in no 
way a political trial; with increasing hopelessness, presiding judge Valery 
Zorkin has tried to reason with the witnesses:  Talk about the facts that are 
known to you, don’t get into public-affairs debates.  It has all been in vain:  It 
has not been possible to keep the hearing of the “CPSU case” within strictly 
legal bounds.  And it won’t be possible in the future—this was predicted from 
the very beginning, and everything has indeed turned out that way.  More-
over, in my opinion, the trial has gone beyond political bounds as well.  When 
the “President’s side” started testifying, when victims of the regime that the 
Party installed in the Land of Soviets began to take the stand, the trial took on 
a pronounced moral tinge. 
Yury Feofanov, The Victims Repent, The Butchers Are Defended,  IZVESTIA (Moscow), Aug. 4, 
1992, at 2, translated in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Sept. 2, 1992, at 24. 
151 Daniel Sneider, Gorbachev Defies Russian Court, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 6, 
1992, at 5. 
152 Konstantin Katanyan, When in Constitutional Court–-Watch Your Tongue, KURANTY 
(Moscow), Sept. 26, 1992, at 2, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Sept. 26, 1992. 
153 Id. 
154 Gorbachev Cites “Moral Reasons” for Not Testifying in Russian Case, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Oct. 4, 1992, at 11D. 
155 Sneider, supra note 151, at 5. 
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ments for conformity with the Constitution.  But what is the Court do-
ing today?  They are concerned with history. . . . This is not a Constitu-
tional Court, this is a trial seeking political goals.”156
Zorkin dug in his heels on the Gorbachev matter, and the issue of 
compliance with the subpoena to testify before the Constitutional 
Court turned into a personal spat.  Zorkin insulted Gorbachev’s com-
petencies as a lawyer and indicated that he felt Gorbachev was holding 
out against the Court because “[h]e has been left without roles in this 
state.”157  Zorkin’s descent to the level of personal insult caused finger 
wagging in the press:  “A rabid opponent of turning the CPSU hear-
ings into a political process, . . . Valery Zorkin has himself succumbed 
to the temptation of entering into polemics with Gorbachev, which is 
not juridical by any standard.”158  Writing in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
defense counsel Abram Move challenged whether Zorkin should con-
tinue to serve as a judge in the case, given that Zorkin had personally 
insulted a potential witness.159
Gorbachev’s refusal to testify, however, also generated some sup-
port for the Court in the media: 
Gorbachev has put the Constitutional Court in a position that offers ab-
solutely no way out.  If the court shows leniency toward a blatant violator 
of the law, a monstrous precedent will be established.  As one of the par-
ticipants in the trial justly commented, “Tomorrow Khasbulatov [the 
speaker of the parliament] will refuse to come, the next day Yeltsin, and 
a week after that, Uncle Vasya from the bakery.”
160
Finally, however, it was Zorkin who backed down in the crisis, say-
ing that “[i]n view of the ex-president’s position and attitude to the 
Court, we have decided that he cannot give testimony which could 
help us establish the truth.”161  The images of both Zorkin and the 
Court were tarnished in this episode, however.  While Zorkin had 
156 How I Failed To Get Clearance To Travel Abroad:  Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, 
OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Oct. 7, 1992. 
157 Yuri Aidinov, Valery Zorkin:  Gorbachev Has Been Left Without Roles in This State, 
VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA (Moscow), Oct. 20, 1992, at 1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., 
Oct. 20, 1992. 
158 Id. 
159 Abram Move, The Constitutional Court and Mikhail Gorbachev, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZ. 
(Moscow), Oct. 27, 1992, at 1, translated in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Nov. 25, 
1992, at 26. 
160 Sergei Parkhomenko, Constitutional Court:  Will We Trade Gorbachev for Honecker?, 
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZ. (Moscow), Oct. 8, 1992, at 1, translated in CURRENT DIG. POST-
SOVIET PRESS, Nov. 4, 1992, at 22. 
161 Boris Slavin, Third Power Suggests “Round Table,” PRAVDA (Moscow), Nov. 11, 
1992, at 2, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Nov. 11, 1992. 
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earned praise for the professional way he handled this delicate case in 
the formal hearings, the episode with Gorbachev showed that Zorkin 
was sometimes thin-skinned and not entirely judicial in his manner 
when challenged. 
The Constitutional Court made its decision in the CPSU case on 
November 30, 1992.162  Surprising everyone in a country in which poli-
tics had rarely before been constrained by law, the Court failed to 
come down all on one side.  First, the Court broadly upheld Yeltsin’s 
decrees banning the activities of the core organizations of both the 
Russian and Soviet Communist Parties.163  But, the Court said, hand-
ing a partial victory to the Communists, the President could not ban 
the local organizations of the Communist Party that gathered as free 
social associations.164  The Court also broadly upheld Yeltsin’s freeze 
on the property of the Communist Parties.165  But, the Court said, bal-
ancing Yeltsin’s victory with a ruling beneficial to the Communists, the 
state could not just seize the property, whose ownership status was en-
tangled in complicated ways between the state and the parties as social 
associations.166  To sort out these property claims, the parties would 
have to go to the arbitrazh courts and untangle the claims one by 
one.167  Avoiding the question of whether the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union had been engaged in anticonstitutional activity while it 
existed, the Court said it did not have to address the issue since the 
party had been dissolved with the deconstruction of the Soviet Un-
ion.168
Yelstin won in part and lost in part.  He was able to get rid of the 
Soviet-era party structures, but was unable to prevent the very same 
162 In re Edict 79, On the Suspension of the Activity of the Communist Party of the 
RSFSR, Edict 90, On the Property of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the 
RSFSR, and Edict 169, On the Activity of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the 
RSFSR et al. [hereinafter CPSU Case], VED. RF, 1992, No. 14, Item 400, translated in 30 
STATUTES & DECISIONS 8 (July-Aug. 1994).  The decision was announced from the 
bench without a written opinion to distribute to the press.  Zorkin said at the time that 
the opinion itself would be distributed in two weeks.  Schmemann, supra note 147, at 
A8. 
163 CPSU Case,  supra note 162, at 38-42. 
164 Id. at 39. 
165 Id. at 39-40. 
166 Id. 
167 Arbitrazh courts in the Soviet Union used to be the courts that handled eco-
nomic disputes under the various five-year plans.  In post-communist Russia, they be-
came the courts that handled property and contract issues among corporate bodies.  
Hendley, supra note 16, at 93-94. 
168 CPSU Case, supra note 162, at 42. 
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rank-and-file members from starting new parties on new constitutional 
terms.  He was not allowed to seize Communist Party property indis-
criminately, but rather had to wait until the arbitrazh courts sorted out 
the complex series of property claims.  Perhaps most importantly, the 
Court demonstrated a careful and, above all, highly legal approach to 
resolving these most contentious of issues. 
Zorkin had made the public announcement of the decision in the 
CPSU case, and the reactions were generally positive.  Yeltsin’s repre-
sentative said that the decision was a “stabilizing factor and a com-
promise . . . . On the whole, the decision satisfies us.”169  The Commu-
nists declared victory as well:  “The decision is not a bad one. . . . It 
gives the party a chance to revive.”170  Though Zorkin had shown fits 
of pique during the trial and had come under public criticism, the de-
cision was praised in the end as a constitutional and thoroughly legal 
judgment.  The Court appeared to be the guardian of the Constitu-
tion and had, surprising many, issued a judicious, carefully crafted rul-
ing that did not just cave in to political expediency. 
While the CPSU case was pending, however, other constitutional 
trouble was brewing.  An impetuous Yeltsin, with his first Prime Minis-
ter Yegor Gaidar, pushed through economic reforms using presiden-
tial decrees and therefore bypassing Parliament.  Price liberalization 
came in January 1992.171  The ruble was allowed to float in July 1992.  
Inflation for the year shot up to an unbelievable 2000%.172  Mass pov-
erty set in quickly. 
All of this was happening while the “parade of sovereignties” con-
tinued, as more and more of Russia’s regions were declaring inde-
pendence, claiming they had no need to pay attention to the center.  
Not just Tatarstan, but Chechyna, Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Karelia, 
Komi, Sakha, and Tuva also declared that their laws would take prece-
dence over the those of the center,173 despite the Constitutional 
Court’s explicit ruling on this point in the Tatarstan referendum case. 
Instead of working with Parliament, Yeltsin decided to wage his 
own war against its leaders.  The Supreme Soviet, the sleeker executive 
committee of the unwieldy Congress of People’s Deputies, was chaired 
by Ruslan Khasbulatov, who had generally opposed Yeltsin’s increas-
169 Guy Chazan, Court:  Yeltsin Acted Properly in Outlawing Communist Party, UPI, 
Nov. 30, 1992 (quoting Mikhail Fedotov, a lawyer for Yeltsin’s team). 
170 Id. (quoting Yuri Ivanov, a Communist Party lawyer). 
171 SERVICE, supra note 121, at 509-10. 
172 Scheppele, Realpolitik Defense, supra note 5, at 1950. 
173 SERVICE, supra note 121, at 521. 
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ingly high-handed manner of governing.174  Parliament responded to 
what it saw as Yeltsin’s arrogant leadership by proposing Yeltsin-
limiting amendments to the creaky once-Soviet, now-Russian Constitu-
tion.175  By the end of 1992, the Constitution had been amended more 
than four hundred times; it was hard for anyone to find a copy of the 
current text,176 let alone discern what all of the changes meant.  Obvi-
ously, this made it harder for the Court to go on interpreting the Con-
stitution as it was written. 
During the progressive deterioration of relations between the Pre-
sident and Parliament that occurred throughout 1992, the Constitu-
tion became the territory on which the incipient war between the two 
institutions was staged.  Starting before the Soviet Union crumbled, 
the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Soviet had been fum-
bling for years with proposals for a new constitution.  Drafts emerged 
from the constitutional commission in November 1990, October 1991, 
and February 1992.  Although each one proposed a mixed presiden-
tial-parliamentary system, each successive draft gave more powers to 
Parliament.177  Yeltsin, who wanted a strongly presidentialist constitu-
tion, objected and presented his own constitutional draft in Novem-
174 The general view is that Khasbulatov opposed Yeltsin’s economic reforms.  
SERVICE, supra note 121, at 521-22.  But speeches made by Khasbulatov demonstrate 
that he had supported the general thrust of the reforms: 
The present situation in the country is extremely difficult.  Moreover, it is be-
coming ever tenser.  It would be wrong to say that there is general under-
standing and acceptance of all of our major measures in the political, eco-
nomic, social, international and other spheres.  It is necessary for everybody to 
think of ways of reaching consensus in our Russian society.  And on the basis 
of this consensus a kind of an unwritten social contract could be concluded, 
which would naturally preclude any actions disrupting the drastic economic 
reforms. . . . There can be no return to the past, to the old ways. 
Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman, Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Statement 
at a Congress of Private Farmers, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Feb. 5, 
1992.  He repeated these affirmations several months later: 
At its last session the Supreme Soviet adopted about 150 pieces of legislation 
which provide the legislative framework for a market economy.  The coming 
session is expected to pass almost twice as many.  Differences with the gov-
ernment are over particulars, over details, and not over substance because 
nobody in Parliament opposes a transition to the market economy. 
“This Country Won’t Survive Another Dictatorship”:  Interview with Russian Parliament Speaker 
Ruslan Khasbulatov, OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Nov. 24, 1992 [herein-
after Khasbulatov Interview].  Khasbulatov did oppose executive centralization of power, 
which turned out to be the crucial issue in the fight that followed, as the rest of this 
section will show. 
175 This process came to a head in December 1992, as we will see below. 
176 AHDIEH, supra note 118, at 50-51. 
177 Id. at 52. 
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ber 1991,178 renewing his plea at strategic intervals in 1992.  In April 
1992, for example, he returned to Parliament to present his argument 
for stronger executive power:  “Without a powerful executive branch 
there can be no reforms, order, nor a statehood befitting Russia, its 
history and its traditions.”179  Yet Yeltsin gave strong approval for the 
Constitutional Court to play a mediating role as the new constitution 
was worked out:  “In the existing situation I think it necessary that the 
Constitutional Court should play a more active role in building rela-
tionships between the executive and the legislative branches of power.  
The authoritative view of the Court could remove many problems and 
avert many conflicts.”180
In the meantime, however, Khasbulatov urged support for the 
constitutional commission’s draft, which provided for a parliamentary 
system that would have a President as a mere figurehead.181  The Su-
preme Soviet avoided voting on the constitution at all in the spring, so 
the matter was drawn out into the fall.182
The Communist Party case before the Constitutional Court was 
settled on the eve of the predictably contentious fall meeting of the 
Congress of People’s Deputies.  The Congress was convened with the 
issue of constitutional reform prominently on the table.  Taking the 
floor before the delegates, Zorkin spoke with great urgency in light of 
the economic chaos, national deconstruction, and constitutional un-
certainty all around: 
We [the Constitutional Court] have the right to warn you that the Con-
stitution is being violated by both branches, by their various representa-
tives. . . . We urge you:  come to your senses.  While you are arguing here 
and while power is losing its efficiency, another kind of power may arise 
out there. . . . Esteemed People’s Deputies, you are putting the Constitu-
tional Court in a hopeless situation. . . . Either you revise the Constitu-
178 Yeltsin Presents Draft Constitution, TASS WORLD SERVICE, Nov. 2, 1991, translated 
in BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 4, 1991. 
179 Boris Yeltsin, President, Speech to Congress, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS 
BROADCASTS, Apr. 21, 1992. 
180 Id. 
181 Speech By Khasbulatov Urges Deputies To Adopt Draft Constitution (Russia’s Radio 
broadcast Apr. 17, 1992), translated in BBC SUMMARY WORLDWIDE BROADCASTS, Apr. 
20, 1992.  During his speech, Khasbulatov lectured the Supreme Soviet on the details 
of a parliamentary system in the manner of a political scientist explaining the very ba-
sics of a particular form of national government.  The role of the president, however, 
was clearly minimal in Khasbulatov’s scheme.  Id. 
182 Burke, supra note 136, at 3. 
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tion and we will defend a new Constitution, or work for the enforcement 
of the present Constitution.
183
Zorkin’s plea went unheeded, though the influential newspaper 
Kommersant wrote that “[t]he unexpected speech by the head of the 
third branch of power . . . was taken by the Congress as a ‘desperate 
cry of the constitutional soul.’”184
Before the Congress began its meeting, however, Khasbulatov had 
indicated that he thought the President’s proposals would bring Rus-
sia to “another dictatorship.”185  Yeltsin appeared before the Congress 
and thundered, “I’m convinced that the passage of these amendments 
[those supported by Khasbulatov] will do direct damage to Russia, 
disorganize the work to transform the country, destabilize the situa-
tion, rather than correct it.”186  In the end, the amendments that 
would have stripped the President of most of his powers failed by only 
“a few votes” out of the 1041-member body.187  In the Congress, then, 
Yeltsin’s majority was highly precarious.188
Stung by his losses and the fragile nature of his victories, Yeltsin 
called for a referendum to let the people decide which branch should 
have the most power.189  He once again appeared before the Congress 
of People’s Deputies to lay down the gauntlet, accusing Khasbulatov 
personally of 
cheap populism and outright demagogue [sic], disorganization of com-
plicated reforms and finally revival of the old Soviet totalitarian commu-
nist system cursed by the people of Russia and rejected by the interna-
tional community.  This is not even a way back, it’s a way to nowhere.  
It’s a pity that the leader of this course which leads nowhere has become 
183 Valerii Zorkin, Chairman of the Constitutional Court of Russia, Speech at the 
7th Congress of People’s Deputies, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Dec. 
2, 1992. 
184 Nika Stark, The President Was the First To Speak, KOMMERSANT (Moscow), Dec. 2, 
1992, at 9, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Dec. 2, 1992. 
185 Khasbulatov Interview, supra note 174. 
186 Boris Yeltsin, Russian Federation President, Speech at the 7th Congress of Peo-
ple’s Deputies, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Dec. 4, 1992. 
187 Celestine Bohlen, Yeltsin Survives Parliament Tests by Hair’s Breadth, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 6, 1992, at A1. 
188 Yeltsin was not able to obtain parliamentary confirmation of his proposed 
prime minister, Yegor Gaidar.  Gaidar had been associated with the shock therapy that 
resulted in hyperinflation.  This refusal of his preferred prime minister was, for Yeltsin, 
the “final straw.”  Michael Dobbs, Yeltsin Challenges His Foes in Congress, Calls for Referen-
dum, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1992, at A1. 
189 Ivan Ivanov & Sergei Podyapolsky, Yeltsin Calls for Nationwide Referendum, ITAR-
TASS, Dec. 10, 1992. 
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the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation—Ruslan 
Khasbulatov.
190
Khasbulatov, in anger, submitted his resignation on the spot and 
stormed out.191  Later, only slightly more calmly, Khasbulatov sug-
gested that the Kremlin be shut down and turned into a museum.192  
The Congress of People’s Deputies then voted to have a counter-
referendum to Yeltsin’s, which would call for early elections for both 
the presidency and the Congress.193
Valerii Zorkin jumped into the escalating political crisis and 
name-calling, ordering that if Yeltsin and Khasbulatov did not stop 
fighting, he would initiate impeachment proceedings194 against both 
of them in the Constitutional Court.195  To thunderous applause be-
fore the Congress of People’s Deputies, Zorkin proposed that the two 
190 Boris Yeltsin, Russian Federation President, Speech to the 7th Congress of RF 
People’s Deputies, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Dec. 11, 1992. 
191 Id. 
192 Yeltsin on Collision Course with MPs, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 10, 1992, at A1. 
193 Dobbs, supra note 188, at A1. 
194 At that time, the Constitutional Court Act permitted the Constitutional Court 
to take up constitutional matters on its own initiative, including initiating the findings 
that would give rise to impeachment proceedings: 
 The RSFSR Constitutional Court shall render findings at the request of the 
RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet or the Pre-
sidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and also of the higher organs of state 
power of the republics within the RSFSR . . .  on conformity with the RSFSR 
Constitution of acts and decisions by the RSFSR President, and also of other 
senior persons in office of the RSFSR and the republics within the RSFSR, 
where, according to the RSFSR Constitution, unconstitutionality of their acts 
and decisions serves as ground for their dismissal or setting in motion of other 
special mechanism on their responsibility . . . . 
 The RSFSR Constitutional Court shall have the right to render findings . . . 
on its own motion. 
Decree of the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies Enacting the RSFSR Constitu-
tional Court Act art. 74.1(1), subsec. 2 (July 12, 1991) (LEXIS, SovData DiaLine—
SovLegisLine Library). 
195 Zorkin declared: 
[A]s you can see, we are confronted with a profound crisis of the constitu-
tional system.  Unfortunately, the legislative and the executive branches have 
failed to reach common ground to achieve compromise.  Under these circum-
stances, in this crisis situation, confronted with the threat of disintegration of 
the Russian statehood, the Constitutional Court demands from the legislative 
and the executive branches . . . to achieve a compromise as a matter of utmost 
urgency. 
Valery Zorkin, Chairman of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, Speech to 
the 7th Congress of People’s Deputies, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, 
Dec. 10, 1992. 
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sides begin roundtable talks with Zorkin himself as the moderator.196  
Convening the two sides over that weekend, Zorkin succeeded in get-
ting them both to call on their supporters to refrain from violence or 
mass actions and to pledge in public to follow the Constitution.197  By 
late Saturday, Zorkin had presided over a compromise acceptable to 
all.  Yeltsin agreed to withdraw his proposed referendum and to stop 
insisting on Gaidar as the lone candidate for Prime Minister; the Con-
gress of People’s Deputies agreed not to hold its planned votes to strip 
the executive branch of power; and a referendum on a new Constitu-
tion would be held in April 1992.  After the Congress of People’s 
Deputies voted overwhelmingly in favor of this compromise, Khasbu-
latov and Yeltsin shook hands.198  The role of Valerii Zorkin in broker-
ing this deal was clear to all, as he was the one who read the final 
agreement to the Congress of People’s Deputies, ending the danger-
ous standoff.199   
At the time, there was general praise for Zorkin’s role in the crisis.  
Sergei Kovalev, a former dissident, said that Zorkin bent “some lesser 
laws in the name of a greater legality.”200  Oleg Rumyantsev, senior sec-
retary of the Supreme Soviet’s Constitutional Commission, said that 
Zorkin’s role was crucial to the success of the meeting before the 
Congress, as “the Constitutional Court promotes the strengthening of 
political stability in society.”201  Russian political columnist Tomas 
Kolesnichenko said, “Zorkin is a national hero now. . . . Many people 
196 Id.; Yeltsin on Collision Course with MPs, supra note 192, at A1. 
197 Andrey Naryshkin, Yeltsin, Congress Appeal To Refrain from Violence, TASS, Dec. 
11, 1992. 
198 Kremlin Compromise Breaks Political Deadlock, UPI, Dec. 12, 1992. 
199 As a New York Times article explained the next day: 
The deadlock was broken when Chief Justice Zorkin, declaring that it was the 
duty of the Judicial Branch to prevent the collapse of constitutional order, 
summoned both sides to negotiations under his aegis. 
 The original interpretation of his powers by Mr. Zorkin raised some eye-
brows, but even skeptics agreed that in the chaos of Russia’s politics, where 
the principle of legality is tenuous and the separation of powers indistinct, the 
Chief Justice played a critical role. 
Serge Schmemann, Yeltsin Bargains with Congress, Reducing Pressure at the Meeting, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, § 1, at 1. 
200 Serge Schmemann, Russia’s Parliament Hesitates Between Law and Power, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, § 4, at 2. 
201 Ivan Lebedev, Russian MP Comments on Results of the 7th Congress, TASS, Dec. 16, 
1992. 
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saw him as the savior of the nation.”202  The weekly magazines New 
Times and Stolitsa both put Zorkin on their covers.203
Even American observers were impressed.  Writing in the Washing-
ton Post, Russia expert William Taubman said that Zorkin “destroyed 
the separation of powers in order to save it.”204  The New York Times 
editorialized on how surprising it was that a “democratic tempera-
ment” had emerged in Russia.  The editorial credited Valerii Zorkin 
with the transformation, calling him “Russia’s answer to Chief Justice 
John Marshall.”205
On December 29, 1992, Zorkin became the first winner of the Na-
tional Accord Prize, awarded by Komsomolskaya Pravda and a nongov-
ernmental organization, called the Committee for National Accord, 
for his work at the Congress of People’s Deputies.206  Along with the 
now extremely popular Zorkin, the Constitutional Court as a whole 
also came into positive public view.  In a little over a year, fully 17,000 
petitions had come to the Court, asking it to rule on various mat-
ters.207  Both Zorkin and the Court were riding high. 
But Yeltsin and Khasbulatov were bound by the Zorkin-brokered 
agreement only for a short time.  On January 15, 1993, Khasbulatov 
fired off a missive to Yeltsin, notifying him that all of his recent presi-
dential decrees were void because the emergency powers under which 
he had authorized these decrees had expired on December 1.208  Yel-
tsin returned the favor by insisting that the April 11 referendum in-
clude only the question he had wanted all along—whether the presi-
dency or the Supreme Soviet should be the most powerful state 
institution.209  The parliamentary committee charged with coming up 
with the wording for the referendum was hopelessly deadlocked.  The 
202 James P. Gallagher, The Fate of Reform Falls to Yeltsin’s Foes, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 20, 
1992, at C1. 
203 Gerald Nadler, Russian Judge Tells Yeltsin, Foe To Quit Fighting, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 
28, 1993, at A7. 
204 William Taubman, Op-Ed., Russia’s Fumbling Fathers, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 
1992, at C7. 
205 Editorial, A Russian Democrat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at A38. 
206 The prize was given for “important civic steps helping overcome confrontation, 
inter-ethnic, social and political conflicts.”  Tamara Invanova, National Accord Prize To 
Be Given to Zorkin, TASS, Jan. 29, 1993. 
207 Alexander Krasulin, Badinter Meets Judges of the Russian Constitutional Court, 
TASS, Feb. 4, 1993. 
208 Vera Kuznetsova, President Concentrates on Referendum, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZ. (Mos-
cow), Feb. 5, 1993, at 1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Feb. 5, 1993. 
209 Justin Burke, Russians Spar over Form of Government, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Jan. 19, 1993, at 3. 
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Moscow Times editorialized about a “Referendum in search of a ques-
tion.”210
With the referendum’s content undecided, Khasbulatov insisted 
on adding his preferred question to the referendum:  whether imme-
diate elections should be called for both the presidency and Parlia-
ment.  Then, he said that Yeltsin’s office should be abolished.  Next, 
Khasbulatov opposed any referendum at all.  Finally, he maintained 
that Yeltsin should resign if less than fifty percent of voters took part 
in the referendum, as the referendum was Yeltsin’s idea.211  Decem-
ber’s agreement was starting to look more like a temporary cease-fire 
than a permanent resolution.  Both Yeltsin and Khasbulatov had re-
turned to their original positions and to trading insults. 
Rather than insisting that the December compromise be strictly 
adhered to, Zorkin called a press conference to urge all parties to give 
up the April referendum.212  Zorkin later said that he had never be-
lieved that a Constitution could be prepared for a vote so soon when 
he mediated the December agreement between Yeltsin and Khasbula-
tov.213  Moreover, the time was not right for a referendum, he thought: 
Why should we test a sick society with this referendum? . . . A well-fed 
people may be asked to join the Maastricht Treaty (to unite Europe).  
But an attempt to confront a hungry people with a decision on constitu-
tional principles, I am afraid, may be misunderstood and used by ex-
tremist forces.
214
Since the referendum had originally been Yeltsin’s idea, Yeltsin 
did not take kindly to the suggestion that he abandon it.  But faced 
with experts warning him that the referendum might fail for lack of 
turnout, which would make Yeltsin appear to be the loser, he eventu-
ally agreed with Zorkin that the constitutional referendum should be 
postponed.215   
As would become the signature feature of this battle, though, no 
sooner had Yeltsin agreed to give up the referendum than he changed 
his mind.  This riled up Khasbulatov to talk again about his proposal 
210 Gerald Nadler, Outcome Appears Uncertain in Yeltsin-Parliament War, WASH. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at A7. 
211 Richard Boudreaux, Yeltsin Retreats from Move To Bolster His Power, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 10, 1993, at A4. 
212 Nadler, supra note 203, at A7. 
213 Richard Boudreaux, Russia’s Top Judge Stars in Historic Role, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
1993, at A1. 
214 Id. 
215 Boudreaux, supra note 211, at A4. 
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for immediate elections, which further spurred Yeltsin to insist upon 
offering referendum voters the stark choice between the President 
and Parliament—and the two continued their mutual sniping for an-
other month.  Finally, in early March, Yeltsin started hinting darkly at 
declaring a state of emergency to put the conflict to rest.216  Khasbula-
tov responded by having the Supreme Soviet call a meeting of the full 
Congress of People’s Deputies to push forward constitutional 
change.217  A serious crisis loomed again. 
As the constitutional tension deepened, the Constitutional Court 
issued a report that the President had earlier asked it to write on the 
state of constitutionality in Russia.  The text of the report was printed 
in the newspapers, and it identified serious threats to Russia’s consti-
tutional order.  First among them was the looming confrontation be-
tween the legislature and the executive, something the report attrib-
uted to both branches’ failure to operate on the basis of separation of 
powers.218  The routine violation of human rights was another area of 
concern for the Court.219  Federal relations were deteriorating and 
laws were contradictory.220  The Constitutional Court was overbur-
dened with work and so could not review all petitions claiming uncon-
stitutionality of state practices and laws.221  In short, it was not a happy 
report. 
Against this background, the Congress of People’s Deputies was 
convened on March 10, and Khasbulatov addressed the group with a 
diatribe against Yeltsin.222  Zorkin addressed the Congress of People’s 
Deputies on March 11, urging all sides to follow the Constitution.223
The Congress moved toward constitutional change by voting on 
resolutions to amend the Constitution.  And Yeltsin lost on all of the 
issues he cared about.  The April referendum was cancelled by the 
216 Olivia Ward, Yeltsin Hints at Emergency Rule, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 3, 1993, at 
A14. 
217 Serge Schmemann, Russian Congress Will Meet for Showdown with Yeltsin, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1993, § 1, at 5. 
218 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, REPORT TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION SUPREME SOVIET 
ON THE STATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LEGALITY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Mar. 5, 
1993), reprinted in ROSSIISKAYA GAZ., Mar. 11, 1993, translated in BBC SUMMARY WORLD 
BROADCASTS, Mar. 18, 1993. 
219 Id. § 2. 
220 Id. §§ 3-4. 
221 Id. § 5. 
222 Andrew Higgins, Yeltsin Duels for Power in Moscow, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 
11, 1993, at 1. 
223 Gennady Talalayev, Chairman of Constitutional Court Calls for Accord, TASS, Mar. 
11, 1993. 
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Congress; the body also voted to strip the presidency of much of its 
power.224  Yeltsin stormed out, threatening to take his case directly to 
the people over the heads of the Congress.  In his view, the referen-
dum was on, no matter what the Congress of People’s Deputies 
wanted.  One of Yeltsin’s advisors, Sergei Shakhrai, warned darkly that 
“[w]e are on the verge of unpredictable events.”225
Zorkin left for the United States, where he had long-planned 
meetings with American leaders.  While there, he gave a press confer-
ence in Washington, defending the active role of the Court in mediat-
ing between the two hostile branches of government: 
When we try to decipher that provision relating to the constitutional 
court which is contained in our constitution to the effect that this is the 
supreme organ of judiciary, called upon to defend the constitutional sys-
tem, I hope and believe that perhaps our posterity will not judge us very 
harshly for the fact that we have tried to interfere into this argument be-
tween the two powers.  We have done and are doing so not in order to 
take power away from them, but in order to make it stronger and active, 
operable.
226
After the Congress of People’s Deputies had adjourned, and while 
Zorkin was still in Washington, Yeltsin’s advisors began urging the 
President to take “extremely tough measures” to preserve his pow-
ers.227  Hearing of a rumored presidential declaration of emergency, 
Zorkin returned early to Russia to announce his opposition to any 
such measures.228  In business as usual, however, the Constitutional 
Court met on March 19 and voided twenty-seven decrees made by 
Khasbulatov and the Supreme Soviet that ran counter to Yeltsin’s re-
forms in the run-up to the crisis.229  Yeltsin, however, was not appeased 
by the Court’s blow to his rival. 
224 Serge Schmemann, Russian Legislature Votes To Reduce Yeltsin’s Powers and Assume 
Dominant Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A1. 
225 Margaret Shapiro, Congress Curbs Yeltsin’s Power, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1993, at 
A1. 
226 Valery Zorkin, Russian Supreme Court, Remarks at the National Press Building, 
in FED. NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 15, 1993. 
227 Margaret Shapiro, Key Advisers Press Yeltsin To Declare Presidential Rule, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 17, 1993, at A29. 
228 Gerald Nadler, Russian Judge Opposes Yeltsin on Direct Rule, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 
20, 1993, at A7. 
229 Alexander Balashov & Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, Court Repeals 27 Decrees by 
Speaker, KOMMERSANT (Moscow), Mar. 20, 1993, at 3, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., 
Mar. 20, 1993.  For the Court decision itself, see In re Decree of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet, On the Social Protection of the Population and on Putting in Order 
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Yeltsin appeared on television to declare a state of emergency on 
Saturday night, March 20, 1993.  He assumed the powers to rule by 
decree, and he called for a referendum on his powers to be held on 
April 25.  While he did not dissolve Parliament, he ordered it not to 
violate his decrees.230  The television broadcast, unaccompanied as it 
was by any written decrees that might have explained the legal basis 
for his announcement, caused the other branches of power to spring 
into action to attempt to stop Yeltsin from plunging into the constitu-
tional abyss. 
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet met that night and declared 
that Yeltsin was “trying to establish a dictatorship.”231  Previously loyal 
Vice President Aleksander Rutskoi went over to the side of Parliament 
in the crisis.  Shortly after midnight, Rutskoi appeared at the White 
House, the office building of the Russian Parliament, to say that he 
was refusing to co-sign Yeltsin’s decrees because they were unconstitu-
tional.  Some parliamentary leaders also appeared in front of the 
White House to protest Yeltsin’s actions.  And standing alongside Rut-
skoi and the parliamentary leaders on the steps of the White House 
the night that Yeltsin claimed the right to govern alone was Valerii 
Zorkin.232
As it turns out, Zorkin had heard about the declaration of emer-
gency before it was made.  He had called an emergency session of the 
Constitutional Court earlier in the day to consider the matter.  The 
Court had sent Yeltsin a letter before his television broadcast, urging 
him not to take up presidential rule.  But Yeltsin had not answered.233  
Instead, Yeltsin made his drastic announcement on a Saturday night, 
when newspapers and news departments of television stations were 
closed for the weekend. 
Once the emergency had been formally announced, Zorkin left 
the Constitutional Court building, where he had been meeting with 
his colleagues, and came to the steps of the White House where he 
symbolically joined forces with Rutskoi (now a refugee from the ex-
ecutive branch) and the parliamentary deputies.  “The president has 
assumed the role of an absolute ruler,” Zorkin said at the White 
the Regulation of Price Formation for Individual Types of Output et al., VED. RF, 1993, 
No. 15, Item 536, translated in 30 STATUTES & DECISIONS 75 (July-Aug. 1994). 
230 Richard Boudreaux, Yeltsin Moves To Rule by Decree, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993, at 
A1. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
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House.  “This is an attempt at coup d’etat. . . . It is regrettable and 
tragic.”234
The next day, Parliament went into special session, voting Sunday 
afternoon to formally ask the Constitutional Court to rule on the con-
stitutionality of Yeltsin’s declaration of emergency.  Parliament indi-
cated that, if the Constitutional Court found against Yeltsin, Parlia-
ment would move to impeach him, as allowed by the Constitution.235
The Constitutional Court continued crisis deliberations, meeting 
all Sunday night before breaking up on Monday morning at 7 a.m.  It 
did not immediately make a ruling, perhaps knowing that finding 
against Yeltsin would almost surely push the Supreme Soviet to initiate 
impeachment proceedings.  That could only make things worse.  An-
ticipating that the Court would rule against Yeltsin, however, some of 
Yeltsin’s aides began a press campaign to say that Zorkin had already 
chosen sides and that the outcome of the Court’s deliberations could 
not possibly be fair.236
For his part, Zorkin went before the press on Monday and indi-
cated that he was speaking on behalf of the whole Court and not just 
for himself.  Surely, the Court had the right to look into the decrees, 
he said, even though it had not received any copies of them; Yeltsin 
had ignored all requests to provide any of the emergency decrees to 
the Court.  These decrees, Zorkin pointed out, “contained several 
items which, to put it mildly, are not in the Constitution and the law 
on the Constitutional Court.”237
While public officials and political commentators had praised 
Zorkin during his earlier successful mediation, a chorus of commenta-
tors now denounced him as one-sided and closed-minded.238  Some 
described him as emotional and incapable of being impartial, seeming 
to have already publicly chosen sides by appearing at the White House 
234 Id. 
235 Margaret Shapiro & Fred Hiatt, Crisis in Moscow:  Russian Legislature Moves 
Against Yeltsin, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1993, at A1. 
236 Serge Schmemann, Top Russian Jurist Urges Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
1993, at A1. 
237 Id. 
238 Even the New York Times, which had editorialized so exuberantly in Zorkin’s fa-
vor a few short months before, ran a story that explained:  “Appointed by democrats to 
uphold the Constitution and the law against Communist arbitrariness, Mr. Zorkin and 
his colleagues on the court now find themselves defending that Constitution against 
democrats who rejected it as a hostile obstacle to progress.”  Id. 
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on Saturday night.239  Perhaps Zorkin was also tired, because the Con-
stitutional Court had met through all of Sunday night and headed 
into an all-night session on Monday as well.240  By daytime Monday, 
casting off the criticism, Zorkin pleaded for Yeltsin and Parliament to 
reach an agreement among themselves.241  His tone sounded almost 
desperate.  Speaking directly to Yeltsin, who still was not returning 
Zorkin’s phone calls, Zorkin publicly begged: 
Boris Nikolayevich, think, we are all people, Russians, perhaps you have 
made a mistake, perhaps a catastrophic mistake.  But tell the parliamen-
tarians this; after all, they are also Russians.  Perhaps there is a chance, 
after all, in the final analysis, jointly to turn away the development of 
Russia from a catastrophe to a consensus.
242
There was no answer from Yeltsin. 
The Constitutional Court issued its decision on Tuesday, ruling 
against Yeltsin’s seizure of powers with a vote of ten to three.  Zorkin 
wrote for the majority in finding that Yeltsin’s television address vio-
lated the Constitution: 
The Constitution and legislation of the Russian Federation do not pro-
vide for the possibility of the introduction of a special procedure for 
administration. . . . While giving assurances that the work of the repre-
sentative bodies of power of Russia is not being suspended, the President 
nonetheless announced a change in the division of competence among 
the federal bodies of power [which is] embodied in the Constitution.
243
The Court declared that Yeltsin’s unilateral decision to go forward 
with a referendum was also contrary to the Constitution, which out-
lined different procedures for calling referenda.244  Yeltsin’s loss was 
complete, though the Court indicated that it shared Yeltsin’s sense 
239 David Hearst, Hot Words from the Bench, Cool Nerves in the Barracks, GUARDIAN 
(London), Mar. 23, 1993, at 11. 
240 It is quite striking in the press coverage of these events that no constitutional 
judges other than Zorkin were ever as visible as Zorkin before the Court struck down 
Yeltsin’s emergency pronouncements. 
241 George Rodrigue, Judge Urges Yeltsin To Accept Compromise, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Mar. 23, 1993, at A1. 
242 Speech by Constitutional Court Chairman:  Yeltsin’s Actions Unconstitutional (Russia 
TV broadcast Mar. 21, 1993), translated in BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 23, 
1993. 
243 In re President Yeltsin’s Address to the Citizens of Russia, VED. RF, 1993, No. 13, 
Item 466, translated in 30 STATUTES & DECISIONS 86, 88-89 (July-Aug. 1994) (alteration 
in original). 
244 Id. at 89. 
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both of constitutional impasse and of the need to have a new constitu-
tion. 
At this point, however, the judges of the Court split in public.  Jus-
tice Ernst Ametistov, who had been publicly silent until this point, 
openly broke with the Court’s majority.  In an interview, Ametistov 
announced, “[t]o my mind, the chairman of the court and the judges 
who took his side violated the constitution even before the decision 
was handed down this morning.”245  Though Zorkin had said on Mon-
day that he spoke for the whole Court, Ametistov said he had never 
been consulted.  Later in the week, Ametistov wrote in the journal 
Kuranty that the Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on a television 
broadcast and that Zorkin had violated the Constitutional Court Act 
by making public statements on a case before it was decided.246  On 
Thursday, another judge of the Court, Justice Tamara Morshchakova, 
explained her dissent from the Court’s ruling on Yeltsin’s television 
address by saying that the Court’s decision had been more political 
than legal.247
With the Court openly divided, political officials on Yeltsin’s side 
of the question joined in attacking both the Court in general and 
Zorkin in particular for not being impartial.248  Yeltsin supporters, 
gathered in a downtown movie theater, yelled “Down with Zorkin!” 
after the Deputy Prime Pinister told the crowd that “[u]nfortunately, 
the Constitutional Court has gone into politics.”249  Yeltsin’s Justice 
Minister, however, stepped down in the midst of the crisis, signaling 
that not everyone was unified within presidential circles.250
Even the Western media turned on Zorkin and the Court.  The 
Washington Post wrote, “Russia’s Constitutional Court . . . is far from 
the apolitical body its name might suggest.”251  The New York Times de-
scribed the Constitutional Court as “a young court with untested pow-
ers” that had “decided on this crucial issue without hearing any argu-
245 Paule Robitaille, Dissenting Judge Rejects Court Ruling, UPI, Mar. 23, 1993. 
246 Ernst Ametistov, Dissenting Opinion, KURANTY (Moscow), Mar. 26, 1993, at 1, 
translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Mar. 26, 1993. 
247 Supreme Soviet Hears Criticism of Constitutional Court’s Decision (Russia TV broad-
cast Mar. 25, 1993), translated in BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 27, 1993. 
248 Id. 
249 Richard Boudreaux, Top Russian Court Rules Yeltsin Act Unconstitutional, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993, at A1. 
250 Rodrigue, supra note 241, at A1. 
251 Margaret Shapiro, Constitutional Court Plays a Political Role, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 
1993, at A23. 
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ments from lawyers or having any briefs before it.”252  The Boston Globe 
published an interview with Ametistov in which he claimed that his 
colleagues on the bench were influenced by “old Communist ideol-
ogy.”253
Zorkin took to the Russian media to press his own point of view, as 
he had done so often before in times of crisis.  In an interview with 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, he said that the Court had not demanded Yel-
tsin’s resignation, and that both the President and Parliament needed 
to work together to end the crisis.254  Another judge on the Court who 
sided with Zorkin, Justice Nikolai Vedernikov, gave an interview to the 
Chicago Tribune in which he defended the Court’s decision and de-
clared rather graphically that “Yeltsin is urinating on democracy!”255
After the Court decision was announced, the Supreme Soviet 
started impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin by calling another 
emergency session of the Congress of People’s Deputies.  It based its 
case for impeachment on the Constitutional Court decision that 
found Yeltsin’s Saturday night pronouncements unconstitutional.  
The eventual vote for impeachment, which would require two-thirds 
of the Congress, was likely to be close.  It could not, however, be ruled 
out.256
By Wednesday of that tense week, Yeltsin showed some signs of 
backing down.  He finally issued a formal decree to back up his Satur-
day television announcement.  The decree called for a referendum, 
but did not mention the “special powers” he had claimed Saturday 
night.257  Actually, in the end, the decree did not contain any of the 
measures to which the Court had objected.258  Yeltsin then sent a 
memorandum to the Supreme Soviet making reasonable arguments 
on behalf of the referendum, and Khasbulatov refrained from making 
belligerent noises.259
252 Serge Schmemann, Crisis in Moscow:  Yeltsin and Rivals Are in a Standoff in Power 
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A1. 
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1993, at 23. 
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PRAVDA (Moscow), Mar. 24, 1993, at 1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Mar. 24, 1993. 
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When the Congress of People’s Deputies met in an emergency ses-
sion on Friday, Zorkin addressed the group.  Defending the decision 
of the Constitutional Court to take up Yeltsin’s television speech and 
to rule its primary elements unconstitutional before the decrees were 
finalized, Zorkin called on the Congress to be reasonable and to take 
“responsibility for the destiny of the country.”260  He offered a ten-
point program that reaffirmed constitutional principles, while listing a 
variety of problematic constitutional provisions, particularly those in-
volving separation of powers and federalism.  But first, Zorkin said, 
there should be new elections and a moratorium on constitutional 
amendments until after the elections could be held.261  Khasbulatov 
started to back down too, and went on television Friday night to say 
that he “didn’t summon the Congress to fire anyone.”262
By the end of week, Yeltsin appeared before the Congress of Peo-
ple’s Deputies with a resolution that spread the blame for the crisis: 
Unfortunately, young statehood resulted in violations of the Constitution 
by the Supreme Soviet, the government, the President and the Constitu-
tional Court.  It is not just to accuse only the President. . . . All the three 
power branches allowed the crisis, they must be responsible for it.
263
He proposed that the Supreme Soviet take into account the report 
that the Constitutional Court had issued just before the crisis began, 
the report about the state of constitutionality in Russia.  Yeltsin also 
said that he would elaborate within the week on measures that all 
three branches could agree upon.264
What might one make of the crisis of the week of March 20, 1993?  
Some interpreted it as a clever device through which Yeltsin was able 
to determine who was really on his side and who was his enemy.  Oth-
ers thought it showed Yeltsin’s weakness and impatience.  Still others 
thought that Yeltsin had been merely reading aloud something his 
aides shoved before him that Saturday night on television.265  People 
were inclined to be forgiving. 
260 Valery Zorkin, Chairman, Constitutional Court, Speech at the 9th Extraordi-
nary Congress of People’s Deputies, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, 
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Not so for Zorkin.  Perhaps the most important legacy of that dif-
ficult week was that Zorkin had been baited, and he bit.  One com-
mentator said that Zorkin had appeared that week to be “on the edge 
of breakdown.”266  A “Muscovite” was quoted as saying that Zorkin had 
reacted “with the hysterics of an abandoned wife.”267  Yeltsin’s entou-
rage was delighted.  Said one Yeltsin advisor, “[w]e don’t really have a 
Constitutional Court anymore.  It has descended to cheap politics and 
no longer has the right to deliver rulings.”268
By the end of the week, the Congress of People’s Deputies had 
agreed to a national referendum on whether the public had faith in 
Yeltsin, just as Yeltsin had wanted all along.  But the proposed refer-
endum also included the question that Khasbulatov had wanted to ask 
all along:  was the public ready to hold early elections for the Presi-
dent and the Congress?269
On March 31, Yeltsin asked the Constitutional Court to rule on 
the constitutionality of the Congress’s attempt to impeach him the 
previous week.  The grounds for Yeltsin’s petition?  The Congress had 
started impeachment proceedings based on the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment that Yeltsin had unconstitutionally seized power through 
special administrative measures, when in fact he had not actually done 
so.270  Though Yeltsin appealed to the Court as if all were forgotten, 
his petition highlighted how ridiculous the Court appeared for having 
declared unconstitutional something Yeltsin was now asserting had 
never been real. 
The polls reflected how polarized the public had become during 
this week of crisis and how far Zorkin’s popularity had fallen because 
of it.  While half of those polled said they trusted Yeltsin after this epi-
sode, only two percent said they trusted Zorkin.  Fully one quarter, 
however, said they had no trust in anyone in national leadership.271  
Some prominent politicians on Yeltsin’s side of the conflict—
including presidential advisor Sergei Shakhrai and St. Petersburg 
266 Id. 
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Mayor Anatoly Sobchak—called for the abolition of the Court.272  
Even the Petersburg Memorial Society’s Human Rights Commission 
called on Zorkin to resign.273
At a roundtable discussion at the Russian Press Ministry, Constitu-
tional Court justices Nikolai Vitruk, Ernst Amestistov, Tamara 
Morshchakova, Gadis Gadzhiev, and Boris Ebzeyev attempted to de-
fend the institution of the Constitutional Court even though “individ-
ual Judges may be bad.”  They agreed in public that Zorkin had vio-
lated the law himself on several occasions.274  Rumors circulated that 
Zorkin had been bought off to support Khasbulatov and the Supreme 
Soviet in the crisis by receiving three apartments from the parliamen-
tary speaker, something Zorkin always forcefully denied.275  With pub-
lic opinion, prominent politicians, and even his own colleagues de-
serting him, Zorkin was reeling from the effects of the faux emergency 
that he had sincerely believed was real. 
Zorkin responded as usual—by holding a major press conference 
to defend himself and by presenting himself as the guardian of the 
Constitution: 
The Constitutional Court is defending the President, just as it is defend-
ing parliament[arian]s, but only insofar as they remain the lawful Presi-
dent of Russia and the lawful Parliament of Russia.  Any other way is 
closed to the Constitutional Court . . . . But I would like you to under-
stand our position. . . . The unilateral withdrawal from a social contract, 
of constitutional compromise means that all the parties to this process 
become free from their pledges.  There can be no doubt about what this 
holds in store for us.  It will be an explosion, a catastrophe.
276
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In response to questions, Zorkin replied:  “If there is a unilateral at-
tempt to destroy the Constitution, we will resist it.”277
And he responded to a question about his own involvement in 
politics with his own rhetorical questions: 
[W]ho has involved us in this politicized process?  Have we ourselves 
jumped into it recklessly, as into a whirlpool, or have we realized that the 
sides cannot come to terms and emerge onto a peaceful and civilized 
road?  Should we have kept silent in such a situation?  Moreover, in De-
cember, if you remember, the two sides themselves appealed to us. . . . 
We are defending constitutional space for politics.
278
But which Constitution?  As the political debate intensified 
throughout 1993, the object of dispute was increasingly the Constitu-
tion itself.  The existing one established Parliament as the supreme 
power in the Russian state; Yeltsin and his entourage eagerly wanted 
the President to dominate Parliament.  Zorkin, perhaps surprisingly, 
consistently defended the idea of a presidential republic under a new 
Constitution,279 even though he was generally seen as being opposed 
to Yeltsin after the March crisis. 
As the widely disputed referendum approached in April, the Su-
preme Soviet changed the ground rules for this public vote, making it 
much harder for Yeltsin’s side to prevail.  The new rules required Yel-
tsin to gain the support not just of half of those who voted, but half of 
the whole electorate, whether voting or not.  The Constitutional Court 
decided that these new rules were unconstitutional in a decision that 
favored Yeltsin.280  When the referendum was finally held at the end of 
April, 59% indicated their confidence in Yeltsin, 54% approved his 
economic policies, 49% wanted an early presidential election, and 
67% wanted an early parliamentary election.  Turnout was estimated 
at a surprising 65.7%.281
speaking for the Court.  Whether the Court thought he was speaking for all of the 
judges increasingly came into question, as we will see. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
279 Tamara Zamayatina, Russia Must Become a Presidential Republic—Zorkin, ITAR-
TASS, Apr. 15, 1993. 
280 In re Congressional Decrees on the All-Russian Referendum et al., VED. RF, 
1993, No. 18, Item 653, translated in 30 STATUTES & DECISIONS 39 (Sept.-Oct. 1994); 
Andrew Higgins, Court Ruling Boosts Yeltsin’s Hopes in Poll, INDEPENDENT (London), 
Apr. 22, 1993, at 10. 
281 Yeltsin Opponents Move To Discredit Vote Results, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 27, 1993, 
at A1. 
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Yeltsin, feeling vindicated by the strong support in the referen-
dum, threw down the gauntlet to Parliament, by claiming (through a 
spokesman) that he was prepared to “implement the will of the peo-
ple in full,” a move interpreted as meaning that Yeltsin felt free to ig-
nore Parliament and therefore the Constitution.282  The irrepressible 
Zorkin announced that Russia was in the grips of radicalism because 
both sides in the constitutional crisis believed, “I come to power and 
destroy you.”  He called for compromise between Yeltsin and Parlia-
ment in considering a new constitution.283  When Yeltsin proposed 
having a constitutional assembly draft a new constitution in the sum-
mer, Zorkin attacked the proposal and insisted on maintaining com-
pliance with the methods for changing the Constitution that were 
specified in the existing one:  either adoption by the Supreme Soviet 
and the Congress of People’s Deputies or adoption by a national ref-
erendum.284
Yeltsin ignored Zorkin’s calls to draft a new Constitution only in 
the way permitted under the existing constitution, and instead con-
vened a 762-member constitutional drafting assembly in June.  
Though the assembly gave every appearance of being representative, 
bringing together Russians from all of the regions (save Chechnya) 
and from a wide variety of walks of life, all of the members of the con-
stitutional assembly were in fact hand-picked by Yeltsin.285  When 
Khasbulatov tried to address the assembly, he was blocked from speak-
ing by Yeltsin’s supporters and angrily stormed out.286  “We are on the 
road to dictatorship,” said Khasbulatov.287  “What we have seen is how 
a court crowns a king,” said Zorkin,288 adding that there was an “evil 
spirit” hovering over the constitutional assembly on the opening 
day.289  Even so, given that he had always supported presidentialism 
over parliamentarism in his public speeches, Zorkin then said he 
282 David Hearst, Yeltsin Claims Poll Is Vote for Reform, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 28, 
1993, at 10. 
283 Nikolai Kishkin, Valery Zorkin:  “Radicalism Hinders Society,”  TRUD (Moscow), May 
15, 1993, at 1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., May 15, 1993. 
284 Sergei Obukhov, Valery Zorkin:  “A Law Made in an Unconstitutional Field Will Not 
Lead to National Accord,” ROSSIISKAIA GAZ., May 18, 1993, at 2, translated in RUSS. PRESS 
DIG., May 18, 1993. 
285 AHDIEH, supra note 118, at 57-58. 
286 Daniel Sneider, Yeltsin Harks Back to Czars in Bid To Recast Government, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 7, 1993, at 3. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 Yuri Feofanov, Judges in Gowns and Judges in Jackets, IZVESTIA (Moscow), June 17, 
1993, at 5, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., June 17, 1993. 
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backed Yeltsin’s call for a strong presidency in the new constitution, as 
long as it was not “dictatorial.”290
Fed up with Zorkin’s public commentaries from the March crisis 
onward, however, other constitutional judges rebelled and Yeltsin, see-
ing Zorkin weakened, moved in to discredit him.  Justice Nikolai 
Vitruk called upon Zorkin to resign, saying that if Zorkin did not, 
Vitruk would leave the Court himself.291  Intensifying public impres-
sions of the split within the Court, a document was leaked from the 
Kremlin during this period, indicating that the President’s office was 
handicapping its chances with the Court by assessing the political 
leanings of the individual judges and perhaps leaning on the judges 
themselves.292  Yeltsin blocked Zorkin’s entrance to his state-provided 
summer house (dacha) and took away his privilege to use a state-
provided car.293  Yeltsin even ordered the government security service 
to stop guarding the Court.294  Hints circulated in the Russian media 
that “compromising material about most of the judges” existed.295  
Rumors that the Kremlin was trying to stage a “palace revolution” by 
replacing Zorkin as President of the Court with Tamara Morshchakova, 
one of the judges who had supported Yeltsin in the March 20 crisis, 
were persistent.296  But nothing happened.  In despair, Justice Anatoly 
Kononov told Megapolis-Express:  “The Court has lost its juridical men-
290 Court Chief Gives Yeltsin an Unexpected Boost, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1993, at A8. 
291 Guy Chazan, Russian Chief Justice, Parliament Speaker Attacked by Colleagues, UPI, 
June 8, 1993. 
292 A transcript of a conversation allegedly held among Yeltsin’s advisors in late 
April was conveniently leaked to Pravda for publication on June 10.  It said, mention-
ing by name a number of justices on the court: 
 [Mikhail] Barsukov [Yeltsin confidante]:  “Opposition to Zorkin on the 
Court is growing. We can count on Oleinik.  Kononov should be monitored, 
although he is a leftist.  Support the Zorkin-Vitruk confrontation.  Think 
about Seleznev.” 
 [Sergei] Filatov [Yeltsin’s chief of staff]:  “I met with Ametistov.  He is ours.  
Morshchakova is wavering.  As for Kononov, he is with us.” 
Anna Ostapchuk, The Judicial Shrine May Be Turning into a Party Cell, NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZ. (Moscow), June 16, 1993, at 1, translated in What Does Constitutional Court’s 
Split Mean?, CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, July 14, 1993, at 13, 15. 
293 Guy Chazan, Yeltsin Boots Top Judge out of His Dacha, UPI, June 11, 1993. 
294 Valery Zorkin Prevented from Quiet Life and Work, VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA (Mos-
cow), June 11, 1993, at 1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., June 11, 1993. 
295 Vladimir Orlov, An Open Finale to the Drama on Ilyinka Street, MOSKOVSKIYE NO-
VOSTI (Moscow), June 20, 1993, at A9, translated in What Does Constitutional Court’s Split 
Mean?, supra note 292, at 14.  Ilyinka Street is the address of the Constitutional Court. 
296 Vladimir Orlov, President vs Parliament:  Last Battle Tactics, MOSCOW NEWS, Aug. 
20, 1993, at 34. 
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tality.  Under the circumstances, the best thing for all of us to do 
would be to tender our resignations at once.”297
Throughout the summer as the constitutional assembly worked 
toward a new constitution, however, the Constitutional Court stayed in 
place and continued its work of reviewing constitutional petitions un-
der the existing constitution.  Members of the Court, and the Court as 
a whole, submitted their thoughts to the assembly for its considera-
tion.298  No one resigned.  Zorkin continued to fend off suggestions 
that the public split within the Court, and a number of dissents in its 
public decisions, meant that the Court was no longer operating on the 
basis of law: 
I hope you would agree with me that the words politics and law are not 
divided by an impenetrable wall.  What is law but a means, a form of life, 
including political life[?]  . . . [T]he Supreme Court of the United States 
of America sometimes passes its decisions on a four-by-five pattern—and 
no one says that the Supreme Court has split. . . . I think we should all 
get accustomed to democratic practices.
299
But to the charge that he had changed his own mind frequently 
(something that, as we have seen, is hard to sustain, given that he sup-
ported presidentialism, constitutional modification under the existing 
constitutional procedures, and compromise between the political fac-
tions throughout the crisis), he nonetheless damningly said, “I think 
that there is something to be said for a chameleon because he can 
survive in the environment in which he lives.  If he didn’t do it, he 
wouldn’t last a day.”300
When a new draft Constitution featuring strong presidential pow-
ers came to a vote before the constitutional assembly in July, Zorkin 
indicated his support,301 saying that the proposal was “within the civi-
lized framework of all constitutions.”302  Though he thought that the 
presidential powers were “excessive” because they allowed the Presi-
dent to dissolve Parliament, and though he indicated that the pro-
297 Tatiana Borovik, Constitutional Court:  Crack Is Not Wide, So Far, MEGAPOLIS-
EXPRESS, June 16, 1993, at 2, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., June 16, 1993. 
298 Valery Zorkin, Chairman, Constitutional Court, Press-Lunch, in OFFICIAL 
KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, June 28, 1993. 
299 Id. (some ellipses in original). 
300 Id. 
301 Lyudmila Alexandrova, Chief Justice Votes for Constitution, Diamond Producer 
Against, ITAR-TASS, July 12, 1993. 
302 Valery Zorkin:  Figure 15 Should Stay Sacred, SEGODNYA (Russia), July 16, 1993, at 
1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., July 16, 1993. 
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posal to increase the number of constitutional judges from fifteen to 
eighteen was not a good idea, on balance he approved the draft.303
Throughout the summer of 1993, then, Zorkin was acting in a 
more conciliatory fashion by participating in the constitutional draft-
ing process and generally supporting what Yeltsin’s followers wanted.  
But Zorkin’s popularity was still low.  (Then again, the Russian public 
viewed few politicians with any respect during this time.)  In a poll 
taken in August 1993, only 20% said they would vote for Yeltsin for 
President if elections were held that day; he was the most popular 
politician on the list.  A miniscule 1% supported Zorkin for that posi-
tion.304
Interviewed in August 1993, however, a hint of paranoia crept into 
Zorkin’s reflections on his constitutional role:  “There are things I 
cannot write even in my diary. . . . Let me express this the way Schiller 
did:  the customs officials are rummaging in my luggage, but all my 
secrets are in my head.”305  Perhaps Zorkin was prescient, because in 
early September, right after Zorkin left the dacha that had been re-
turned to him during the period of conciliation over the summer, Yel-
tsin ordered presidential security guards to blockade Zorkin’s dacha 
again.306  When Zorkin was finally allowed to return to recover his pos-
sessions from the dacha, he found his cat dead—killed by a bullet 
wound.307
As it turned out, the Russian Parliament itself was the next fatality.  
On Wednesday, September 21, Yeltsin isssued a decree that seized all 
state power, dissolved Parliament and announced new elections to be 
held for Parliament in December.308  The problem was that the Con-
stitution then in place did not give the President the legal ability to 
dissolve Parliament.  Yeltsin acknowledged as much in his official de-
cree, but argued that the April referendum had “supreme judicial 
power” and permitted him to take this step.309  Parliament refused to 
303 Id. 
304 Andrei Suldin, Yeltsin Remains Most Popular Politician in Russia—Poll, ITAR-
TASS, Aug. 5, 1993. 
305 Vladimir Orlov, Valery Zorkin:  A Year and a Half in Search of Objectivity, MOSCOW 
NEWS, Aug. 13, 1993, at 33. 
306 Helen Womack, Judge Accuses “Spiteful” Yeltsin, INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 
10, 1993, at 11. 
307 Olivia Ward, Yeltsin Fires Another Salvo at Foes, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 19, 1993, at 
F3. 
308 Margaret Shapiro, Yeltsin Dissolves Parliament, Orders New Vote, WASH. POST, Sept. 
22, 1993, at A1. 
309 Id. 
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be dissolved and promptly stripped Yeltsin of his powers.  Parliament 
instead swore in Vice President Rutskoi in Yeltsin’s place.310  There 
were rumors of troop movements in the city. 
The Constitutional Court went into emergency session, as they 
had done for the March crisis.  The judges decided after a three-hour 
session by a vote of ten to four that Yeltsin had violated the Constitu-
tion by dissolving the Parliament.311  This time, however, in contrast 
with the March emergency decision, the Constitutional Court found 
that the dissolution of Parliament constituted legal grounds for Yel-
tsin’s impeachment.312  As usual, it was Valerii Zorkin who was out in 
front, speaking for the Court and making the announcement about 
the Court’s decision on television.  Zorkin’s announcement was pub-
lished along with the Court’s official finding: 
The highest leadership of the country has resolutely moved to a point 
beyond which lies the loss of control over the development of events, the 
paralysis of power, chaos, and anarchy on the territory of an enormous 
country, [which remains] as formerly a nuclear superpower.  Such a 
condition will not last long and will inevitably lead to a dictatorship of 
one side or another, with all its attendant attributes.
313
Zorkin then proposed a four-point plan to deal with the crisis:  
First, the Congress of People’s Deputies should pass a resolution per-
mitting early concurrent elections for both the presidency and Par-
liament.  Second, Yeltsin should be permitted to retain control over 
the government, but the Congress of People’s Deputies should super-
vise the cabinet.  Third, the Supreme Soviet should suspend work on 
its draft constitution and ensure merely that the elections were legally 
carried out.  Fourth: 
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation shall be recognized 
in the capacity of a guarantor of the achieved agreement, ceasing at the 
given stage the function of middleman in the midst of political strife, 
310 Id.; Steven Erlanger, Showdown in Moscow; Yeltsin’s Gamble:  Force the Issue Now, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1993, at A19. 
311 What the Constitutional Court Has Decided, ROSSIISKIE VESTI, Sept. 23, 1993, at 1, 
translated in 30 STATUTES & DECISIONS 35, 35 (Nov.-Dec. 1994). 
312 Given the situation of legal fluidity, it is significant that the Court published its 
conclusions not in the parliamentary newspaper, which had been its practice, but in-
stead in one of the leading newspapers.  In re Edict No. 1400, On Staged Constitutional 
Reform in the Russian Federation et al., ROSSIISKAYA GAZ., Sept. 23, 1993, at 2, trans-
lated in 30 STATUTES & DECISIONS 33, 33 (Nov.-Dec. 1994). 
313 The Constitutional Crisis and Possible Measures To Overcome It, ROSSIISKAIA GAZ., 
Sept. 23, 1993, at 1, translated in 30 STATUTES & DECISIONS 34, 34 (Nov.-Dec. 1994) 
(brackets in original). 
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and shall continue to work in its normal regime, concentrating its atten-
tion on the defense of the constitutional rights of citizens.
314
The decision of the Constitutional Court that Yeltsin had violated 
the Constitution and could therefore be impeached prompted an an-
gry dissent from Justice Amestistov, who had sided with Yeltsin ever 
since the Court started to split into factions.  He slammed the majority 
for deciding prematurely, outside of the regular Court procedure, on 
the constitutionality of Yeltsin’s decree, and he supported Yeltsin’s 
view that the President was empowered to act simply on the basis of 
the April referendum: 
From the preamble to the Edict, it follows that it was passed with the 
goals of the execution of the will of the Russian people expressed in the 
referendum of 25 April 1993, which is grossly ignored by the Congress of 
People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.  In 
the Edict are brought forth multiple facts of serious violations of this 
will.  Moreover, it is necessary to take account of part 2 of Article 2 of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation, in accordance with which the 
people shall exercise state power not only through the soviets of people’s 
deputies, but also directly, that is, through referendum. . . . This, in our 
opinion, means that the decision of the referendum concerning any 
concrete question has greater legal force than other laws, and even than 
the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as precisely this decision is 
the direct and highest expression of rule by the people.315
With the Court visibly split, Zorkin announced that he did not in-
tend to mediate between the President and Parliament in this new 
fight.316  He did continue, however, to press his four-point plan for 
solving the crisis.  Khasbulatov convened a press conference and an-
nounced his support for Zorkin’s ideas.317  Yeltsin, on the other hand, 
refused to talk to Parliament and ignored Zorkin’s proposal.  Noting 
that after his decree, Parliament had ceased to exist, Yeltsin rejected 
the suggestion of a “dialogue” with the other side:  “Can’t be, won’t be 
and needn’t be.”318
314 Id. at 34 -35. 
315 Separate Opinion of Judge Ernst Ametistov, ROSSIISKIE VESTI, Sept. 25, 1993, at 
1, translated in 30 STATUTES & DECISIONS 35, 38-39 (Nov.-Dec. 1994). 
316 Guy Chazan, Judge Calls for Early Elections To Solve Russia’s Crisis, UPI, Sept. 22, 
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317 Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman, Supreme Soviet, Press Conference, in OFFICIAL 
KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Sept. 23, 1993. 
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With the United States and European governments lining up be-
hind Yeltsin, the military steadfastly remaining neutral, the central 
bank supporting Yeltsin, and Yeltsin’s cabinet largely remaining intact, 
the efforts of Khasbulatov and Parliament were doomed to futility.319  
Yeltsin used the loyalty of those in the finance ministry to cut off the 
salaries of parliamentary deputies.320  Parliament refused to disband 
and the deputies blockaded themselves in their offices, while their 
supporters gathered outside the White House.  Parliament acted as 
though it were under siege, and with troops loyal to Yeltsin ringing 
the Parliament building, a siege seemed imminent.321
Zorkin, appearing before the blockaded Parliament, pleaded with 
the deputies to accept Yeltsin’s proposal for an election.  “Let us think 
about Russia,” he said.  “I do not want to discuss here what is right and 
what is wrong.”322  Of course, this was not an easy position for Zorkin, 
given that he had written the Court decision that provided the 
grounds for Parliament to impeach the President whom Zorkin was 
now urging them to support.  Asked about the consistency of his state-
ments, all Zorkin could do was admit:  “You have caught me in a con-
tradiction.  But note that the contradiction is born of a contradictory 
situation whose participants are located in a real so-called parallel 
world.”323  Zorkin pressed on. 
The crisis intensified.  As one foreign correspondent noted, “Out-
side the Parliament building, the presidential grip is tightening.  In-
side, they may be on the verge of eating their young.”324  Riot police 
circled the White House.  The electricity was cut off.  Vice President 
Rutskoi appeared on the balcony of the White House to talk to the 
supporters of Parliament who were increasingly agitated outside.  
When the supporters demanded weapons, Rutskoi announced, “We 
can win only one way—not with submachine guns, truncheons or fists.  
We can win only with law.”325
319 Fred Kaplan, Yeltsin Stays in Control; Foes’ Decrees Are Ignored, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Sept. 23, 1993, at 1. 
320 Richard Boudreaux & Sonni Efron, Yeltsin Urges Early Vote for Russian Presidency, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at A1. 
321 Richard Boudreaux, In Barricaded Russian Parliament:  A Dramatic Plea, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at A1. 
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For his part, Zorkin felt pulled back into the role of mediator.  
Shuttling between Rutskoi in the Parliament building and Mikhail 
Poltaranin, a close aide to Yeltsin, Zorkin attempted to convince all 
sides to return to the point just before things had run off the rails.  He 
called on Yeltsin to restore Parliament and called on Parliament to 
consent to concurrent elections for the presidency and Parliament in 
December.326  On Tuesday, September 28, Zorkin made a public 
statement announcing the Constitutional Court’s intention (by this 
time, perhaps only his own private intention) to take up the question 
of the constitutionality of acts since Yeltsin’s decree dissolving Parlia-
ment: 
The Russian political and social situation continues to deteriorate.  Fun-
damentals of the constitutional system and federal relations are being 
destroyed.  There is a real threat of large-scale violations of human 
rights.  Both sides to the conflict refuse from searching for a compro-
mise and do not exclude a possibility of violence.
327
Zorkin demanded that Yeltsin suspend his emergency decree, that 
Parliament repeal everything it had done since the emergency was de-
clared, that force not be used by either side, that rights not be limited 
in any way, and that a high-level conference immediately be convened 
with the major players to determine how to go forward to a joint elec-
tion of the President and Parliament.328  Yeltsin, clearly leading in the 
streets and in controlling the government, refused Zorkin’s compro-
mise.  When Yeltsin refused, so did Parliament.329
In the meantime, the Constitutional Court continued quite pub-
licly to fall apart.  Some of the judges openly claimed that they would 
refuse to sit with the Court as long as it was engaged in politics.  Jus-
tice Vitruk finally submitted his resignation.330  On September 29, the 
Constitutional Court—at least, all of the judges who were still formally 
on the Court—held a press conference.  Zorkin spoke first: 
[J]udging from the mood in the Constitutional Court, we will discharge 
the duties under the Constitution.  Individual judges of course, are at 
liberty to resign or otherwise make their dissenting position known.  But 
if you want my personal opinion, I think such behavior is at variance with 
326 John Lloyd, Parliament Rebellion Starts To Fade, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1993, at 4. 
327 Constitutional Court Chairman—Statement, TASS, Sept. 28, 1993. 
328 Id. 
329 Yeltsin Opposes New Move for Simultaneous Elections, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 28, 
1993, at A8. 
330 David Hearst, Anti-Yeltsin Protestors Take to Moscow’s Streets, GUARDIAN (London), 
Sept. 29, 1993, at 8. 
  
2006] CONSTITUTIONAL COURT PRESIDENTS 1829 
 
the duties of judges under the law on the Constitutional Court.  I hope 
that the situation will be rectified and everybody will understand that not 
only the decisions of the Constitutional Court but decisions of executive 
and legislative branches of power must be complied with.  The impor-
tant thing is that these decisions should be within the Constitution. . . . 
[T]he conflict should not be resolved with the help of barbed wire, but 
in the constitutional way.
331
 But Justice Morshchakova took issue with Zorkin’s statement that 
the Court should proceed as it was.  Morshchakova, who is fluent in 
German and an expert on German constitutional law, pressed a com-
parison between Germany and Russia: 
I would like to ask a counter question, a rhetorical question, can you 
imagine a situation when you will go to the Constitutional Court of West 
Germany asking about the political prospects or the prospects for politi-
cal development?  I think the questions now being raised in our Consti-
tutional Court are diverting the Constitutional Court from its direct du-
ties, even in this difficult and unusual situation.  The Constitutional 
Court is a body that provides legal protection, not an instrument for the 
resolution of political conflicts.332
Justice Ametistov agreed with Morshchakova: 
[T]he law on the Constitutional Court and the Constitution inasmuch as 
it applies to the activities of the Constitutional Court categorically for-
bids any forms of political activities of the court.  This is an issue that 
arose a year ago and it is precisely what made the work of the Constitu-
tional Court much more difficult and this is what prompted me and not 
only me, but also other judges to declare yesterday that we will refrain 
from taking part in the court sessions.
333
Zorkin attempted a recovery to the audience gathered at the press 
conference:  “Ladies and Gentlemen, as you see democracy prevails in 
the Constitutional Court.”334
With this public expression of disagreement within the Court, 
however, Yeltsin’s forces were quick to side with the Court’s dissenters.  
Sergei Shakhrai, Yeltsin’s advisor, built on this impression of Zorkin as 
a political activist.  “I have the impression that the Constitutional 
Court is no longer acting as a court and has transformed itself into a 
political organ,” he said in a public speech.  “In this situation, the 
331 Russian Federation Constitutional Court, Press Conference, in OFFICIAL KREM-
LIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Sept. 29, 1993. 
332 Id. 
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Constitutional Court can no longer be trusted as a Court which is to 
be respected and whose decisions are mandatory.  Regrettably, they 
have been destroying their own reputation.”335  Yeltsin aide Gennady 
Burbulis piled on: 
I am against any persecution of Zorkin as a citizen, but I intend to make 
every effort to ensure that Society recognizes the harmful and sinister 
nature of that man, who has lost any possibility to represent the law and 
who, regrettably, can no longer be viewed as a more or less sensible fig-
ure in our life.336
In the meantime, tension swelled in the streets.  A scuffle between 
pro-Parliament demonstrators and the police erupted.  The police 
gave the defenders of the White House one day to surrender or face 
attack.337  When the attack did not come, tension escalated even fur-
ther. 
There were rumors that four of the constitutional justices had re-
signed.338  A statement from the Court said that “truant” judges might 
face suspension.339  Responding to restlessness from Russia’s regions, 
the Constitutional Court welcomed to Moscow and to the court build-
ing itself the representatives of sixty-two of Russia’s eighty-nine regions 
for a meeting to form an alternative Parliament—a Council of Federa-
tion Subjects.340  Zorkin defended the Court’s action in helping to co-
ordinate Russia’s regions, expressing his worry that the country could 
slide into civil war without a new reconfiguration of the regions.341  
The Court was no longer above the conflict; it had sunk down into the 
middle of it. 
The Court continued to crumble.  The remaining judges voted to 
suspend justices Ametistov, Vitruk, and Kononov.  The first two were 
suspended for their refusal to take part in Court sessions and the lat-
ter for “health reasons.”  But it was unclear just what the suspension 
meant.  According to Justice Morshchakova, the decision was made to 
enable the Court to have a quorum for its actions—for which four-
335 Sergei Shakhrai, Chief of Staff, Russian Federation President, Speech, in OFFI-
CIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Sept. 29, 1993. 
336 Gennady Burbulis, Press Conference, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROAD-
CAST, Sept. 30, 1993. 
337 Fred Kaplan, Yeltsin Turns Up Pressure on Foes, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1993, at 2. 
338 Id. 
339 Sonni Efron, Foes of Yeltsin Get Ultimatum, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at A1. 
340 Vladislav Dorofeyev, Regions Establish Own Body of Federal Power, KOMMERSANT 
(Moscow), Oct. 1, 1993, at 3, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Oct. 1, 1993. 
341 Valentin Logunov, What Is Needed Is Goodwill, PRAVDA (Moscow), Oct. 1, 1993, at 
1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Oct. 1, 1993. 
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fifths of the sitting judges would be required.342  If some non-
participating judges were suspended, they no longer counted as “sit-
ting” for the purposes of setting the quorum.  Ironically, the Court 
could therefore still meet and make decisions, even though the sus-
pended judges were boycotting the Court proceedings precisely to 
prevent the Court from having a quorum. 
But time ran out—not only for the Court, but also for Parliament.  
On Sunday, October 3, Rutskoi, still holed up in the White House, di-
rected bands of parliamentary supporters to take over the office of the 
Moscow mayor and the Ostankino television tower.  Armed demon-
strators followed his command, and a pitched battle raged at the tele-
vision tower when Yeltsin’s troops opened fire on the demonstrators.  
The demonstrators shot back.  Troops moved through the city; gun-
fire was heard in many areas.  As smoke rose over Moscow, there was 
confusion about who was fighting where, whether the troops stayed 
with Yeltsin or defected to the side of the demonstrators, and what was 
happening in the White House.343
On Monday morning, October 4, at 7 a.m., Yeltsin ordered his 
troops and tanks to attack the White House itself.  Crowds of Musco-
vites watching from nearby bridges and television audiences all over 
the world were eyewitnesses as tanks fired directly into the Parliament 
building.  Rutskoi and Khasbulatov stayed in the White House, hoping 
that Russians would rise to their defense.  But there was no uprising.  
In the panic, Rutskoi called Zorkin and pleaded for help:  “They are 
murderers.  They are shooting point-blank, crushing people with 
tanks.  If you are a real Christian, you have to do something.”344  
Though Rutskoi must have thought he was speaking confidentially to 
Zorkin, in fact, the phone call was broadcast live over the Ekho Moskvy 
radio station.  While Zorkin’s replies were inaudible, Rutskoi could be 
clearly heard in a panic shouting into the phone, “They won’t let us 
342 Alexander Balashov, Three Constitutional Court Judges Suspended, KOMMERSANT 
(Moscow), Oct. 1, 1993, at 3, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Oct. 1, 1993. 
343 Detailed accounts of that first crucial day can be found in Margaret Shapiro & 
Fred Hiatt, Troops Move in To Put Down Uprising After Yeltsin Foes Rampage in Moscow, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1993, at A1; Sonni Efron, Yeltsin Calls in Troops After His Foes Ram-
page in Moscow and Rout Police, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at A1. 
344 Lee Hockstader, Under Fire, Hard-Liners Watch as Crusade Crumbles, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 5, 1993, at A29. 
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out of here alive.  I beg you, call the embassies. . . . I implore you, Va-
lera [Zorkin’s nickname], you understand.”345
But at this point, there was nothing either Zorkin or the Constitu-
tional Court could do.  As Zorkin told the Moscow News at the time, 
“We have no weapons, we cannot put up any resistance. . . . We are 
lawyers.”346
By mid-afternoon on Monday, Rutskoi and Khasbulatov had sur-
rendered, along with the other parliamentarians in the building.  
They were taken into custody.  Around the city, the death toll was 
mounting as bodies of demonstrators and bodies of police were col-
lected.  At least 150 people died that day fighting at the television 
tower and at the White House.347
Back at the Constitutional Court, an open rebellion broke out 
against Zorkin.  Four of the justices—Vitruk, Oleinik, Morshchakova, 
and Ametistov—called for Zorkin’s resignation.  Vitruk gave a public 
statement in which he announced that “many judges” could not work 
with Zorkin and so “we are breaking up the Court as a collective de-
mocratic body.”348  Morshchakova noted that the Constitutional Court 
Act prevents any judge from engaging in politics, and “therefore, 
[Zorkin] may no longer continue not only as the chief justice, but also 
as a judge of the Constitutional Court.”349  Oleinik said that Zorkin 
“has no right, even a moral one, to be a Constitutional Court mem-
ber.”350 Justice Nikolai Seleznev and the Court’s General Secretary, 
Yuri Rutkin, also supported the demand for Zorkin to resign.351  Only 
Justice Gadis Gadzhiev publicly supported Zorkin, saying that his res-
ignation would be merely a “good beginning for a stage-by-stage 
break-up of the Constitutional Court,” though apparently eight of the 
other judges were also privately on Zorkin’s side.352  Yeltsin’s chief of 
345 A. Rutskoi to V. Zorkin:  “Valera, Call the Embassies,”  IZVESTIA (Moscow), Oct. 7, 
1993, at 3, translated in Rutskoi et al.:  From Bravado to Surrender, CURRENT DIG. POST-
SOVIET PRESS, Nov. 3, 1993, at 6. 
346 Vladimir Orlov, Zorkin Made Redundant, MOSCOW NEWS, Oct. 15, 1993 (ellipsis 
in original). 
347 Justin Burke, In Name of Law and Order, Yeltsin Crushes Opposition, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Oct. 7, 1993, at 1. 
348 Igor Belsky, Four Judges Demand Constitutional Court Chief Resignation, ITAR-
TASS, Oct. 6, 1993. 
349 Id. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. 
352 Anna Ostapchuk, Constitutional Court:  Crisis Inside and Outside, NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZ., Oct. 7, 1993, at 1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Oct. 7, 1993. 
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staff, Sergei Filatov, called Zorkin to say that legal proceedings would 
be instituted against him for “creating a legal basis for the extremist 
actions” if he did not resign.353  For his part, Zorkin was briefly hospi-
talized as his colleagues demanded his departure.354
On Wednesday, October 6, Zorkin resigned his position as Presi-
dent of the Constitutional Court.355  He did not, however, resign his 
position as a judge. 
Yeltsin took to the television and denounced his opponents, blam-
ing them for the violence.  In that group, Yeltsin prominently in-
cluded Zorkin.356
With the Court on the ropes and its justices in open rebellion 
against their former President, Yeltsin issued a decree on October 7, 
1993, closing the Constitutional Court.357  In this decree, Yeltsin 
blamed the Court itself for the crisis: 
Twice during 1993, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 
has placed the country on the edge of civil war with its precipitous ac-
tions and decisions.  But when the threat of civil war became real, the 
Constitutional Court failed to act. . . . The Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation has turned from a body of constitutional justice into 
a weapon of political struggle representing an exceptional danger for 
the state.
358
Yeltsin suspended the activity of the Court “until the passage of a 
new Constitution of the Russian Federation,” opened the question of 
what institution would be best able to preserve constitutionality in 
Russia (thereby suggesting that the Constitutional Court might be 
abolished).  He also turned the remains of the Court over to the care 
of a body called the Department for the Protection of the Highest 
Bodies of Judicial Power, in which the chair of the department was to 
be appointed by the minister of security.359
The judges who had backed Yeltsin all along were obviously not 
pleased by this move.  Both Vitruk and Morshchakova spoke out 
against the closure of the Court, though both noted that they could 
353 Id. 
354 Belsky, supra note 348. 
355 Jeff Berliner, Russia’s Top Judge Quits, UPI, Oct. 6, 1993. 
356 Id. 
357 President of the Russian Federation, Edict No. 1612, On the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation (Oct. 7, 1993), COLLECTION OF ACTS OF THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (SAPP), 1993, No. 41, Item 
3921, translated in 30 STATUTES & DECISIONS 40, 40 (Nov.-Dec. 1994). 
358 Id. 
359 Id. at 41. 
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hardly blame Yeltsin for doing it.  When it finally dawned on this 
group of judges that the President could now do anything he wanted, 
one of the judges, Nikolai Vedernikov, explained that “the president is 
[now] effectively without control.”360  Zorkin, who understood this all 
along, despaired, “A new leaf is being turned over in Russian history 
with the army capable of becoming the next collective head of 
state.”361
The press, which had largely been supportive of Zorkin as he had 
attempted to mediate over that last difficult year of the first Constitu-
tional Court, came down on him hard, some with baseless accusations.  
A headline in the Rossiiskiye Vesti proclaimed “Zorkin Handed Out 
Firearms.”362  In an astonishing rewriting of history, Zorkin’s bias was 
now evident going back to the days of the Communist Party trial, since 
he was now retroactively seen as unduly sympathetic to the Commu-
nists.363  The Constitutional Court “stopped paying attention to the in-
creasing number of Parliament’s resolutions which ran counter to the 
constitution,” said Rossiiskiye Gazeta,364 against the evidence.  Zorkin 
was even accused of having falsif ied the results of the voting in the 
Constitutional Court decision that declared Yeltsin’s March state of 
emergency proclamation unconstitutional,365 though no such charges 
had been made at the time. 
Zorkin, now sidelined at home with high blood pressure, worried 
about the “terrible legal nihilism” running through the last thousand 
years of Russian history.366  He gave interviews to the press explaining 
his side of the story in those early October days.367  When the new con-
stitutional draft finally appeared and Yeltsin announced it would be 
voted on in a referendum in December, Zorkin renewed his criticism 
360 Lena Afanasyeva, Constitutional Court Bows to Yeltsin, UPI, Oct. 8, 1993. 
361 Orlon Vladimir, The Collapse of the Constitutional Court, MOSCOW NEWS, Oct. 8, 
1993. 
362 Boris Vladimirov, Zorkin Handed Out Firearms, ROSSIISKIYE VESTI, Oct. 19, 1993, 
at 2, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Oct. 19, 1993. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. (citing an account in the Rossiiskiye Gazeta). 
365 Rudolf Gladkikh, Zorkin Falsified Voting Results, Vitruk Says, ITAR-TASS, Nov. 6, 
1993, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Nov. 6, 1993. 
366 Richard Boudreaux, Ex-Judge Defends Role in Moscow Showdown,  L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
4, 1993, at A14. 
367 Interview by Anna Ostapchuk with Valery Zorkin, in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZ. (Mos-
cow), Nov. 12, 1993, translated in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Nov. 16, 
1993; Tatyana Borovik, Valery Zorkin:  “I Made Mistakes, But I Always Sought Concord,” 
MEGAPOLIS-EXPRESS (Russ.), Nov. 17, 1993, at 13, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Nov. 
17, 1993. 
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of the extremely strong powers concentrated in the President in this 
new Constitution.  “Bureaucratic centralization will simply steamroll 
over the provinces,” he said.368  As it turned out, the new Constitution 
put forward for a vote in December was not exactly the Constitution 
that had been voted on by the constitutional assembly in the summer.  
It had greatly enhanced presidential powers, even over and above the 
extraordinary powers of the summer draft.  Zorkin’s earlier objections 
to executive centralization found new energy in the increased execu-
tive centralization of the proposed new Constitution. 
On the grounds that he had become a critic of the President’s 
new Constitution, Zorkin’s fellow judges voted to suspend him from 
his office as a constitutional judge.369  Zorkin intemperately lashed out 
against them for being “perjurers and accomplices in a state crime.”370  
At a news conference, he said that his fellow judges were “under the 
thumb of a dictatorial, authoritarian regime.”371  After all, said Zorkin, 
“What kind of law-governed state are we talking about when it is for-
bidden to criticize the constitution?”372  It was small comfort to Zorkin 
that the remaining constitutional judges had voted to suspend Justice 
Viktor Luchin as well—in his case, for fraternizing with the Commu-
nist Party.373
Zorkin kept up his attack on Yeltsin’s proposed Constitution.  It 
was a “constitution of shock therapy,” he told one group.374  In the 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, he said that the new Constitution reminded him 
of the old communist Constitution in which the leading role of the 
Communist Party was defined.  “But then there was a whole party.  
Now it is one man.”375  On another occasion he said, “One should not 
allow Russia to become a presidential banana republic.”376  Pessimistic 
368 Radik Batyrskin, “There Will be No Free Elections,” Declares Ex-Chairman of Constitu-
tional Court Valery Zorkin, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZ. (Moscow), Dec. 1, 1993, at 1, translated in 
RUSS. PRESS DIG., Dec. 1, 1993. 
369 Former Chief Justice Lashes Out at Colleagues Who Suspended Him, UPI, Dec. 2, 1993. 
370 Id. 
371 Wendy Sloane, Former Judge Warns of Authoritarian Rule in Russia, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Dec. 3, 1993, at 8. 
372 Id. 
373 Former Chief Justice Lashes Out at Colleagues Who Suspended Him, supra note 369. 
374 Jonathan Steele, Sacked Judge Keeps Sights on Yeltsin, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 
4, 1993, at 13. 
375 Id. (quoting NEZAVISIMAYA GAZ. (Dec. 1, 1993)) 
376 Orlov Vladimir, Valery Zorkin:  No Longer a Judge?, MOSCOW NEWS, Dec. 10, 1993. 
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about the new Constitution, he said to a journalist, “I have to ask the 
question:  ‘Why has God again forsaken Russia?’”377
Yeltsin was nothing if not confident about the outcome of the ref-
erendum that was to be held on his new Constitution.  At the same 
time, and on the very same ballot as the question of constitutional ap-
proval, he set elections for representatives to the newly reconstructed 
Parliament.  The December election, then, featured party lists and in-
dividual representatives jockeying for seats in a body that would only 
exist if the first question on the ballot were answered in a positive fash-
ion.378
In any event, the new Constitution was approved, though not with-
out question.  Support for the Constitution softened in the polls on 
the evening of the vote.  Just to make clear what he thought was at 
stake, Yeltsin threatened that civil war would break out if the Constitu-
tion were not approved:  “The question of whether or not there is to 
be civil peace and tranquillity in Russia depends on what you de-
cide.”379  Increasing the political tension, fifty of the new political par-
ties with candidates in the election called at the last minute for a can-
cellation of the constitutional referendum.380  But the referendum 
went ahead. 
The ground rules of the vote required that the Constitution pass 
by an absolute majority of votes in an absolute majority of the popula-
tion of eligible voters; in short, at least 50% voting in favor of the con-
stitution with a turnout of at least 50% of the total electorate.  But, 
given the controversy in the run-up to the constitutional vote, was the 
turnout on the day of the election really enough?  In the face of 
doubts on this question, the Kremlin seized the moment and an-
nounced victory in the constitutional referendum almost immediately 
after the polls closed, despite the fact that no one at that time could 
tell what the official turnout had been.381  For its part, the election 
377 Olivia Ward, Former Top Judge Warns of Perilous Times, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 13, 
1993, at A12. 
378 Tamara Zamyatina, Russia’s Electoral Marathon Close to the Home-Stretch, ITAR-
TASS, Dec. 10, 1993. 
379 Yeltsin Addresses the Nation on Importance of Adopting New Constitution (Ostankino 
Channel 1 TV broadcast and Mayak Radio broadcast Dec. 9, 1993), translated in BBC 
SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 11, 1993; Tony Barber, Russian Elections: Yeltsin 
Warns of Civil War, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 10, 1993, at 12. 
380 Fifty Russian Parties and Organizations Call for Cancellation of Referendum (ITAR-
TASS News Agency (World Service) radio broadcast Dec. 6, 1993), printed in BBC 
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commission hesitated.  In some regions, turnout did not meet the 
50% threshold, and so aggregate figures had to be compiled for the 
whole country before the result was known.382  Eventually, the election 
commission announced that turnout had been 53%, out of which 
60% had voted for the new Constitution.383  With the active support of 
about one-third of the electorate, then, the Constitution squeaked 
into effect.  While the Kremlin called attention to its success in the 
matter of the Constitution, it could not help but have been dismayed 
that, in the parliamentary voting, parties supporting Yeltsin trailed 
behind the quasi-fascist party led by the flamboyant Vladimir Zhiri-
novsky, with the Communist Party coming in a close third.384
The new Constitution, perhaps surprisingly, retained the Consti-
tutional Court, but in a move reminiscent of American President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, the new Russian Constitution 
added six judges to the thirteen authorized under the previous Con-
stitution.385  Perhaps because of the imminent dilution of their power, 
the remaining judges of the frozen-in-amber Constitutional Court,386 
realizing the threat to the independence of the Court that new Yeltsin 
appointments might make, hurriedly recalled their previously discred-
ited colleagues.  Both Zorkin and Luchin were given back their judi-
cial jobs by their fellow justices.387  As Izvestia noted, “Zorkin’s come-
back . . . should be interpreted as an indication that the Court is ready 
to take an active political stand within the current balance of powers 
in Russia.”388
Zorkin, perhaps true to form, immediately expressed his doubts 
about whether the new Constitution had in fact been legitimately ap-
382 Preliminary Results of Elections Announced in Russia, ITAR-TASS, Dec. 13, 1993. 
383 Lyudmila Yermakova, Russia Has Adopted New Constitution—Preliminary Results, 
TASS, Dec. 13, 1993. 
384 Serge Schmemann, Yeltsin’s Reformers Show Weakness in Russian Vote; Constitution 
Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at A1. 
385 RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION art. 125(1). 
386 Because the Court was merely suspended and not legally abolished, judges and 
their staffs continued at their work throughout the shutdown.  I discovered this when I 
was doing research at the Constitutional Court and found records and correspondence 
from the period during which I had assumed that the Court was simply shuttered.  
When I asked, several staff members said that everyone came to work as usual during 
that time, though the Court issued no public decisions.  It was always preparing, how-
ever, to be reopened. 
387 Leonid Nikitinsky, Constitutional Court in Its Former Composition Issues First Warn-
ing to President, IZVESTIA (Moscow), Jan. 27, 1994, at 3, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., 
Jan. 27, 1994. 
388 Id. 
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proved.389  Later, during the long period when the Court was still not 
in session because the new law regulating the Court had not yet been 
passed and the new judges mandated by the new Constitution had not 
yet been appointed, he signed a statement supporting a left-of-center 
political movement called “Accord in the Name of Russia.”  This 
caused his fellow judges to once again give him an ultimatum to stay 
out of politics or be voted off the Court.390  Bowing to pressure, Zorkin 
announced his disengagement from politics:  “I am in the Constitu-
tional Court so far, and I’m not going to leave it.”391
But the Court languished in limbo all spring, waiting for Parlia-
ment to approve a new draft law on the Constitutional Court.392  The 
law was finally passed in summer,393 with a “Zorkin clause,” providing 
that a Constitutional Court judge could be stripped of his powers if, 
when warned by his colleagues, he refused to stop engaging in activi-
ties or actions “incompatible with his office.”394  But the limbo of the 
Court did not end.  Yeltsin let the Court languish for another half 
year.  Only in February 1995 were enough judges finally elected to the 
Court to allow it to resume its operation.395  By the time new judges 
were appointed, the Court had been closed for nearly seventeen 
months, and by the time the Court actually reopened for business, 
eighteen months had passed.  The new President of the Court, elected 
by his fellow judges, was one of the new judges:  Vladimir Tumanov.396  
The new mandate of the Court sharply reduced the Court’s discre-
389 Steven Erlanger, Finance Minister Shuns Yeltsin Plea and Quits Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 27, 1994, at A1. 
390 Sergei Parkhomenko, The Constitutional Court Has Asked Zorkin To Resign in a 
Good Way, SEGODNYA (Russ.), Mar. 22, 1994, at 1, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Mar. 
22, 1994. 
391 Tatyana Krasnova, Valery Zorkin:  “We Must Live in Peace and Remember the Past,” 
VEK (Moscow), Apr. 22, 1994, at 3, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Apr. 22, 1994. 
392 Howard Witt, Russia’s Constitutional Court Languishes in Legislative Limbo, J. COM., 
May 24, 1994, at 6A. 
393 Parliament Passes Law on Court, UPI, June 24, 1994. 
394 Russian Constitutional Court Act, supra note 24, art. 18(7); Indira Dunayeva, 
Law on the Constitutional Court Adopted, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZ. (Moscow), June 25, 1994, at 
1, translated in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, July 20, 1994, at 17. 
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Judges on the Constitutional Court under the new Constitution are nominated by the 
President and approved by the Federation Council, the new upper house of Parlia-
ment. 
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tion:  the new law on the Constitutional Court no longer allowed the 
Court to take up cases on its own initiative.397
The newly reconstituted Court answered the questions raised be-
fore it with such a focus on law that broader issues of politics seemed 
to pass it by.  In its first major decision after reconstituting itself, the 
Court decided, by a vote of eleven to eight, that Boris Yeltsin had com-
mitted no constitutional violation by launching the First Chechen 
War.398  Tumanov was in the majority; Zorkin dissented.  Interviewed 
about the decision, Tumanov said that political questions were not a 
matter for the Court.399  That said, however, nearly all of the judges 
expressed different views in public about the opinion.400
The Chechen War case was not typical of the Second Russian Con-
stitutional Court, however.  After this case, the Court settled into a 
sort of routine, issuing relatively bland judgments with much law and 
little overt politics visible in the decisions.  A bit of nostalgia set in for 
the First Constitutional Court.  By the end of 1996, one Russian com-
mentator was able to say: 
The Constitutional Court under the chairmanship of Vladimir Tumanov 
has not left any significant mark on the judicial process.  The last time 
that it attracted public attention was in the summer of 1995 when it was 
considering “the Chechen case.”  Its verdict was disappointing . . . . 
 In the two years of its activity under Tumanov’s chairmanship the 
Constitutional Court has not rejected a single normative act passed by 
the President, Government or Federal Assembly.  This means that either 
all Federal legislation is perfect from a constitutional stand-point or else 
the Court’s judges read decrees put before them without taking the 
bands off their eyes.  The latter supposition seems more likely.
401
397 Article 36 of the Russian Constitutional Court Act permits the Court to con-
sider only cases brought to it by petition. 
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For practical purposes, Zorkin disappeared from public view.  Vir-
tually all references to him in the media were to things he had done 
while he was the President of the Court years earlier; his current ac-
tivities, even though he was still a judge on the Court, were invisible.  
And the same invisibility extended to the Court as a whole. 
In early 1997, Marat Baglai took over as President of the Court, 
when age forced Justice Tumanov to step down.402  The Baglai Court 
was no more active than the Tumanov Court had been.  In 2000, a 
Western commentator summed up the Constitutional Court’s accom-
plishments:  “The ‘second court,’ reconstituted after 1993, has been 
distinguished not by ambition, but by a lack of it.”403  Herman 
Schwartz, whose book on post-Communist constitutional courts was 
the result of much travel, many interviews, and the beneficial disci-
pline of comparison among courts, noted that the Russian Constitu-
tional Court seems “overly cautious substantively.”404
While the Court largely disappeared from the public stage, the 
country as a whole went through many shocks.  The August 1998 col-
lapse of the ruble and the surprising ascent of Vladimir Putin from 
obscure former-KGB agent to Prime Minister to President on the eve 
of the millennium were just two events that rocked Russian public life.  
Through all of this, however, the Court went on deciding cases, taking 
in petitions, doing its work in relative obscurity.405
The 1993 Russian Constitution had created a presidency with few 
constraints on presidential power, as Zorkin and others had warned at 
the time it was written.  With the rise of Vladimir Putin, however, the 
country was to get its first disciplined President.  Putin had been 
trained as a lawyer, and he understood the boost to political power 
that law can give.  Upon taking office, he pushed through Parliament 
a whole series of major legal changes:  a new land law, a new criminal 
402 Andrei Kolesnikov, The Keys from Impeachment in Reliable Hands, SEGODNYA 
(Russ.), Feb. 22, 1997, at 2, translated in RUSS. PRESS DIG., Feb. 22, 1997. 
403 John Lloyd, Crime and Punishment:  Russia Is Emerging From the Ashes of Commu-
nism as a Relatively Benign Force in the World, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 6, 2000. 
404 HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE 159 (2000). 
405 In a project I am presently working on, however, I argue that the Court was not 
really inactive, but simply operating under the radar of Russian national politics.  
Though the Court only published about twenty-five cases per year during this period, it 
decided another several hundred each year in a sort of epistolary jurisprudence that 
resulted in petitioners getting letters from the Court resolving their complaints.  But 
since those cases were not published, no one except those working in the Court knew 
that all of this activity was going on throughout the reign of the Second Russian Con-
stitutional Court. 
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code, a new criminal procedure code, and more.  He supported an 
independent judiciary and ran for election on the platform of the 
“dictatorship of the law.”406
As it turned out, Putin was quite concerned with what the Court 
thought of his legislative proposals.  While he did not bring cases to 
the Court himself, he met often with the judges and made it clear that 
he sought their advice.407  He was also very active in ensuring that the 
judges he thought were most favorable to his own position remained 
on the Court.  Both President Baglai and Vice President 
Morshchakova were due to retire from the Court in 2001.  They were 
judges Putin thought he could count on, and the Court was also reluc-
tant to let them go because they were experienced and fair-minded.  
The Court proposed to Putin that the terms of the justices be ex-
tended by removing the mandatory retirement age so that all would 
serve life terms in office, with the idea that Putin would introduce 
these proposals in Parliament.  While the justices were on summer 
holiday, however, Putin in fact introduced not only an amendment to 
remove the retirement age, as the judges had requested, but also an 
amendment to extend their still-fixed terms of office, which made life 
tenure impossible.408
The judges were not pleased.  They had hoped that Putin would 
consult with them before fixing the specific forms of his proposals.  It 
now appeared that Putin was playing favorites on the Court, having 
drafted a complicated proposal that just happened to have the effect 
of keeping Baglai and Morshchakova on the Court, while not in fact 
accomplishing the equalization of judicial tenure that the judges 
themselves had sought.  The justices on the Court turned a wary eye 
on Baglai, whom some suspected to be part of the plot to keep him as 
President of the Court.409
When the bill came under debate in the Duma, its political pur-
poses seemed so transparent that some of the deputies called it the 
“Law on Baglai.”410  As the bill went through the protracted legislative 
process, seemingly neutral amendments were introduced for political 
reasons; the amendments would have permitted Baglai to stay, but 
406 Vladimir Putin:  Dictatorship of Law Is the Only Dictatorship We Must Obey, RIA NO-
VOSTI, Jan. 31, 2000. 
407 I owe this account of events to intrepid court-watcher Alexei Trochev’s article, 
supra note 21, at 5. 
408 Id. at 6-7. 
409 Id. 
410 Id. at 8. 
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would have required Morshchakova to go.  The debate was compli-
cated, involving the Duma (lower house of the Russian Parliament), 
the Federation Council (the upper house, consisting of regional rep-
resentatives), and the office of the President.  In the end, a version of 
the “tenure amendments” passed:  the one that extended Baglai’s 
term, but not Morshchakova’s.  Almost as an act of resistance, the 
Constitutional Court reelected Morshchakova as vice president of the 
Court, even though she only had a few months left to serve on the 
bench.411  But what of Baglai?  As it turns out, his term as President of 
the Court was up in early 2003.  The judicial tenure battles had, how-
ever, soured his colleagues on him and made them suspicious of his 
closeness to political factions in Putin’s entourage and in Parliament, 
because the judicial tenure amendments of 2001 seemed to have been 
passed just for him. 
Voting for the presidency of the Constitutional Court is done by 
secret ballot of all of the judges.  If there is no majority in the first 
round, voting goes to a second round and so on until a particular 
candidate has a majority of the votes. 
When the vote for Constitutional Court President was held in Feb-
ruary 2003, no one was more surprised at the result than Valerii 
Zorkin.  In the second round of voting, by a bare minimum vote of 
ten votes to nine, Zorkin himself was reelected President of the Con-
stitutional Court of the Russian Federation.412  Facing reporters, he 
uncharacteristically said that he was completely unprepared to answer 
questions.  But, he said, “life goes on and everything will be normal in 
the Constitutional Court.”413
Why was Zorkin elected President of the Court?  How could he 
have returned to the position from which he had fallen so precipi-
tously a decade before? 
Some of the explanation no doubt lies in changes in the Court’s 
composition.  Those who had been most critical of Zorkin—
Ametistov, Morshchakova, and Vitruk—had all left the Court.  Vitruk, 
in fact, had left the Court only weeks before Zorkin’s election, and 
411 Id. at 7-15.  As Trochev explains, the system of retirement from the Constitu-
tional Court depends on a successor being named to fill the position.  As it turns out, 
Putin failed to nominate a replacement for Morshchakova for some months, allowing 
her to stay on the bench for a full year after her mandatory retirement age.  Id. at 13-
15. 
412 Natalia Panshina, Russian Constitutional Court Elects Chairman, TASS, Feb. 21, 
2003. 
413 Id. 
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Morshchakova only the year before.414  They were, as a result, no 
longer around to vote against him.  But the rumor around the Court 
at the time415 was that the judges wanted to show Putin that he could 
not play fast and loose with the tenure of judges.  If Baglai had been 
willing to allow himself to be the beneficiary of a crass political move, 
the other judges were not going to let him go on to lead the Court.416  
And who better to stand up to authority and to hold the Court’s 
ground than its former firebrand Valerii Zorkin? 
When he finally appeared ready to speak before the media, Zorkin 
again appeared as the guardian of the Constitution, this time in a 
“non-revolutionary” situation: 
I don’t know how the administration assesses the Constitutional Court.  I 
try not to follow it because my negative experience has taught me that in 
an ordinary situation, not in a revolutionary situation, a judge should be 
silent and should look only into the text of the Constitution.  And con-
siderations of expediency—political, the Kremlin administration’s opin-
ion, economic expediency—this is for politicians.  The Court looks for a 
legal form. . . . I think we should not be guided by what pleases whom, 
but by what pleases the Constitution.
417
With the phoenix-like rise of the once and future President of the 
Constitutional Court, the press rediscovered that he was their favorite 
all along.  There was even some strategic rewriting of history.  “Unlike 
most of the key players in the 1993 power struggle,” wrote pundit Bo-
ris Kagarlitsky, “Zorkin emerged with his dignity intact.”418  “No one 
has ever challenged the professional credentials of lawyer Valery 
Zorkin,” said the Moscow News.419  “Zorkin has been brought back not 
because he has ‘mended his ways,’ but rather because at the initial 
414 Trochev, supra note 21, at 17-18. 
415 I was living in Moscow and doing research at the Constitutional Court when 
Zorkin was reelected.  Obviously, his surprise reelection was a matter of frenzied specu-
lation among staffers at the Court.  What I report here is the result of that gossip in the 
halls of the Court. 
416 As Evgeny Kiselyov reported before his televised interview with Zorkin:  “Ac-
cording to well-informed sources, the top interpreters of the Constitution have been 
feeling increasingly unhappy about the policy of the former Chairman, as a result of 
which, some people claim, the Constitutional Court has turned into a legal division of 
the President’s administration.”  Interview by Evgeny Kiselyov with Valerii Zorkin, 
Chairman, Constitutional Court, in OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT’L NEWS BROADCAST, Feb. 
25, 2003. 
417 Id. 
418 Boris Kagarlitsky, A Constitutional Cakewalk, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003. 
419 Konstantin Katanyan, Constitutional Court Gets Old Chairman Back, MOSCOW 
NEWS, Feb. 26, 2003, at 7. 
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and most difficult stages, he knew how to steer the ship between Scylla 
and Charybdis,” asserted Vremya.420  The first deputy speaker of Par-
liament said that Zorkin “is a man of principles who has a well-
developed sense of self-respect and knows how to stand up for his own 
opinion.”421  And perhaps the highest praise: 
The Constitutional Court chairman is a free man subject only to the law.  
This can be a serious problem for the powers that be.  When a high offi-
cial can’t be bought, he seems to be someone out of this world.  Ours is a 
world where there is a price on everything—a court ruling, a song of 
praise, a government award, anything.  The relations between these two 
worlds, which exist within a single state system, can be the subject of a 
fascinating study.  Just watch Zorkin.
422
An insightful observation indeed. 
And so it came to be that on the ten-year anniversary of the events 
of October 1993 and on the ten-year anniversary of the new Constitu-
tion itself, Valerii Zorkin was the only official from that time still left 
standing in a high position of state power. 
*      *      * 
How was it, through this turbulent history, that Zorkin managed 
to be restored not only to the presidency of the Constitutional Court 
but also to the role of the guardian of the Constitution?  Despite the 
accusations made against him, Zorkin’s positions remained constant 
throughout the whole time he was in public view.  He believed that 
state bodies of power had to follow the existing Constitution, that on 
balance a moderate presidentialist system would be better for Russia 
than a parliamentarist one, that conflicting political forces had to rec-
oncile and compromise, that politics was not about the winner taking 
all.  He also believed that separation of powers was crucial to a consti-
tutional state, that human rights must be respected even in times of 
crisis, and that the job of the guardian of the Constitution was to 
speak constitutional truth to potentially unconstitutional power, no 
matter what the personal (or political) cost.  His colleagues, at least 
those who remained on the Court in 2003, knew that. 
420 Yury Feofanov, Paths of the Judicial Branch, VREMYA (Moscow), Mar. 6, 2003, at 6, 
translated in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Mar. 26, 2003, at 4. 
421 Yury Stroganov, Zorkin Is on Guard Again, TRUD (Moscow), Feb. 26, 2003 at 2, 
translated in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Mar. 26, 2003, at 3. 
422 Viktor Loshak, Watch Zorkin!, MOSCOW NEWS, July 23, 2003. 
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Though Zorkin was often thin-skinned, quick to personalize dis-
putes, and not as restrained as he might have been at moments of 
high political tension, on balance his constitutional sensibility was 
strong, stable, and incorruptible.  In retrospect, he seems marvelously 
sane given what happened to him when he was the victim of a political 
smear campaign waged by Yeltsin’s supporters during the crisis of 
1993.  Quite often, as we have seen, Yeltsin’s forces simply lied about 
what Zorkin had done, said, or believed.  For example, Zorkin was not 
an opponent of economic reform, a person who always sided with 
Khasbulatov and the Communists, or someone who had benefited 
personally from Khasbulatov’s largesse, as Yeltsin’s entourage claimed.  
Yeltsin’s forces politicized the Constitution so that every adverse deci-
sion was spun as a merely political decision for their opponents, every 
favorable decision was simply ignored because it did not fit the image 
they wanted to convey—that Zorkin was a political opportunist who 
had chosen sides.  Yeltsin’s forces consistently twisted what Zorkin said 
to make his recitation of what the Constitution required sound like 
Zorkin’s personal, political platform.  In fact, the Constitution of the 
time did say that it was Parliament, and not the President, who had 
the dominant power in the Russian state.  During the 1993 crisis, Yel-
tsin’s forces used every method at their disposal to rattle Zorkin per-
sonally—throwing him out of his house, taking away his car, cutting 
off his phone, perhaps even shooting his cat.  Under these tough cir-
cumstances, Zorkin was the voice of moderation, compromise, and 
constitutional fidelity. 
Perhaps Zorkin was too eager to speak for the Court when in fact 
the Court’s consensus had already fallen apart.  He was accused of 
that as well.  Still, in retrospect, it is easy to exaggerate how much of 
the Court he lost.  The Court had thirteen judges, and only four of 
them ever spoke out against Zorkin.  The other eight stayed with him. 
During Zorkin’s period of political exile from 1993 to 2003, he 
nevertheless remained a sitting judge on a quiescent Court, where he 
had a reputation for being one of the most brilliant legal minds on 
the bench.423  When it appeared that Putin and Parliament were going 
to play games with judicial tenure, picking favorites and singling out 
certain judges for punishment, Zorkin’s fellow judges knew to whom 
they could turn when it came time to defend the Court.  They picked 
Zorkin.  And in fact, in 2005, Parliament passed a new amendment to 
423 I know this from talking to the other judges and staffers in the building.  The 
other justice who routinely won praise for legal brilliance was Morshchakova. 
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the Constitutional Court Act equalizing judicial tenure so that now all 
judges serve life terms with a common retirement age of seventy.424  As 
of the publication of this Article, Zorkin has another seven years to go.  
Not in any hurry to see him leave, in February 2006, Zorkin’s fellow 
judges reelected him to another term as President of the Constitu-
tional Court.425
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT PRESIDENT AS  
GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION  
When communism collapsed, constitutionalism stood up to take 
its place.  Or, at least, constitutionalism offered itself as a moral ideol-
ogy of the state to replace the instrumental ideology of communism.   
While virtually all in Hungarian public life eagerly embraced this new 
philosophy, the acceptance of constitutionalism in Russia was far more 
variable.  As we have seen, it was, among state actors, only the Russian 
Constitutional Court that took the Constitution seriously in those 
early turbulent years after the Soviet Union was dismantled.  In Hun-
gary, however, virtually everyone became a constitutionalist overnight.   
Even with this variation, however, the Constitutional Courts of the 
two countries attempted to do the same thing:  to articulate what their 
Constitutions meant and to get the other branches of power to accept 
that they were bound by this understanding.  In this, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court largely succeeded through the 1990s, while the 
Russian Constitutional Court largely failed in the period we have fo-
cused on, from 1991 to 1993.  But the Russian failure was less a prob-
lem of the courts than of the politicians with whom they had to work.   
Russian President Boris Yeltsin was constitutionally uncontrollable, 
and apparently without a rule-of-law bone in his body.  Parliamentary 
Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov was similarly impetuous, though he 
seemed more favorable to the Constitution perhaps because the Con-
stitution seemed more favorable to him and to the Russian Parliament 
generally.  By contrast, all of the major political parties and party lead-
ers in Hungary claimed allegiance to the Hungarian Constitution and 
pledged to uphold the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court.  These were radically different contexts and starting points, 
424 Trochev, supra note 21, at 1. 
425 Yury Kolesov, Three-Time Chairman:  Valery Zorkin Remains Head of Constitutional 
Court, VREMYA NOVOSTEI, Feb. 22, 2006, at 3, translated in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET 
PRESS, Mar. 22, 2006. 
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and they marked both different histories and different futures of the 
two countries.   
Although Russia and Hungary are very dissimilar countries, politi-
cally and constitutionally speaking, the first Presidents of the two 
Courts nonetheless had uncannily similar political trajectories.    
László Sólyom and Valerii Zorkin were elected Presidents by their fel-
low constitutional justices, and they became major public figures in 
the political lives of their countries because they spoke for their 
Courts.   They were constantly in the press, explaining their Constitu-
tions and their Constitutional Courts’ decisions.  In fact, each ap-
peared to gain the political strength he had from channeling the Con-
stitution of each country by being its spokesperson and its strongest 
legal ally.   The Russian and Hungarian Constitutional Courts issued 
decisions inconvenient for all those who held political power, and did 
so on a regular basis.  It fell to the Presidents of the respective Courts 
to explain what these Courts were doing.    The Constitutional Court 
Presidents also had to cajole compliance from sometimes reluctant 
politicians and had to defend constitutional visions to a general public 
new at such things.   
Both Sólyom and Zorkin had been professors leading quiet lives 
before they were thrust into these positions of power.  And both re-
tained the public personality of the professor in their new roles.   Both 
were serious, knowledgeable, and patient in their detailed explana-
tions.  They professed a lack of interest in politics, and sharply distin-
guished the legal things they did from the political things that politi-
cians did.   They took the task of education to be central to their jobs, 
and they often gave what amounted to lectures in the public press to 
explain what their respective Constitutions required and what their 
respective Courts were doing.    
In short, neither Sólyom nor Zorkin had the public personality of 
the politician.   They did not make populist appeals; in fact, both gen-
erally did the opposite by explaining how public opinion was irrele-
vant to their tasks.   They did not claim constituencies or allegiances 
to any part of the party system or the population; in fact, both self-
consciously maintained identities as leaders above politics, as men 
who governed by ideas, not by political faction.    They always claimed 
to put the Constitution, the constitutional order, and the Constitu-
tional Court ahead of any personal ambition.  In short, they had judi-
cial personalities.    
In addition, the power both Sólyom and Zorkin claimed was dis-
tinctly legal power.  Speaking for their Courts, and even for their Con-
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stitutions, both Sólyom and Zorkin typically referred to chapter and 
verse of their respective Constitutions for the authority they needed to 
push their respective governments toward constitutional compliance.   
Both the Hungarian and Russian Constitutional Courts published 
their decisions; in important cases, the judges—often the Presidents— 
even read decisions from the bench in front of the press and public.   
When Sólyom and Zorkin went out to “sell” a decision to the broader 
public or to reluctant politicians, they did so relying on the published 
opinions of their institutions.426  In their public pronouncements, they 
often explicitly claimed to not be doing anything political.  They con-
structed the space for legal influence by explicitly disavowing political 
influence. 
Finally, in both cases, Sólyom and Zorkin deployed a good deal of 
strategic constitutional aggression.  Though they had been quiet pro-
fessors before moving to the bench, they were pit bulls as Constitu-
tional Court Presidents.  When their Courts or their Constitutions 
were challenged, they attacked back, claiming the moral high ground 
of constitutional analysis.  When they saw constitutional violations, 
they felt free to growl at the violators.  They were never off duty and 
they were never inclined to react with retreat to the aggression that 
was launched in their direction.  They were, in short, eager to defend 
what they saw as their territory and could be quite aggressive about 
doing so.  
We can see that judicial personality, legal power, and constitutional ag-
gression kept both Zorkin and Sólyom speaking out as guardians of 
their Constitutions.  The politicians would not—in fact, almost surely 
did not—like what the Constitutional Courts did, but it was hard for 
politicians to attack the Courts as long as the Courts, their Presidents, 
and their justices stuck to the script in which judicial personalities 
used legal power in the service of constitutional aggression.  Perhaps 
the best evidence that these were the elements holding the Courts and 
426 In both Russia and Hungary, though, the decisions of the respective Constitu-
tional Courts are not written in a way that the ordinary person could understand.  
They use extremely technical language, typically refer by article and section numbers 
to passages in the laws they are reviewing without reproducing the content of those 
sections of the law in the opinions themselves, and have a highly formulaic quality.  In 
fact, in both Russia and Hungary, it takes several pages of reading in a typical opinion 
before the determined reader can even figure out what the case is about.  No wonder 
the Presidents of both Courts feel the need to explain in ordinary language to the 
press what the major decisions mean! 
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their Presidents in place comes from what happened when Sólyom 
and Zorkin stopped relying on the triple strength of these three 
sources. 
Sólyom lost his seat on the Hungarian Constitutional Court when 
he entered the political fray in arguing for the renewal of both his 
own term and the terms of his other colleagues who were due to leave 
the Court at the same time.  As he proposed more and more desper-
ate ways of staying on the Court, Sólyom’s support evaporated, not just 
in Parliament but also within the Court itself.  Sólyom spoke increas-
ingly for himself, and not for the Court.  He spoke on subjects that 
were not obviously tied to the Constitution itself.  And perhaps most 
fatally, he spoke in what appeared to be his own self-interest and not 
for the good of the Constitution. 
Zorkin also began his long and horrible fall from power when he 
stepped outside the three sources of judicial power.  Appearing on the 
steps of the White House during the faux emergency of March 1993, 
he appeared to be acting as a politician, and not as a judge.  Moderat-
ing between the President and Parliament throughout the spring and 
into the fall of 1993, Zorkin’s power appeared to be anything but dis-
tinctly legal, especially when the two sides were no longer pledging to 
uphold the Constitution as he tried to force them into a compromise.  
Finally, when the rest of the Court broke from him in public, he could 
no longer claim to be channeling the Constitution or even the Court.  
And so the aggressive stance he took to keep the Constitution from 
falling to pieces no longer seemed like distinctly constitutional aggres-
sion, but instead something he deployed only as a personal matter.   
In both cases, Sólyom and Zorkin fell from power when they 
ceased to look like the guardians of their Constitutions.  How, then, 
can we explain their returns to positions of high power?     
Sólyom and Zorkin were both returned to power by the actions of 
their colleagues and not because they had self-evidently sought power 
for themselves.  Sólyom and Zorkin seem to have both been humbled 
by their experiences in leaving the Court presidencies the first time, 
and were instead perfectly content to wait in the wings until others 
thought they might be of use.  In both cases, they disappeared from 
the public realm and made no visible effort to seek power.  It is crucial 
to the return of each of these men that each was drafted from new-
found obscurity into the positions that they did not overtly seek.  
Sólyom and Zorkin were, as a result, not apparently back in the game 
for political power, but instead were committed to maintaining the 
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constitutional integrity of the institutions they were called upon to 
lead. 
In both cases, too, Sólyom and Zorkin were returned not to posi-
tions in the push and shove of ordinary politics, but to offices that had 
been held out as positions above politics.  Zorkin, of course, returned 
as Court President.  Sólyom returned as President of the Republic of 
Hungary.  The presidency in Hungary, however, is a ceremonial and 
symbolic position, with the country’s governmental policy-setting head 
located in the office of the Prime Minister.  The President of the Re-
public stands for the country and its constitutional order much the 
same way that the President of the Court stands for the Constitution 
itself.  Sólyom and Zorkin, then, both returned as guardians of the 
Constitution, each in their own way.  They did not return as politi-
cians.   
Finally, both Sólyom and Zorkin returned as modest, humble, 
professorial, un-self-interested servants of the larger constitutional or-
der.  Sólyom’s presidential campaign consisted largely of his promises 
to be faithful to the Constitution and its principles.  Zorkin’s return to 
the presidency of the Russian Constitutional Court came precisely 
when his fellow judges were eager to have someone defend the 
Court’s constitutional independence from politics.     
In short, nostalgia and principle seem to predominate in the re-
turn to power of both men.  Nostalgia was invoked because those who 
selected them for their new positions of power chose them precisely 
because of the ways that they had defended their Constitutions in 
their previous turns in office.  But principle was invoked as well, be-
cause both men are expected not to just rest on their laurels, but to be 
active and aggressive defenders of their Constitutions in their new 
roles.  The return of Sólyom and Zorkin to public life signals a return 
of a certain form of constitutional consciousness that each man had 
stood for in the early years of the political transition from commu-
nism.   
In constitutional systems, then, constitutions need defenders, and 
the person who can be the guardian of the constitution has an impor-
tant and powerful role in the ongoing operation of constitutional 
politics.  The U.S. Chief Justice may be the head of the judiciary, and 
the first among equals, but the U.S. Chief Justice does not generally 
become the primary public defender of the Constitution.  Constitu-
tional Court Presidents, as I have tried to show, get the power they do 
from adopting that role, not from being the central figure at the apex 
of a generalized judiciary.  For all of his power, then, the U.S. Chief 
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Justice lacks a crucial capacity that gives the heads of other high courts 
a legal and even moral authority that the mere administrative head of 
the judiciary cannot match.  By being the guardian of the constitu-
tion, a constitutional court president can have more constitutional 
clout than anyone else in the political system.   
